グローバル時代の日本学研究：GJS講演会／セミナーの成果

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国際総合日本学ネットワークは、日本研究の国際化を推進する組織として、2014年４月に東京大学内に設立されました。英語名はGlobal Japan Studies Network、通称GJSです。現在は研究部門を東洋文化研究所が、教育部門を現代日本研究センター(2020年７月に設立)が、それぞれ責任をもって管理しています。

この「ブックレットGJS」は、国際総合日本学ネットワーク（GJS）での研究活動や運営経験を踏まえて、その現場から生まれた知見を記録するためのシリーズです。

1 はじめに

—— 園田 茂人（東京大学東洋文化研究所 教授）

本ブックレットシリーズの第 1 巻「国際総合日本学ネットワーク 10 年の歩み」で触れたように、GJS 講演会は現在までに 28 回（第 1 回目が 2014 年 6 月 5 日、第 28 回目が 2019 年 10 月 25 日に）実施されました。2021 年度には「アジアにおける日本研究」シリーズが開催されていますが、これを GJS 講演会に含めると、本稿を執筆している現在で 36 回、講演会が実施されたことになります。

他方で GJS セミナーは、第 1 回目が 2014 年 7 月 10 日に始まり、現在までに 75 回実施されています。

「グローバル時代の日本学研究：GJS 講演会／セミナーの成果」と題された本ブックレットは、講演会とセミナーで行われた合計 100 以上の報告から、「これぞ東文研 GJS の日本研究」と言える報告を選び出し、そのテープ起こしを報告者に手直しして頂いた原稿を収録したものです。収録する報告を 4 本（うち講演会 1 本、セミナー 3 本）と決めた上で、(1) 報告者の国籍や性別、アプローチをできるだけ多様なものにする、(2) 研究内容が日本と世界、とりわけアジアとの結びつきに言及している、(3) 人文的アプローチと社会科学的アプローチとがバランスよく選別されている、などを念頭に、講演会／セミナーを長く主宰してこられた鍾以江准教授と私が合議して決めました。

GJS 講演会についてはシニア教員の報告、セミナーについては東文研の訪問研究者を含む若手研究者（主にポスドク・博士号候補生など）の報告となっており、前者については東文研会議室で、後者については東文研 1 階のロビーで、それぞれ報告会を重ねてきました。もっとも、2020 年 3 月にコロナ禍が世界的に広がってからというもの、第 67 回 GJS セミナー（2020 年 6 月

16 日）からはオンライン開催へと移行し、現在に至っています。

本ブックレットに寄稿してくださった 4 名を簡単にご紹介しましょう。

“Transnational Communicative Networks in the Japan-Korea Solidarity Movement of the 1970s and 80s”（第 26 回 GJS セミナー：2016 年 11 月 10 日実施）の筆者である李美淑（Misook Lee）さんは、現在、立教大学グローバル・リベラルアーツ・プログラム（GLAP）の助教をされています。報告当時は東京大学大学院総合文化研究科「多文化共生・統合人間学（IHS）プログラム」の特任助教として、東文研の本郷オフィスで勤務しておられました。同プログラムをも運営していた私は、李さんにお世話になっていますが、ご報告は、2015 年に学際情報学府に提出した博士論文の一部を扱い、1970 年代から 80 年代にかけての日韓の進歩的知識人の連帯を扱った内容となっています（http://gjs.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/ja/events/post/20161110_gjs_seminar/）。

「18、19 世紀の漢文圏における相互認識と徂徠学派」（第 49 回 GJS セミナー：2018 年 2 月 13 日実施）の筆者である藍弘岳（Hung-Yueh Lan）さんは、ご報告当時は台湾国立交通大学の副教授でしたが、現在は中央研究院歴史語言研究所の副研究員になられています。ご報告の前年にあたる 2017 年に『漢文圏における荻生徂徠：医学・兵学・儒学』を東京大学出版会から発表され、この本に魅せられた当時の東文研特任助教の新居洋子さんが「是非とも台湾から招聘したい」というので、このセミナーが実現しました。徂徠学派の漢詩文と経学を通じ、中国から日本への影響だけでなく、日本から中国・朝鮮への影響という双方向の動きを射程に入れた意欲的な報告です（http://gjs.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/ja/events/post/20180213_gjs_seminar/）。

“Japan-Thai Collaboration for Addressing the Challenges of Ageing Society”（第 71 回 GJS セミナー：2020 年 12 月 22 日実施）の筆者である Nalanda Robson さんはオーストラリアのモナシュ大学でティーチング・アシスタントをされています。彼女は 2019 年 11 月～ 12 月に国際交流基金が主催した「第 2 回次世代日本研究者協働研究ワークショップ」にタイ代表として参

加し、ワークショップの活動の一環として東文研 GJS を表敬訪問した際に私たちと知遇を得ました。日本の JICA（国際協力機構）がタイ政府と進めている医療支援のプロジェクトをケースとして、政策移転（policy transfer）の力学を分析しています（http://gjs.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/ja/events/post/20201222_gjs_seminar/）。

最後に、“Japanese Studies in the Age of Globalization”（第 22 回 GJS 講演会：2017 年 6 月 14 日実施）の筆者である Patricia G. Steinhoff さんについては、もはや説明は要らないと思います。長くアメリカの日本研究を主導してこられ、現在ではハワイ大学の名誉教授をされています。日本の赤軍派の研究で学位を取られ、ハワイ大学を拠点に研究を進めてこられました。国際交流基金の委託を受けてアメリカの日本研究の状況を分析する作業もなさってきており、彼女の編集した *Japanese Studies in the United States: The View from 2012* は、海外の日本研究事情分析としては出色のものです。『死へのイデオロギー―日本赤軍派―』（木村由美子訳，2003 年，岩波現代文庫）のように、日本語でも本が出ています。長大な講演録ですが、大変にわかりやすい英語でお話下さっており、GJS にとっても勇気づけられる内容となっています（http://gjs.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/ja/events/post/20170614_gjs/）。

今回、東洋文化研究所の設立 80 周年という節目にあたって GJS ブックレットシリーズを刊行しようということになり、そこからこの講演録の刊行構想に繋がったのですが、考えてみれば、講演録は多くの情報を含む貴重な資源です。すでに講演・セミナーのリストはブックレット第 1 巻で提示しましたが、今後は、こうした研究者情報をもとにしたスピンオフ企画を考えていいのかもしれません。オンラインでの活動が一般的になり、講演録も作りやすくなった現状に即した活動が必要となるからです。

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第 26 回 GJS セミナー「1970 年代～ 80 年代の日韓連帯運動におけるトランスナショナルなコミュニカティブ・ネットワーク」

The 26th GJS Seminar "Transnational Communicative Networks in the Japan-Korea Solidarity Movement of the 1970s and 80s"

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Misook Lee (Research Associate, Integrated Human Sciences Program for Cultural Diversity, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, the University of Tokyo (at the time))

Date & time: November 10, 2016 (Thu.), 5:00-6:00PM

Venue: Lobby (1F), Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia, Utokyo

Language: English

Lee: Good afternoon. First of all, I would like to thank the Global Japan Studies network for giving me this opportunity to present a part of my dissertation. My name is Misook Lee, a research associate of the Integrated Human Sciences program for Cultural Diversity, the University of Tokyo. I'm from South Korea, and studied the Master's and Doctoral program at the University of Tokyo. Last year, I finally got the PhD degree in Socio-Information and Communication studies. I'm still working on the research topic of the dissertation to broaden the scope. It will be greatly appreciated if I can get your comments and suggestions for further development of research.

My research background is in Media and Communication Studies. From the communication studies perspective, today, I'd like to talk about the transnational communicative networks in the "Japan - Korea solidarity movement" of the 1970s and 80s. I have one question, especially to Prof. Zhong. Have you heard of the "Japan - Korea solidarity movement"?

Zhong: What do they say in Japanese?

Lee: 日韓連帯運動 , “Japan - Korea solidarity movement”. No? You haven’t heard about it. Okay.

Then, before introducing the “Japan - Korea solidarity movement”, I will briefly explain the history of democratization movement of South Korea, because it is the background of the formation of the “Japan-Korea solidarity movement” in Japan. In South Korea, after the liberation from colonization in 1945 and the Korean War from 1950 to 1953, Korean citizens have struggled for a long time against the authoritarian and military regime until 1987, when the declaration for democratization was finally achieved by the people’s power. During the democratization movement, Korean activists problematized not only the Korean military regime itself, but also the US and Japanese government, which was perceived as sharing political and economic interest with the Korean military regime under the cold war system, forming a triple hierarchical structure like the US - Japan - South Korea.

You can see the photo on the slide. This is the famous *Myeongdong* Catholic Church in Seoul. And in front of that church, you can see the students are trying to set fire to the cloth on which “Japan’s imperialism” and “Reagan (administration)” were written. The student groups and activists in Korea democratization movement perceived the US and Japan, the former colonizer, are backing the Korean military regime.

Since the authoritarian government of South Korea consolidated the dictatorship with the revision of constitution in 1972, Korean compatriots in Japan, USA and Germany have actively engaged in the solidarity movement with the democratization movement of South Korea. They also formed fluid but close networks, with the intellectuals and activists who are locals in those countries. In Japan, *Zainichi*, meaning Korean residents in Japan, whose roots are traced back to one Korea, and some of

progressive and liberal Japanese intellectuals and activists formed a civic activism called as the "Japan-Korea solidarity movement", 日韓連帯運動 in Japanese. This "Japan-Korea solidarity movement" had broad movement realm networking with various issues and groups such as "anti-Japanese foreign policy toward South Korea," "support of Korean and *Zainichi* political prisoners," and "anti-pollution exportation," to South Korea and to other Asian countries, and "anti-sex tourism," and also "anti-ethnic discrimination."

These are a few photos to depict the "Japan - Korea solidarity movement". The two in the left side are from 1974 and show people in hunger strike in a tent with a message "towards solidarity." The hunger strike was organized by *Zainichi* and Japanese intellectuals together. Those two photos in the right side are from 1980, related to Gwangju Uprising. I guess you don't know what Gwangju Uprising is. Gwangju Uprising occurred in May 1980 in the Southwestern city of South Korea, Gwangju. Initially, it begins with the demand for the lift of martial law, but reacting to the brutal repression and state violence, the massacre, the Gwangju citizens self-armed and formed commune to fight against the national army. Although the self-armed citizens were defeated, the Gwangju Uprising is known as it paved a way for the democratization movement of the 1980s. In 1980, Kim Dae-jung, a leader of opposing group, was allegedly accused of leading the Gwangju Uprising to overthrow the government, and was to be given the death sentence by the military regime. This Gwangju Uprising and death sentence to Kim Dae-jung caught an international attention as well as that of activists in Japan.

Here, you can see the girl is holding a photo of Kim Dae-jung and the man's vest says "solidarity with the Gwangju uprising." This photo shows one of rallies occurred in November 1980 in Hibiya Park and you can see there are a lot of flags. Those flags are actually from labor unions. So, you can see the labor unions also par-

ticipated in this solidarity movement.

My research question for today's talk is how voices of Korean activists were able to be heard in Japanese society, which previously didn't have much interest in Korean issues in the 1960s. Although there was social background such as the anti-Vietnam war movement and the accusation of ethnic discrimination in Japan from *Zainichi* around the end of 1960s and early 1970s, it doesn't fully explain how the voices of Korean activists reached into the Japanese society. Thus, I focused on the information exchange networks among activists beyond the national borders, especially the Christians' information exchange networks.

According to Keck and Sikkink, scholars in international relations, who proposed the theory of transnational advocacy networks, the core of the networks is the information exchange and the networks itself could be seen as a political discursive space where differently situated actors negotiate meanings for common understanding. However, the existence of information exchange alone doesn't guarantee the formation of such a discursive space for common understanding. Thus, I slightly revised their argument by incorporating Habermas's theory of "communicative action," which he sees as indispensable for the formation of a public sphere.

According to Habermas, communicative action should be based on interaction with the other, a cooperative process of interpretation for common understanding, and a reflective attitude toward one's own pre-interpreted world. Transnational networks based on these communicative elements can be regarded as transnational communicative networks. In order to investigate the formation and dynamics of the transnational networks around the "Japan-Korea solidarity movement", I conducted semi-structured interviews with former activists, and discourse analysis of the first-hand material such as movement media, leaflets, and documents produced by the former activists.

How the transnational information exchange networks were formed? First of all, there was a need from the democratization movement of South Korea for the formation of these networks. Against the South Korean military regime's control on information and media, Korean activists wanted to enlarge and amplify their voices internationally. So, they sought to form networks with oversea Koreans and foreign citizens to build international public opinion supportive for the South Korean democratization movement. Especially, Christians formed somewhat systematic information exchange networks. At that time, churches had international mobilization resources and organizational structure, and they also actively engaged in dialogue beyond the national borders.

For example, Oh, Jae-shik, the former secretary of the Urban Industrial Mission of the Christian Conference of Asia, in short CCA, resided in Tokyo. As the secretary of CCA, he established the DAGA, Documentation Center for Action Group in Asia, with financial support from WCC, World Council of Church, in Tokyo in 1973. The DAGA was located in the building of the United Church of Christ in Japan, 日本基督教団, in Nishiwaseda.

As for the background of establishment of this center, DAGA, Oh said that, in 1972, martial law was proclaimed in South Korea and the Philippines, and most Asian countries were becoming increasingly militarized. When I was in New Zealand, I heard that martial law had been declared in the Philippines. I flew there directly, but by the time I arrived, my friends were already in prison or had fled. In South Korea, the political and social tensions were also greatly increasing. When people went in or out of the country, they had to go through a body check whether they carry any political information which the military regime doesn't like. Facing these situations, or rather due to these situations, the need to let the world know what was happening in South Korea and other Asian countries grew out naturally. Then,

foreign missionaries and travelers including Japanese Christians worked as information messengers, secretly carrying information in and out from South Korea. Those underground information were brought to and shared with Korean Christians in Japan, and were further disseminated to the world.

Based on this information smuggled out, a series of "Letters from South Korea" were able to be published in the monthly magazine *Seka*i under the pseudonym of T.K. Sei. T.K. Sei, is now known to be Chi Myong-kwan, represented and delivered the voices of the repressed in South Korea, such as victims of human rights and their family members and also student activists, labor activists and so on. Regarding the production of the series, Chi later said that the "Letters from South Korea" was an international collaboration with friends in many countries, such as Japan, the US, Canada, Australia, Germany, and the UK. During the 1970s and 80s, *Sekai* not only published the series of letters, but also numerous reports and statements from South Korea with translation to Japanese in the magazine.

Underground leaflets and statements could be found everywhere in the magazine. For example, a two-page report written by Korean students during the Gwanjgu Uprising in 1980 was inserted among different articles, and ended with the appeal "if you pick up this print, please copy and distribute it to people." In this regard, *Sekai* can be seen as one of the main discursive spaces where the voices of Koreans were indirectly delivered to Japanese society.

This is another example of the delivered messages through the Christian networks. In February 1974, Japanese pastor, Iijima Makoto brought messages out from South Korea. One statement titled "messages to democratic Japanese citizens" was written by the Student Council of Seoul National University. It says that Korean society had become a heaven for foreign capital, a kingdom of pollution, and the place

for sex tourism. For them, these realities were perceived as the re-establishment of a high degree of influence by the former colonizer, Japan. They argued that Japanese democracy was closely related to Korean democracy, and urged democratic Japanese citizens to fight for Japan's democracy as a way of solidarity for the joint struggle with Korea democratization movement.

This image depicts the transnational Christians' information networks. In these networks, there were also direct discursive spaces where members meet and discuss through world, regional, and also national level of inter-church meetings. For example, the National Council of Churches of both Korea and Japan held their first-ever joint meeting in Seoul in 1973 to discuss these eight topics, Japan's neocolonial economic advance to South Korea, the legal status of Korean residents in Japan, the remained Sakhalin Koreans, Japan's Immigration Law, the Korean victims of the atomic bombing, *Yasukuni* Shrine, and sex tourism, and history textbooks. At that time, the Japanese and Korean Christians who participated in the meeting jointly declared that they would collaborate to solve these issues as those are the concerned issues for both societies.

Especially, Korean Christian women requested that the issue of sex tourism to be discussed in this joint meeting in a special session. Hearing their report, Japanese Christian women were shocked because they didn't know much about the reality on the sex tourism. So they organized a group called "Women against Kisen Kanko (sex tourism)" and formed solidarity actions with Korean women activists. Later, this anti-sex tourism developed into the "Asian Women's Association" in 1977. The Asian Women's Association was the feminist group which formed solidarity with women in Asia and contributed later to internationalize the issue of sexual slavery, comfort women, of the Imperial Japanese Army. You can see their Newsletter cover images of Volume 1, Volume 2, and Volume 3 here. They are all about Korean women's pro-

tests. In the cover image of Volume 1, you can see a woman with a black tape on the mouth. She's doing the silence protest. Actually, she is Lee Hi-ho, the wife of Kim-Dae-jung who became later the South Korean president.

This joint meeting between NCCK and NCCJ became an annual meeting since 1973. Through these Christians' networks, Korean activists and Japanese activists directly or indirectly shared information, discussed the issues, and also exchanged their perspectives and discourses. As a response to the voices of Korean activists, Japanese Christians especially from NCCJ formed a group called the Emergency Christian Conference on Korean Problems (ECC), 韓国問題キリスト者緊急会議 in 1974. The statement of establishment says the Japanese Christians were urged to form this solidarity group in reaction to Korean Christians.

It says as follows. "Since last year in South Korea, students, intellectuals, and journalists have spread protests against the Park government, the Japanese government, and the Japanese corporations. They have argued for the democratization of South Korea, establishment of human rights, and anti-subordination to the Japanese economy. A number of Christian leaders and students have also participated in those activities and also deployed their own activities. In addition, responding to the Christians in motherland, Christian youth in the Korean Church in Japan protested in front of foreign ministry, and had a 10-day hunger strike in Sukiyabashi Park, demanding the cancellation of the Korea-Japan ministerial talk. We've got shocked and received harsh criticisms and urge from their fearless struggles based on the faith. That is, the Korean political situation in which people are risking their lives is related to Japan's past colonization and current economic invasion. This problem is what we Japanese have to be responsible in front of God. With this thought, we gathered at the Emergency Conference." This is the statement of the establishment of this group.

There were also Catholic Church Networks such as the Council for Justice and Peace, 正義と平和協議会 , established in 1974 in Japan. Inside the Council for Justice and Peace, they organized the Korea committee, directly after establishing the 正義と平和協議会 . Priest Fukamizu Masakatsu, who became the general director of the Council in 1981, said that "As pointed out repeatedly by Bishop Soma Nobuo (the first general director of Council for Justice and Peace in Japan), our activities of the Council for Justice and Peace in Japan was activated through the enormous energy of the Korean Catholic bishops, students, laborers who risked their lives to struggle." It means the Catholic Church activists in Japan, they also participated in the "Japan - Korea solidarity movement," together with the Protestant Christian activists. For example, you can see the flyers for prayer meetings, 祈祷会 . It shows there were not only the Protestant group, but also the Catholic group, and they jointly held a series of prayer meetings. In the time of chanting, they sang the song "We shall overcome" in both Korean and Japanese language.

By being involved in the "Japan – Korea solidarity movement," some of the Japanese participants reflected the connection and relations between Japan and South Korea, which is historically situated from the colonial past. Yamaguchi Akiko, a member of ECC and a staff of NCCJ, pointed out that the solidarity movement allowed the consciousness in Japanese society toward past invasions in Asia to arise in more outspoken and detailed way. She said, "Even in Churches in the 1970s and 80s, there were still many people who said they had affluent lives and good memories in colonies. Although there were some people who felt guilty and thought we needed to acknowledge the victimized Asian people, they couldn't publicly talk about that. So, those people would have committed to the solidarity movement as a proof of repentance. Thus, it was through the solidarity with the struggling Koreans that the reflection on the past history between Japan and Korea was able to arise."

This reflection on the past and the calling for reconciliation with the victimized people in Asia came to be more directly expressed in mid-1980s in the "Japan-Korea solidarity movement." For example, there was the protest rally against the Korean president Chun Doo Hwan's visit to Japan. Chun Doo Hwan, the newly emerged power with the military coup at the end of 1979 after Park was assassinated, was considered as the new dictator in South Korea. In the protest rally against Chun Doo Hwan's visit to Japan in 1984, the declared statement says, "To solve the problem of Colonial past and War crimes, it should start from an apology to Koreans by the decision of national assembly based on people's will. We, against Chun's visit to Japan, in order to establish "true" friendship between Japan and Korea, based on solidarity of Minjung level, will work together with *Zainichi's* citizenship movement - such as the anti-finger printing system, and the peaceful reunification of Korea."

Later, these perspective and arguments could be seen to be connected to the Kono statement and Murayama statement in mid 1990s which officially apologize to the Asian victims. Like a response to the changes in Japanese society, when Kim Dae-jung became the president of South Korea, he took an open policy toward Japan such as accepting the Japanese cultural products which were prohibited officially in South Korea till the late 1990s.

Then I will turn to the conclusion part. As we have seen, there were information exchange networks around the "Japan - Korea solidarity movement". Through the Church networks, Korean and Japanese activists interacted directly or indirectly to share the concerned issues, perspectives, and discourses for common understanding.

In addition, the reflective attitude of Japanese solidarity activists who tried to respond to the Korean activists' criticism toward Japan led efforts to reform Japanese democracy and also efforts to reconcile with Asian people in order to overcome the

impasse of the imperial past. In this regard, I argue that transnational communicative networks can be a platform to transform regional and world politics.

For the future research projects, I'd like to investigate and research the solidarity movement toward Asia in Japan in the 1970s and 80s, beyond the "Japan – Korea solidarity movement". For example, as you can see this Thai book, published in 1979, it shows there were transnational information networks which connect South Korea, Japan and Thailand. The book is about South Korean democratization movement including the struggles and works of the poet Kim Chi-ha, but says the information was provided or mediated by the Pacific Asia Resource Center (PARC) in Japan. So, it shows there were transnational networks among activists in Asia beyond Japan and South Korea. I would like to expand the research scope including other Asian activists in the transnational information exchange networks.

As the second topic for further development of this research, I'd like to understand and analyze today's challenging environment for the legacies of the solidarity movement. When we see the current situation, I cannot help but saying that there were limitations of the networks, especially in terms of sustaining the legacies of the solidarity movement and the transnational communicative networks. I would like to trace the political and economic structural change, including the transformation of media environment, to analyze the limitations or possibility of sustaining the transnational networks and solidarity movement.

Thank you so much for attention.

Zhong: ありがとうございます。では質疑応答に入ります。

Questioner 1: May I ask one question? It is very basic one and maybe you have mentioned it but I couldn't catch it. That is about the language as a tool to communi-

cate among activists in the "Japan – Korea solidarity movement." How was it like? Maybe *Zainichi* people as well as the Koreans who can speak Japanese might have played an important role?

Lee: Thank you for the important question. At that time, elder Korean people, especially intellectuals such as Chi Myong-kwan, were able to speak and write Japanese because they got educated during the period of Japan's colonial rule. So, not to mention the *Zainichi*, many elder Korean people actually could speak Japanese. They used the Japanese language when they need to communicate with Japanese people.

Questioner 1: Isn't it the legacy from the colonial time? Isn't there any Japanese who tried to study Korean language?

Lee: Yes, there was. For example, Yamaguchi Akiko, she was the staff of NCCJ, and she committed to the issue of sex tourism with other Christian women. According to her, she attended the joint meeting in the church networks between Japan and South Korea, and she felt ashamed that she couldn't understand Korean language, and started learning Korean language in a small group with some other activists in early 1970s. After learning Korean language, she actually translated some Korean documents or articles to Japanese in the networks of the "Japan – Korea solidarity movement". So I can say that some of the Japanese activists felt or got urged that they should learn Korean language to understand the context, contents, or perspectives of the Korean people's movement.

Questioner 1: Thank you so much.

Questioner 2: Thank you very much for the interesting presentation. I have a few questions. The first question is how the reaction or reflection from the Korean side

was. The second issue is about the Christian networks. I guess there was a larger network between Japanese and Korean people. And then within that, there were Christian networks. What about the size of the networks? And I'm also curious if there was any kind of preexisting ties between the Christians before this democratization movement. In social network analysis, many people say that people have already some kinds of networks within, and then when they become politicized, the networks also become political networks. So, I was curious about the aspects of preexisting networks.

Lee: Thank you for your very important questions. Regarding the first question, I guess you were wondering the reaction and reflection from the South Korean side toward the "Japan-Korea solidarity movement". The "Japan-Korea solidarity movement" was occurred in Japan, but the networks for information exchange was transnational, connecting Korean activists and Christians in Korea, Korean Christians residing in Japan, and many other information messengers, missionaries and travelers from US or Germany and so on.

In South Korea, ordinary people didn't know much about the "Japan-Korea solidarity movement" as well as some domestic political situation due to the information and media control of the military regime. The military regime wanted to praise their policies and perspectives through the media control to get the mass support.

Reacting to this media control, a few progressive newspaper and journalists formed a press freedom movement in the early half of the 1970s. During those days, the newspapers reported the solidarity actions from Japanese citizens, especially to the press freedom struggles in 1974. You can find the articles like Japanese citizens gathered and then proclaimed a statement to support the solidarity toward the Korean press freedom movement. But interestingly, the Korean press freedom movement

rejected any financial support from Japanese citizens, and that was also reported in Japanese media like they rejected financial support from Japan like even from the individual citizen.

There were many explanations on that. But it's not just antagonist action toward Japan. One explanation is the Korean activists didn't want the "helping stance from the above", although they basically wanted to get international attention and solidarity from the abroad. Actually, there were many moments and episodes about this. For example, when Japanese intellectuals and activists came to South Korea in 1972, and met Kim Chi-ha, the Korean poet imprisoned as a political prisoner, the Japanese intellectual Tsurumi Shunsuke said "we are here to save you with the collective signatures from all over the world". Toward this "saving stance" from the above, Kim Chi-ha said that "I will add my voice to help your movement". Kim Chi-ha was one of the leaders of anti-Japan-Korea talks and treaty in 1964 and 1965. There were huge nation-wide movements against this Japan-Korea talks and treaty, but the voices and arguments of Korean activists in mid 1960s were not really heard in Japanese society at the time. Without recognizing what Japan did in the past, the treaty was signed with no apology and no reparation. So, when Kim Chi-ha heard that statement such as "we came here to save you", he might have thought the Japanese intellectuals and activists can easily fall into the hypocritic "savor" or "precursor" stance without reflecting on what their society and state had done and are continuously doing to their neighboring country. So, Kim said "your movement cannot help me. But I will add my voice to help your movement."

Tsurumi Shunsuke was surprised to this Kim's reaction. In the memoir of Tsurumi, he said he was very surprised to Kim's reaction, which was the reaction from the equal human being. This episode became spread soon among the Japanese activists in solidarity. For example, *Nikkan Renti News* in 1975 mentioned this episode in

their articles. It was spread not only through the articles in movement media and magazine *Sekai*, but also through meetings of solidarity activists. This episode gave a chance to think and rethink about the attitude when they are doing solidarity movement, like "it should be a movement to save ourselves" from the ongoing structural relation between Japan and Korea, meaning "facing the past and ongoing structural injustice in our society", which later developed into the efforts in problematizing the colonial past and reconciliation.

Of course, in the Korean democratization movement, they didn't know much about the solidarity movement in Japan at the time. But the Korean democratization movement was also a kind of people's reaction and reflection toward the ongoing imperial/colonial relation under the cold war system, which situated South Korea with Japan and US in hierarchical relationship. And, the "Japan – Korea solidarity movement" in Japan was also a kind of reaction and reflection toward this structural condition. So, the reaction and reflection of both societies is not basically same, because the relationship itself was not the equal or same. But if we can see and understand the "Japan – Korea solidarity movement" as Japan's democratization movement to reform Japanese society, forming solidarity with the South Korean democratization movement, we can broaden the relationship among Asian people in the post-colonial era, and think of the possibility of regional and global democracy from the people's movement and transnational solidarity from below. I'm not sure it's enough to answer to your first question, but when we question on the reaction or reflection of the side of the repressed, we needed to ask first where the repression was from and what it was like in the structural perspective.

And the second question was about the Christian networks. Yes, there were lots of national, regional, and world networks preexisting before 1970s. For example, the World Council of Churches, WCC, as I remember, was established in 1947. And the

Catholic churches had also networks including the study abroad system to Rome to become the bishop. So, there were lots of personal contacts and also organizational networks in Churches. As you pointed out, there were preexisting networks among Christians and also personal ties as you talked. And, when there was this kind of democratization movement or human rights violation issues, then those church networks can be deployed quickly to respond those issues by committed Christians. So, the reason that I focused on the church networks was that the Churches were able to form systematic information exchange networks with the preexisting networks for resource mobilization and ties based on the Christianity. Thank you.

Questioner 3: I was just wondering how such networks were possible? The people participating in such networks were common people or only limited number of people who were really friendly to Japan since the colonial time? I mean the Korean people who were participating in the networks was all the people or a large number of people, or only a limited number of people? And, was it really effective?

Lee: Again, the "Japan-Korea solidarity movement" was occurred in Japan. Some Japanese intellectuals and activists, and *Zainichi* formed this solidarity movement with diverse issues. And, there were information networks connecting the Korean democratization movement with oversea solidarity movement such as the "Japan-Korea solidarity movement". Thus, when it comes to the information exchange networks, there were limited number of Korean Christians and intellectuals including the Korean Christians residing in Japan. So if you are asking whether all the Korean people were participating in the information networks between the Korean democratization movement and the "Japan-Korea solidarity movement", the answer is, of course, not. In addition, those Korean Christians and intellectuals in the networks are also critical to Japanese government and its past wrongdoings like many Koreans in democratization movement. But, the Christian intellectuals and activists were able to fly oversea

to have Church meetings or to study abroad, a bit more easily compared to the ordinary people at that time in Korea. With these organizational and conditional features of Churches, although it was the limited number of Koreans, they could form the transnational information networks. From these networks, lots of information, which were the underground documents and reports from the Korean democratization movement, could be disseminated to the US, and world as well as Japan. In terms of building the international attention to democratization movement and human rights violation, I think, this kind of transnational information networks were very effective against the information and media control by the military regime.

Questioner 3: The information was disseminated to Japan and also to the US. How was it possible?

Lee: The information exchange between the solidarity movement in the US and democratization movement in South Korea was somehow mediated by Tokyo. At that time, when foreigners go to Seoul, South Korea, they need to stop in Tokyo, Haneda airport, and then transfer to Seoul, Kimpo airport. It was the same cases for Koreans. If Koreans need to go to the US or European countries, you need to transfer in Haneda airport, because there wasn't direct air way to go abroad. Nowadays we can just easily move directly from South Korea to the US, but at that time in the 1970s, the foreign missionaries need to stop in Tokyo to go to South Korea. And, in those days, the foreign missionaries who are transferring in Tokyo, usually dropped by the United Church of Christ in Japan, 日本基督教団. There, they meet other Christians including Korean Christians, and then were asked to work as information messenger. At that time, in the building of the United Church of Christ in Japan, the office of NCCJ is located, and inside of NCCJ, there was ECC office. In addition, the offices of CCA (Oh Jae-Shik) and Korean Christian Church in Japan were also located in the same building. With personal contact and ties, Korean Christians in Japan asked

foreign missionaries who are transferring to South Korea to meet Korean Christians and activists in South Korea and bring underground information back to Tokyo. Those were disseminated to the US and other countries through transnational human rights or church networks. Of course, there were also foreign missionaries residing in South Korea, and they also disseminated the underground information from South Korea directly to US and other countries, and also to the international human rights organizations.

Questioner 3: What's the attitude of the South Korean government to this kind of solidarity movement?

I guess, South Korea, Japan, the US all have the idea of separation of state and church, and no interference to the politics of other countries. Were the governments aware of such movement, and what about their attitude?

Lee: Yes, of course they were aware, and they didn't like it. In terms of South Korean government at that time, they perceived this kind of oversea solidarity movement as interfering actions to influence power over the Korean domestic politics. So, basically, they didn't like it. Japanese government also knew, and they didn't like it. Japanese government, under the US – Japan relations, put more emphasis on stability in the peninsular than the democratic values. So, Japanese government formed close relation and connection with Korean military regime, backing the repressive attitude of the military regime, as in the case of Gwangju Uprising. So, Japanese government also regarded the solidarity movement or networks as interfering actions to the foreign politics, like what the Korean military regime argued. However, some activists in the solidarity movement argued that this is not interference. Rather, they argued the interference was already occurred in the cold war system and Japan has already deeply involved in Korean politics, by supporting the military regime and helping the people repressed. So, the solidarity activists argued that their action is to

make their government not to interfere and repress Koreans. This kind of perspective was also found in Korean democratization movement. Korean activists criticized the Korean military regime, but they also criticized the Japanese government in terms of its neo-colonial attitude. So, the Korean activists called for the joint struggle, meaning the Koreans would fight for Korean democracy, so the liberal Japanese people fight for Japanese democracy. That is the way to have joint struggle. This was from the document of Korean student activists, who were calling for solidarity to the liberal Japanese people.

So, when there was solidarity among states in the cold war system, and these connected powers pressure and suppress people from the above, the peoples beyond national borders also can react and form transnational networks from the below to fight against and resist this kind of structural power on them.

Of course, the governments didn't like such movements. But, I guess, even in the solidarity movement, some activists might have felt reluctant to speak out political issues related to other countries. However, since the solidarity activists gradually perceived the issues raised by Korean democratization movement toward Japan were also deeply related to their society and themselves, they interpreted their solidarity actions are for urging the Japanese democracy.

Questioner 4: Do you think it is possible today to see that kind of solidarity movement? From South Korea to Japan to help or support?

Lee: In Japan, people have witnessed the rise of historical revisionism and the efforts of deny the colonial past. For example, the Japanese government recently tried to deny the Kono and Murayama statement. And many historical problems are still remained unsolved in terms of recognition, interpretation, education, and concrete

measurements for reparation and so on. Those issues are, like what the solidarity activists argued in the 1970s and 80s, the issues of Japan's democracy. Although the transnational information exchange networks of the 1970s and 80s have dissolved, we have lots of communication channels among Korean and Japanese civic groups. And, there are still solidarity actions among Korean and Japanese activists, and sometimes there are international actions beyond Japan and South Korea. However, I don't think there will be the same movement exactly in the same way, because the solidarity movement in the 1970s and 80s was situated with the cold war system, the political and economic structure at the time. But, with the legacies of the solidarity movement, when there is calling for solidarity to South Korea from the Japanese activists, such as in the movement against the historical revisionism or other issues, then, there will be the solidarity movement from South Korea and also from other countries.

Zhong: Let's have probably one more short question, before we conclude.

Questioner 5: You said that the political and economic structural background in the 1970s and 80s situated and made the "Japan-Korea solidarity movement" possible. At that time, Taiwan was also experiencing the same democratization movement, almost in the same time. So why wasn't there "Japan-Taiwan solidarity movement". What's the difference between Taiwan and South Korea?

Lee: I haven't researched the solidarity actions in Japan toward Twain in terms of democracy and human rights in the 1970s and 80s. So, my answer could not be the right answer. But, the first aspect that I can think of is the transnational information exchange networks between Taiwan and Japan. In terms of Korean case, there were not a few Chrisitan Koreans residing in Japan as mediators, who were able to connect Korean Christians and activists in South Korea with Japanese Christians and

activists in Japan. In addition, there were not a small size of *Zainichi* Korean community who were concerned the Korean political situation. Some *Zainichi* people formed organizations like *Hanmintong* and many *Zainichi* individuals committed to the solidarity movement as translators.

Questioner 5: So, the key factor here is *Zainichi* ?

Lee: Rather than the existence of *Zainichi* itself, I think, the existence of the transnational networks. Probably, Taiwanese Christians or Taiwanese activists have formed this kind of transnational information networks and solidarity movement in the US. However, I am not sure this kind of transnational networks and solidarity actions were formed in Japan at that time. I need to look at more.

One factor that I might question is whether the Taiwanese activists perceived Japan as an influential country to their government. The United States is the influential country, so the activists perceived the US as the leverage to pressure their own government. That was the same case to South Korea. However, when it comes to Japan, because Japanese government and business had deeply involved in Korean political and economic situation, meaning close ties with Korean military regime, Korean activists perceived Japan as one of important leverages from which the Korean government would be affected. So, they urged to change Japanese foreign policy toward South Korea, not to support or back the military regime. I am not sure whether this kind of situation was also found in the Taiwanese democratization movement.

Questioner 5: If you call a movement, it should have a comparatively remarkable size. Nowadays, there are information exchange activities among Chinese and Japanese, but I can hardly see there is a movement such as the “Japan - China solidarity movement”. So, what’s the difference between Korea and other countries?

Lee: Again, the "Japan - Korea solidarity movement" is not a movement between South Korea and Japan. It's a movement occurred in Japan, but with the transnational information exchange networks in the background, which were connecting the Korean democratization movement and the oversea solidarity movement. There could be many factors which made the solidarity movement in Japan possible, like *Zainichi* Koreans, colonial and neo-colonial relation in the cold-war system and so on. And of course, the solidarity movement was not majority in Japan at that time. In terms of size, the Japanese mass were indifferent, and the solidarity movement can be seen as comparatively small size. However, they used the term, 日韓連帯運動 ("Japan – Korea solidarity movement"). In terms of China, I guess, the Chinese activists or Chinese democracy movement is not yet formed into the critical mass to call for the solidarity from Japan or other countries. When there is the critical mass and the voices of calling for solidarity, the preexisting networks of information exchange could be politicized. I don't have much background knowledge about Taiwan and China here to answer the question, but I hope to learn more.

Zhong: If they called themselves a movement, then it's a movement from a historical perspective. Well, I really hate to stop the discussion. But we're running out of time. Let's thank Dr. Lee for the very fascinating presentation. Thank you for all the questions.

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第 49 回 GJS セミナー「十八、十九世紀の漢文圏における相互認識と徂徠学派」

The 49th GJS Seminar "Mutual Perceptions among the Chinese Character Cultural Sphere and the Sorai School"

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Hung-Yueh Lan (Associate Professor, National Chiao Tung University, Taiwan (at the time))

日　　時：2018 年 2 月 13 日（火）16：00 ～ 17：00
会　　場：東京大学東洋文化研究所　大会議室（3 階）
使用言語：日本語

藍：みなさん、こんばんは。今日は「十八、十九世紀の漢文圏における相互認識と徂徠学派」というテーマをめぐって、報告させていただきます。

ご存じのように、荻生徂徠は江戸時代に生まれた儒者としてはおそらく最も有名だと言えましょう。彼は寛文六（1666）年に生まれました。幼少時の名は伝次郎でしたが、のちに徂徠を号として、また物茂卿と自称するようになりました。徂徠の父たる方庵は町医者として生計を維持していましたが、将軍徳川綱吉に召し出された後、「御側医師」を勤めるようになりました。しかし、延宝七（1679）年、方庵一家は江戸から追放されることになりました。徂徠は家族と共に田舎の南総（千葉中部）で、追放生活を送っていました。元禄五（1692）年、彼は二十六歳ごろに江戸に帰って貧乏な町儒者（塾の先生）として生活していました。その時に、『徂徠先生医言』などの著作を書きました。この時期、貧乏な生活を送っていたので、落語でおなじみの「徂徠豆腐」という逸話も残されました。概要は、増上寺の門前に店を構えていた豆腐屋七兵衛は、貧しい徂徠に豆腐の差し入れを続けましたが、やがて徂徠はその近辺を離れた後、七兵衛も徂徠を忘れました。しかし、後に七兵衛の豆腐屋が火事で焼かれた時、徂徠は出世していたので、恩返しとして七兵衛にお金を差し上げたというような話です。面白いことに、この話は後に、台湾の殖民地時代の修身科教科書に、美談として取り上げられました。

柳沢吉保に召抱えられた後、徂徠は武士の教育のほかに、『孫子国字解』と『呉子国字解』（未完）などを編集しました。そして、宝永二（1705）年、彼が四十歳ごろの時期に破産した蔵書家から大量の書籍を一括購入して、明代中国の文人たる李攀龍と王世貞の詩文集を読み始めて古文辞を学ぶことを決意しました。宝永六（1709）年、将軍綱吉の死に従い、吉保が隠居するようになり、藩邸内の学校も閉鎖されました。従って、徂徠は退隠して、茅場町宅に移居して蘐園塾を開きました。その時に、徂徠は『読荀子』『読韓非子』を書き、諸子学をも研究するようになりました。さらに、正徳元（1711）年に、岡島冠山を招き、訳社という唐話講習会を開き、唐話をも学ぶようになりました。のちに、享保二（1717）年、彼が五十二歳ごろの時期に、『弁名』と『論語徵』『大学解』『中庸解』など経書解釈関係の著作を書きました。後に、政策論関連の『太平策』『政談』を書きました。

そこで、徂徠の漢文論に注目したいと思います。彼の考えでは、漢文の背後には中国語と日本語などとの差異のほかに、漢文文体としての雅俗などの差異もあります。まず、漢文は中国語だけではなく、日本語で読むこともできます。すなわち訓読です。漢文を訓読することは漢文を受け入れた現地の読み手の音声言語（言）によって書記言語としての漢文（文）を読む行為です。音声言語間の通訳とは違います。そのため、訓読は、成立当初においては、漢文文意の理解を助ける口語の日本語による解釈でもあります。しかし、仮名と和語がすでに創出された江戸時代に生きていた儒者にとって、訓読は漢文内部の漢字解釈の次元に止らず、漢文の背後にある異なる言語体系との間の翻訳とも捉えられます。ですから、彼らは中国人がそれほど意識していない文法の問題に直面しやすかったのです。

そのため、荻生徂徠は訓読という漢文を読む方法を批判した一方で、「故学者先務、唯要其就華人言語、識其本来面目。而其本来面目、華人所不識也」（「題言」『訳文筌蹄』）とも述べました。そこで、徂徠は二つの重要なことを発見しました。一つは、訓読で漢文を読むことは翻訳にほかなりません。それは「靴を隔てて痒きを掻く」の感をもたらしました。もう一つは、中国人

自身はかえって中国語の「本来面目」を知らないという指摘でした。つまり、訓読で漢文を読む日本人も、華音で漢文を直読した中国人も、同じく自らの話す音声言語の言語秩序・世界観に閉じ込められています。このように、彼は漢文の背後にある中国語と日本語の差異、古代中国語と現代中国語の差異などを認識するようになりました。

さらに、徂徠の観点から言うと、雅文学としての漢文文体には古文辞と唐宋古文などの差異もあります。経書は古文辞で書かれたので、古文辞を学ばないと経書を理解することはできない、と彼が主張したわけです。それに対して、俗文学としての漢文を理解するために、白話小説、唐話を学ぶ必要もあります。そして、訓読を批判した徂徠は、その代わりに所謂「崎陽之学」（唐話学）を薦めました。そのために、彼らの唐話学の講師たる岡島冠山も『唐話纂要』（1718）、『唐訳便覧』（1726）、『唐音雅俗語類』（1726）、『唐話便用』（1735）など、文士向けの唐話学習用教科書を作りました。これらの教科書は、長崎の唐通事が使う『訳家必備』と比べると、貿易用語に加え、白話小説に見られる白話も多く使われています。白話小説が唐話教育に使われていただけではなく、多くの白話小説が和文に翻訳されました。岡島冠山はさらに、軍記物語の『太平記』を白話小説の文体に翻訳して『太平記演義』を著しました。

しかし、唐話にも実際には様々な方言があります。つまり、外江話〔南京話［官話］、杭州話］、福州話、漳州話などがあります。徂徠は一体どの方言を学んだのでしょうか。それはおそらく杭州話あるいは南京官話ではないかと言われています。面白い点として、私は最近気付いたのですが、朝鮮王朝から北京に行く朝貢使、つまり燕行使は中国に朝貢に行っていましたが、彼らは実際、北京に行ったのです。そして、燕行使のある人物もまた通信使として日本に来たことがあります。面白いことに、このような人物は日本で岡島冠山と中国語で会話したこともあります。つまり、朝鮮通信使と日本の文人は筆談だけではなく、中国語で話したこともあります。これは『雞林唱和集』というような通信使関係の資料の中に記録されました。ただ、通信使が

話した中国語は北京官話です。岡島冠山ができた言葉は南京官話です。その時期の南京官話と北京官話にどれほどの差があったか、私も分かりませんが、二人は何とか通じたらしいです。もちろん北京官話は、実は南京官話に基づいて発展してきた言葉ですが、北京あたりの方言にも影響されました。とにかく、これはちょっと面白いことではありませんか。二人の中国以外の人が日本で中国語を話しました。

徂徠の話に戻りますと、徂徠は一体どういった言葉を話したか。これは実際、それほど重要な問題ではないと言えるかもしれません。というのは、徂徠にとって官話、つまり中国語を学ぶ目的は漢詩文を読み、また作るためです。それは唐話、中国語を学んで中国人とコミュニケーションを取るためではありません。現在のわれわれが外国語を学ぶのとは異なる問題意識をもって学んでいました。

『唐話纂要』の序文には、唐話の学びは読書と作文と大いに関係があるというような考えが載せてあります。これは多分、徂徠学派の共通認識だと思います。そうであるから、徂徠の弟子たる太宰春台は「華語トハ中華ノ俗語ナリ。今ノ唐話ナリ。サレバ文学ニ志アラン者ハ、必唐話ヲ学ブベキナリ」(『和読要領』)とも述べています。また、大典顯常は「華音を兼習ふて文学の助となることは甚多し、凡そ字音の字義にあつかること多く又文句の脈絡節奏華音を知に因て發明すること多し」(『初学文談』)と述べています。

ただ、そう思わない人もいます。江村北海は「学業ハ成就スル事ニテ、音ノ異同ハアヅカル事ナシ」と述べています。さらに面白いことに、帆足万里という人はこのように言っています。帆足万里は「今観通唐音者其文之紕繆自若、則作文之不與唐音也亦明。能通唐音亦費数年之力、以学文則其糜棄歳月也甚。……設使人々可與唐人対語、恐非国家立防之道。是余之所以不取唐音也」(『修辞通』)と述べています。彼の意見では、国防の観点から言うと、民に唐話を学ばせるのは危ないことです。それは、つまり民が中国語を話せるとスパイになる可能性があるではないかという発想かもしれません。これは民がキリスト教に騙される可能性があるというような心配と似ているので

はないかと思います。とにかくこういう考えもあります。

さらに言うと、詩を作るためには唐話と唐音、中国語を学ぶだけでは足りません。原瑜は「今の唐音モ正音ノミニハ非ズシテ謬レル音甚多ケレドモ、ソレハソレナリニ稽古シテ、稽古略々成就ノ上ヘニテ、諸韻書ニ就テ是ヲ正セバ、其誤リハ自カラ瞭然ト明カニ知ル�々モノナリ。唐音学ト韻鏡学トコモコモ攻メ、互ニ磨シ相和シテ共ニ進メバ、声韻ノ学不日成就スベシ」(『過庭紀談』) と述べています。彼の考えでは、漢詩文の音韻を学ぶために、やはり唐話を学ぶべきですが、それだけでは足らないので、『韻鏡』のような音韻学の著作を読むべきです。つまり、唐話学と韻鏡学両方を学ぶ必要があるというような考えもありました。

とにかく一時期、唐音、唐話を学ぶ必要があると考える人も結構いました。江戸中期では、『古文孝経音釈』(太宰春台)、『四書唐音辨』(朝岡春睡、享保七年刊)、『大学講義　附唐音』、『唐音学庸』(岡島冠山、享保一二年刊)、『九経音釈』(坂本天山)、『孝経全文音釈』(坂本天山 寛政一二年序)、『五経音釈』(種野友直)、『春秋左伝古字奇字音釈』(後藤芝山、延享三年)、『書集伝音釈』(鄒季友著、昌谷精溪編、弘化四年刊)、『論語音釈』(中村中倧)、『世説音釈』(恩田蕙楼、文化一三年刊)、『三体詩唐音』(岡島冠山、享保十一年)、『唐音世語』(宝暦四年？)、『唐詩選正声唐音付』(石川金谷)、『華音唐詩選』(岡島冠山、享保十年刊)、『辛丑元旦詩集』(岡島冠山) など、唐音で注釈された経書と詩集が刊行されていました。そうして作られた詩集とか経書もたくさん残されました。私が知っている限り、これらの本を研究した人は、まだいないのではないかと思います。興味がある方は、どうぞ研究してください。

ところで、中国語を学ぶべきと考えていた徂徠は中国人に対してどう思っていたかといいますと、これはよく知られた話です。荻生徂徠の考えでは、中国人は中国人ですが、中国人みんなが文章を書けるわけではありません。つまり、徂徠は唐話の学びを薦めましたが、唐通事の文学に対しては、批判をしました。彼は「朝鮮来聘、此方学士借声譽於其人。近来亦漸覚其非、則走崎陽以獲華人一題跋、渠詫曰它特外国耳、豈若華人乎。華人誠華人矣、然

華人皆能文章､則二十一史何須文苑」(「與平子和」『徂徠集』) と述べています。つまり、彼は漢文を書けるという観点から一般の中国人を見下している感じがします。そして、長崎の唐通事が中国語を話せて偉そうな振る舞いをすることに対してちょっと嫌がっている感じがします。

彼の弟子たちも同じです。太宰春台は「長崎人不足畏也。……惟二三舌人、因習象胥、略識文字、為可與言耳。厥詩下調、厥文俚語。若問経術、則曰祖述程朱。夫如是､何畏之有。非惟長崎人之不足畏､雖諸夏人客長崎者亦不足畏。蓋彼皆賈豎､否則樴師柁工､即略有識文字者､乃市井書手､僅供契券簿暦之役､亦何畏之有」(「送赤里子蘭之長崎序」『春台先生紫芝園稿』) と述べています。このように、太宰春台が言った言葉なのですが、長崎に来た中国人はおおよそ商人、あるいは船の労働者ですから、少し文章が分かっても、それは契約を書くためだけの知識です。長崎の唐通事だけでなく、長崎に滞在する中国人のことも、恐れる必要はない、と彼は言っています。

もう一人、大潮元皓も同様のことを言っていますが、彼は「予故曰崎人學華而日遠於華也。其所為宛然倭人面目矣。假令所修乃特譯士之業耳。其先人所傳世世子孫習之以為生亦何知焉。故崎之學一華音足矣。一華音足矣、則何以能文乎」(「贈大生維篤序」『西溟餘稿』) と述べています。長崎の唐通事は中国語はできるが、漢文はできないではないか、というふうに言っています。だから、彼は自分が優れた素晴らしい漢文を書けるという観点から、一般の中国人のことを言っています。そして、当時日本に来られる中国人は大体があまり学識のない貿易商人です。これは朝鮮通信使とは、ちょっと違います。

それでは、中国に対して徂徠はどういうふうに見ていたのでしょうか。これも話すと話は長くなりますが、非常に簡単に徂徠の観点から言うと、彼は「唐虞三代、聖人用教之邦、而鞠為胡土」(「二火弁妄編序」『徂徠集』) と述べています。すなわち、聖人は中国で生まれたのですが、今はいわゆる胡土、夷狄が統治する土地になっている、というのです。もちろん、江戸時代では、いわゆる明清交替は、よく華夷変態の観点から見られていました。だから、徂徠だけではなく、おおよそ江戸の文人とかはそういうふうに見ています。

そして、徂徠学派学者の観点では、やはり清朝から夷狄になったのではなくて、秦漢の時からもう駄目になっていくというか、駄目になっていたということになります。

一番露骨に言っているのは、多分この平野金華ではないかと思います。彼は「清者何也、西戎敗周、五胡偪南、遼金蒙古韃滿代明、乃掃先王郁郁之文而為淳維畜牧之政、我道塗炭斯文晦食莫極焉。以渠視我東方至治之極、鄰國相望、雞狗之聲相聞、民至老死而不相往來。是以清之與我臭味亦異」(「与玄海上人書」『金華稿刪』) と述べています。彼から見ると、秦漢以前の時期、つまり周王朝は西戎に倒されたことがあります。秦漢以後も何度か遊牧民族に侵略されました。だから、昔の優れた中華文明は全く一掃されて、なくなりました。そして、そのような夷狄としての清朝とは全く付き合いたくない、と言っています。彼の言っていることは非常に露骨ですね。後に服部南郭もこれと類似したことを言いました。ただ平野ほど露骨ではないです。服部南郭は「彼邦三代之道一壞、秦漢以後國勢大非也。以天下供一人、故驕淫之主相繼於上、……且量其地勢則夷狄相接、四郊盈壘、邊圉之策、歷世講之、而不能禦其侵犯」(「贈熊本侯序」『南郭先生集』) のように述べています。つまり、中国の統治した領地は夷狄と接触しているから、何回も侵略されてきたので、古代の文化はもうだいぶ前になくなってしまったのだ、と指摘しました。

そういうことなのですが、ただ、徂徠学は清朝自体のことを、必ずしも夷狄としてのみ見ているわけでもありません。徂徠ではないですけれども、徂徠の弟の北渓は吉宗の命令を受けてたくさんの清朝、明朝の本を研究して、そういう報告書をたくさん書きました。『集政備考』、『則例類編』、『則例全書』、『大清会典』など、清朝法律と政治制度に関係する書籍を集め、そしてこれらの書籍を研究し、「集政備考目録」、「則例類編目録」、「則例全書目録」、「明朝清朝異同」、「明清異同にて料簡書」、「大清会典巻之六～十三」、「六部尚書考」、「大清会典巻之四十八」、「清朝官職目録」、「清朝官職」などの文章を著しました。その中で、明代と清代の制度がどういうふうにつながっているか、あるいは違うかを詳しく説明しました。これは非常に面白いと思います。

荻生北渓は制度改革の観点から、宗室制度、貨幣制度、戸口制度などをめぐって、明朝と清朝の制度の異同を論じています。その類似面としては、例えば儒学の観点から、明朝の漢民族政権と清朝の満洲族政権がともに、貞操を守る婦人を道徳模範として表彰していることを挙げています。差異面としては、明朝の宗室が爵禄を持ちながら、官職に就くことができず、才知を持つ宗室の人材が活躍できなかったのに対し、清朝の宗室は政治参与が可能であることを指摘しています。祭祀制度の面においても、明代が元太祖だけを祭るのに対して、清朝は元太祖のほか、元世祖と遼太祖、金太祖、金太宗をも祭っています。しかも、蒙古の親王に特別に俸禄を与えることによって篭絡せんと図っています。北渓の考えでは、これらの制度から、漢族を抑圧するための深意を読み取ることができます。このような報告書と徂徠が関わっているかどうかは分かりませんが、これらの文章において、彼は恐らくある程度徂徠の意見などを受け入れた上で、清朝制度に対してかなり鋭い指摘をしています。

ただ、『建州女直之始末』という本がありまして、この本は確かに徂徠が手入れをしました。それには「建州ノ夷ハ元ヨリ剛強ニシテ、シカモ早ワサナリ生附ナリ。馬ヲ馳猟ヲ好崖壁ニ上リ下リコト飛カコトンシ。馬ニテ江河ヲ渡シテ舟ヲ用ヒス……建州ノ夷ハカリハ水陸ニ達者ニシテ、江河大海ヲ隔ルコトナキユヘニ、其大將死スンハ中國の禍絶ヘカラスト云ウナリ」とあります。このように、北溪は、清朝の前身たる建州女直は「武を好む風俗」を持ち、彼らが陸上だけではなく、水上でも馬で川を渡って攻撃することができるほどの軍事力を持っている、と認識しています。ただ、これは実際に彼が書いたものではなくて、多分、明末の『経国雄略』という本を直接に翻訳したものです。だから、彼はこのような明末、つまり鄭成功のお父さん、鄭芝龍の軍隊が清朝を理解するために書いた本、そういうものを踏まえてこのようなものを書きました。従って、この見方が北渓の考えを反映しているかどうかはちょっと分かりません。徂徠はこういうふうに思っていたかどうかも分かりません。ただ多分、彼はそれなりに現実の清朝を冷静に見ていたと

思います。

先程いろいろ言いましたように、徂徠は中国をあまり評価していない立場ですけれども、しかし、彼は明代古文辞派を非常に高く評価しています。明代古文辞派も難しいですが、近代以後の個性、フィクションを重んずる中国文学思想史の叙述では、明代古文辞派は重視されず、およそ独創性がなく、模倣と剽窃といった文学手法ばかりを説いた文学流派として、否定的に評価されてきました。非常に簡単に言うと、彼らは「文は必ず秦漢、詩は必ず盛唐を範とする」という考えなのです。つまり、それぞれの成熟期の漢詩文を模範としてその詩と文の「辞」と「法」（文法）を模倣、習熟すべきだというような考えを持っています。そして、徂徠は「六経辞也。而法具在焉。……降至六朝辞弊而法病、韓柳倡古文、一取法於古。其絀辞者、矯六朝之習也。……李王二公倡古文辞亦取法於古。其謂之古文辞者、尚辞也。主叙事不喜議論、亦矯宋弊也」（「答屈景山第一書」『徂徠集』）と述べています。同時代の宋学、宋代の経書解釈、あるいは詩文に対して否定的に見ているのですね。徂徠は、このような明代古文辞派の文学を踏まえて朝鮮通信使のものを否定的に見ているのです。

時間がありませんので、少し簡単に言うと、徂徠は「芙蓉白雪の色」を持つ徂徠学派の擬盛唐詩は通信使らが作った宋調的な詩より優れていると、見ています。つまり、彼は自分の弟子、山県周南が「芙蓉白雪の色」を持っていると、まるで阿倍仲麻呂の再来であるかのような評価をしています。阿倍仲麻呂は李白の友だちですから、江戸時代の文人にとって歴史上のスーパーアイドルのような存在です。とにかく彼は、こういう観点から自分の弟子の詩を褒める一方、朝鮮人の詩は宋詩らしく俗っぽいとか、俚語を使ってるとか、そういうような批判をしました。要は、彼は明代古文辞派の観点から、つまり宋学を見下すような観点から、通信使の詩をちょっと揶揄しているというか、そのように見ているのですね。このように、彼の批評には朝鮮に対する日本の「文」における優越意識が読み取れます。

しかし、通信使には通信使の見方があります。これも有名な話ですが、申

維翰は「日本人求得我国詩文者、勿論貴賤賢愚、莫不仰之如神仙、貨之如珠玉。即舁人廝卒目不知書者、得朝鮮楷草数字、皆以手攢頂而謝。所謂文士、或不遠千里而來待於站館。一宿之間、或費紙数百幅、求詩而不得、則雖半行筆談、珍感無已。蓋其人生長於精華之地、素知文字之可貴、而與中華絶遠、生不見衣冠盛儀、居常仰慕朝鮮。故其大官貴游、則得我人筆語、為夸耀之資。書生則為声名之路、下賤則為観瞻之地。書贈之後、必押図章、以為真蹟。每過名州巨府、應接不暇」（「附聞見雑録」『海游録』）と述べています。彼の理解では、日本人はわれわれ通信使が作った詩を非常に珍重して宝のように思っています。そして、日本人は精華の地に生まれて文字の貴重さを知っています。それは恵まれている点ですが、しかし彼らは中華とは少し離れているので、中華と接する朝鮮を非常に羨ましく思っています。申維翰は、そういうふうに徂徠とは全く違う見方をしています。もちろんこれは朝鮮中華主義の発想があると思いますが、その他に、彼は日本が朝鮮と同じ文化圏、同文圏の人と見ています。つまり、文字のありがたさとかを知っています。そういうような意識を持っていると思います。太宰春台の本を読んでも、そういう意識を持っています。朝鮮と中国は、やはり同じ文化圏の人というふうに見ています。だから、筆談できます。

そして、面白いことには、先程も言いましたように、通信使は中国へ朝貢に行ったりしていたのですが、南のことはそれほど知っていませんでした。彼らが知っていたのは、日本は鎖国しており、中国に朝貢はしておらず、中国と外交関係は持たないが、南中国から本などをいろいろ輸入している、ということです。そのことは通信使も意識していました。ただ彼らは、江戸時代の日本はなぜそんなに文学が発展したかという点について、やはり中国、南京あたりの本がたくさん輸入されているからではないか、というふうに見ています。そういうふうに彼らは理解しています。

だから、申維翰は「日本人與余対坐酬唱者率多粗疏、遁塞、語無倫序。或見其橐中私藁、時有一句一聯之最佳者、観席上所賦全是天壌。余意南京海賈每以書籍来販於長崎島、故順治以後、江南才子之詩集多在日本、而為我人所

以未見者。則彼或暗偸狐白、而取媚於秦姬者歟」（「附聞見雑録」『海游録』）と述べています。一方、朝鮮通信使は、日本人はわれわれほど中国らしくないから、日本人が作った漢詩は平仄を間違えていることが結構多いとか、そういうふうに見ています。そして、面白いことに、彼らから見れば、筆談現場でお互いに詩を詠うときに、日本人の詩は実に粗っぽいのですが、別れる時にお互いに送った詩文は事前に書いたものですから、そのほうがよいのです。ですから、申維翰は次のように考えています。彼は「余意南京海賈毎以書籍来販於長崎島、故順治以後、江南才子之詩集多在日本、而為我人所以未見者。則彼或暗偸狐白、而取媚於秦姬者歟」（「附聞見雑録」『海游録』）と述べています。彼の考えでは、そのような詩文は恐らく、われわれ朝鮮人が見られない江南地域の文人が作ったもので、日本の文人がそれを盗んで作ったものではないか、というふうに疑っています。このような発想は、むしろ非常に面白いのですね。すなわち、日本の文学が発展しているのはやはり江南地域、中国の地域の文学発展のおかげであるというふうに、彼は見ています。ちなみにこの部分は、『海游録』の日本語訳としては最も使われている平凡社東洋文庫のバージョンには収録されていません。私が読んでいるのは、『海行摠載』という叢書に収録された漢文のバージョンです。

しかし、徂徠の観点から言うと、朝鮮通信使はやはりすごいです。というのも、彼らは選ばれてきた人ですから、当然すごいと徂徠は思っています。そして、春台の言っていることはもっと面白いのです。春台が申維翰に送った「奉送朝鮮製述青泉申公序」という文章があります。朝鮮通信使と唱和した日本各地の文士の多くは通信使たちが詩を作る速さ（「善詩与其敏捷難當」）を賞賛しているのに対して、春台によれば、古代中国の礼楽政治の視点、「賦詩言志」という伝統においては、外交の場における「賦詩」は主として「雅頌の言を誦む」べきであり、詩作の多さと早さなどを競争するのではないはずです。つまり、春台の考えでは、外交の場で詩を吟唱することは、やはり礼のためですよね。だから、誰のスピードが早いか、正しいかとか、それを競うわけではありません。朝鮮通信使はそういったことを自慢しているので

すが、それは実は礼に合わないのではないか、と春台は述べたのです。

あまり時間がありませんが、最後の部分を少し説明します。当時、日本は鎖国していますから、日本人が中国とか朝鮮に行くこともあり得ないですが、日本の学者が書いた本はだいぶ輸入されていました。どういう本が注目されたかといいますと、やはり考証学者の人々は、考証学の性質を帯びたものに興味を持っています。

荻生徂徠の著作たる『論語徵』、『大学解』、『中庸解』『弁名』、『弁道』、『徂徠集』のほかに、『論語徵』を収録した『論語徵集覧』と太宰春台が書いた『古文孝経』『論語古訓』『論語古訓外伝』『詩書古伝』、及び山井崑崙が編集した『七経孟子考文補遺』と根本遜志が編集した『論語集解義疏』などが輸入されていました。これら徂徠学関係の著作において、主として『七経孟子考文補遺』、『論語集解義疏』、『古文孝経』及び徂徠の『論語徵』は多くの清儒に知られるようになりました。そして、徂徠の『論語徵』を実際に読んだ人も何人かいました。一番有名なのはやはり『論語正義』を書いた劉宝楠なのですけれども、一番たくさん『論語徵』を引用したのは、『経句説』を書いた呉英です。呉英は、徂徠の孟子批判に対して非常に不満を持っています。これについて私は、東アジアならではの観点から徂徠学を見るときのポイントになるのではないかと思います。つまり、東アジアのいわゆる朱子学批判者、例えば伊藤仁斎とか戴震とか、朱子学を批判しても孟子は信じるというか、孟子の議論に依拠しています。しかし、徂徠学の特徴は、孟子そのものを批判していることです。孟子こそ「聖人の道」を誤解させたというか衰えさせた張本人というような解釈をしています。この意味で、徂徠学派の見方は、東アジア儒学史の観点から言うと非常に特徴的なものです。

さらに言うと、朝鮮にも徂徠学派の著作が朝鮮通信使によって持ち帰られましたが、その他に実は、清朝を経由して徂徠学の著作が読まれました。例えば金阮堂、この人は、清朝で阮元を通して『七経孟子考文補遺』を読んだことがあります。そして、金邁淳という朝鮮の文人は、春台の『論語古訓外伝』を読んだことがあります。面白いことに金邁淳は、春台の主張は阮元の「性

命古訓」の議論と似ているのではないか、というふうに言っています。ただ、阮元は孟子を批判しませんでしたが、春台は批判したんですね。そこは違っています。さらに言うと、清朝の梅曾亮という人が、何かのルートを通じてこの金邁淳の話を読んだのですが、「金邁淳の言っていることは正しい。孟子まで批判した徂徠・春台は異端だ」というような考えを示したのです。このように、日本の外部でも徂徠学に関する議論がありました。かなり珍しい例ですが、一応ありました。

私の考えですが、荻生徂徠は孟子まで批判しましたから、彼の弟子による経書の解釈は一応読まれていたのですが、思想史の観点から言うと、清朝の知識人たちに何か特別な影響を与えたことは実はないのではないかと思います。つまり一応、彼は外国にも知られていますが、何かの思想史的な影響は多分ないと思います。

最後、結論に入ります。私がこの講演で言いたいことは、漢文圏つまり東アジアの視点から言うと、漢文は一見するとみんな同じように見えますが、かなり違います。その背後には、文体の観点から言うと古文辞とか唐宋古文の差違もあるし、中国語、日本語、朝鮮語とか、あるいは中国の中でも近世とか古代の言葉があります。そして、いろんな方言があります。これらの差違によってさまざまな基準が作られます。

そして、荻生徂徠は彼なりの、つまり、古文辞学の基準で同時代の日本知識人を見るだけではなく、同時代の漢文圏の国々のことも、こういう観点から見ています。他の国の知識人もまた、彼らなりの観点から、日本の学問を見ています。その意味で私は、18 世紀と 19 世紀の漢文圏の知識人は、全部ではないですが、一種の同文意識を持ちながら、そういう競争心でお互いに実は蔑視している時もあるのではないか、と思います。講演はここまでということで終わります。ご静聴ありがとうございました。（拍手）

園田：ありがとうございました。ちょっと時間は短いのですが、あと 10 分ぐらい質疑応答の時間がありますので、特に結論についてご意見のある方はフロアのほうからどうぞお願いします。

松方：東京大学史料編纂所の松方と申します。私は、漢文は実は全然できなくてオランダ語の蘭学の研究とかをしているのですけれども、文法とか話し方が違うということを指摘されたのですが、その中から文法に対する意識みたいなものは、それなりに出てくることが見られるんでしょうか。ちょうど 19 世紀の初めぐらいに志筑忠雄という人がオランダ語の文法の研究というのをだんだん始めるのですが、そういうものからの影響は見られますでしょうか。

藍：徂徠は確かに漢文の背後にある文法を意識しています。だから、そういう研究もありましたけれども、蘭学者のああいう方法論は実は徂徠学から影響を受けたのではないかという研究もありました。荻生徂徠は、漢文は漢文として見ているだけではなく、その背後にある言語の存在も意識しているから、現代の言語学のような感じで一度分類して解釈しようとしています。その枠組みは現代の言語学と違いますけれども、中国のいわゆる文章、文章理論の書に関係する本を学びながら自分なりに分類していたのですね。そして、蘭学者はそれを一応参考にしてそういう方法論を書いたのですね。それは誰か名前は忘れましたけれども、論文がありました（この問題については、岡田袈裟男『江戸の翻訳空間―蘭語・唐話語彙の表出機構』（笠間書院、1991 年［新訂版 2006 年］）、大島秀明「蘭文和訳論の誕生：志筑忠雄「蘭学生前父」と徂徠・宣長学」（『雅俗』18、2019 年）などをご参照ください）。

松方：ありがとうございます。

園田：他はいかがでしょう。僕は社会学を勉強しているので、差違が存在しているというのは非常に面白いのですが、複数の差違の中でどれが一番重要な、自と他を分ける文体になっているというようなことは分かりますか。

藍：これは人によって違うのではないかと思いますが、重要なのは、徂徠は単に日本語と中国語の差違ではなくて、漢文の中のいわゆる古文辞と唐宋古

文とか、そういった差違もかなり意識しています。しかし、徂徠研究の中で一部の人は、これを単純に日本語と中国語の差違というふうに見ていると思います。ただ実際は、荻生徂徠はやはり、長い歴史を持っている漢文史の中に自分も位置づけて、物事を考えていると思います。だから、古文辞と唐宋古文の差違は非常に重要な差違だと徂徠は見ていると思います。

園田：ということは同じように競争心、蔑視している、つまり、自分よりも低く見るという論理も、あるいは、誰が誰に対して蔑視を持っているかということも、状況が相当違っていた。

藍：そうですね。つまり、ひとつのケースで見ると多分、非常に微妙な状況が出てくると思います。ただ、単純に先程の私の講演内容から見ると、そういう考えが出てきました。

質問者：園田先生の質問に少し似ているのですが、こういった差違が生まれてくるというのは、要するに誰に対して話をするかという部分で、それぞれの国の、例えば漢の人、あるいは日本の人が誰に話をするかという部分での質問なのですけれども、要するに彼らが差別意識とか、そういうものを持つときに読者・聴衆として想定しているのは、自国民だというふうに解釈していらっしゃいますか。それとも例えば、中国の人が徂徠を評価するときに、日本人に語りかけるみたいな部分はあるのか、ないのかという。恐らくないのではないかともちろん思うのですが。

園田：今日のお話は相互認識とあります。相互とは本当にインタラクションがあったのか、モノローグ、つまり、相手に伝えるつもりは全くないものの集積だったのかということなのです。

質問者：そうですね。

藍：相互認識といっても、実際に私が言っていることは知識人に関する話ですね。徂徠のコメントが引用された本には『問槎畸賞』というものがあります。これは、通信使の詩文をよく使用したりする、そういう本なのですけれども、それは内部向けのもの、日本人だけに見せるものです。朝鮮人に見せるものではないです。そして、申維翰の『海游録』もまた、朝鮮人のために作られ

たものです。日本人のために作られたものではありません。それが近代になると、研究対象としてみんな読むようになりました。申維翰は実際、外交の場で和気藹々な言葉を用いるというか、そのように対応していますけれども、国に帰るとやはり自分の見方が出てくるのではないかと思います。

荻生徂徠の『問槎畸賞』という本には、当時の唱和詩、つまり日本の文人と朝鮮通信使の唱和詩の中で、徂徠学派のものはなぜかほとんど収録されていないのです。このことに対して徂徠は何か不満を持っており、では自分で作りましょうというか、こういうものを作りました、そういうこともあります。だから、その内容は徂徠学の見方を非常に強く反映しています。

園田：他はいかがでしょうか。小島さん、時期的に多分最も適したパートナーの１人ではないですか。

小島：まあ、はい。専門の方は他に大勢おられますけれども。茫漠たる言い方になりますが、秦漢以降を否定するというのは、それこそ宋学、朱子学なんかそうですけれども、その延長線上で今度は、徂徠たちは宋代の思想とか文学も否定します。この関係性というのは、どういうふうになりますか。

藍：荻生徂徠の考えでは、中国は秦漢以後だんだん遊牧民族に侵略されて、魏晋南北朝時代などもあり、それで昔のものはだいぶなくなりました。そして、仏教も出てきました。徂徠はそういう観点から、宋学そのものは、そういった夷狄の要素、あるいは仏教の影響を受けたとか、そういうふうに言っていると思います。だから、先生のご専門のように、背後には仏教的な形而上学といったものがあるから、昔の三代の聖人の教えとは異なる、そういうふうに徂徠は見ていると思います。それが私の理解なのです。

園田：では次に、新居さん。

新居：今の宋学に関するご質問とちょっと関係があるかもしれないのですけれども。藍先生のご著書でも、宋学批判ということが、古文辞学に向かうときのすごく重要なキーポイントのひとつになっていると思うのですが、そのときの宋学をどういうふうに理解したらいいのか。つまり、徂徠が実際に見ていた宋学とはどういう宋学なのでしょうか。

私も知識はそんなにないですけれども、例えば宋代の理学と明代の理学にはかなり異なるところがあるかと思います。徂徠の著作を見ていると、明代の理学とは意外と影響関係があるのではないかなと思えるところもあったり。明代の理学というか、同時代の理学については例えば影響があったりしないのですか。もちろん批判はしていると思いますけれども。

藍：これはちょっと難しいところですね。僕の言っている宋学はいわゆる儒学の宋学だけではなく、徂徠の観点から言うと唐宋以後、だんだん古代と違うものが発明されたのですね。そういうものは宋代で一応完成されて宋学になっています。だから、儒学だけではなく唐宋古文とか宋詩といったものも明詩に影響を与えました。そういうものは、宋的、宋の雰囲気を持っています。例えば仏教の影響を受けたとか、語録の言葉を使うとか、そういった宋学的なものと見ています。

そして徂徠は、同時代の明代についても古文辞学以外は――もちろん彼は王陽明のことも知っていますが――あまり評価はしていません。簡単に触れただけです。そして、明代の他の知識人については、例えば顧炎武などには全く触れたことはありません。だから、古文辞とは何かというのは、自分も非常に悩んでいますけれども、私が言っている宋学は、普通の人が言っている宋学、儒学思想史の観点からの宋学とは少し異なります。朱子学者が使っている文学とか、あるいは彼らの詩も宋学に含まれています。

私がなぜそのように見ているかと言うと、それは徂徠から見るとそうなっているからです。その観点から言えば、そういうものは全部宋学になっていると思います。ただ、もちろん徂徠の著作をひとつひとつ見てゆくと、彼が言っている宋学は実は儒学のことを言っている場合があると思います。

園田：承っている話だと、この後に何かインフォーマルなミーティングがあるようでございますけれども、多分他にもいろいろあるお話は、そちらでやっていただくということになると思います。それでは1時間になりましたので、藍先生へ、大きな拍手をお願いいたします。（拍手）

4

第 71 回 GJS セミナー「高齢化社会の課題に取り組むための日本タイ協力：政策移転のダイナミクス」

The 71st GJS Seminar "Japan-Thai Collaboration for Addressing the Challenges of Ageing Society: The Dynamics of Policy Transfer"

ナランダ・ロブソン（モナシュ大学 教育助手（当時））
Nalanda Robson (Teaching Associate, Monash University, Australia (at the time))

Date & time: December 22, 2020 (Tue.), 4:00-5:00PM
Venue: Online via Zoom
Language: English

Zhong: Hello, everybody. Thank you for coming to today's Global Japan Studies seminar. My name is Zhong Yijiang, I am the host of today's event. Today we are very glad to have Nalanda. Dr. Nalanda, you've got your PhD?

Robson: I haven't, nearly, almost. So, next year I will finish.

Zhong: Okay. So, Nalanda Robson from Monash University, Australia, to give a talk on Japan-Thai collaboration. Well, Nalanda, will you introduce in more details of your research and presentation?

Robson: Okay. お願いいたします。I will now share my screen, just one moment everybody. My name is Nalanda Robson. I'm currently third year at Monash University, PhD Student, and my PhD topic is Japan-Thai Collaboration for Addressing the Challenges of Ageing Society: The Dynamics of Policy Transfer. So, I'm currently in Australia. It's 6 p.m. in Australia at the moment, so it's dinner time. It's very good to be here. Thank you for having me and I'm very honored to be talking about my PhD, for you all. It is still very much a work in progress and by next year I think I should be able to finish it, so late 2020, due to all sorts of interruptions this year and

being unable to travel, et cetera.

My topic of discussion today is research that explores the transfer of Japanese ideas, Japanese programs and initiatives, from Japan to Thailand in the context of solving Thailand's ageing population challenges. So, the main case study that I'm going to show you today is JICA, Japan International Cooperation Agency, a program called Seamless Healthcare program and how it is transferred to Thailand, a Thai hospital in Bangkok called Ratchaphiphat Hospital. This program goes for five years, from 2017 until 2022, aimed at rehabilitating elderly patients. So, this is a collaboration between JICA and the Hospital and it's a case study that really illustrates how policy transfer works in a real case scenario. I think my thesis is unique because it is multidisciplinary. It involves demography studies, it involves Japanese studies, it involves Thai social studies and, of course, policy studies with the policy transfer. So, it's a real intersect of four different fields.

Before launching into the case study itself, I want to briefly explain how I stumbled upon this topic. It was like a little happy accident. I went to Bangkok at the age of 25, I go there every year actually because my mother is from Thailand. In 2017, at the age of 25, I attended a symposium, a very interesting symposium called the Japan-Thailand Joint Symposium: People and Cultural Exchange for Our Future. It was a really brilliant symposium, like I said, and my eyes were opened to the many really concerning issues about Thailand's already ageing society and further it was heading towards this super-aged society that Thailand was about to become.

And many policymakers were there, think-tanks, researchers, spoke about their frustration at the lack of action by the Thai government to prepare itself for a transition that really is going to happen within 20 to 25 years. What you can see here on the left is Japan currently and Thailand is looking very similar, but in the next 20 to 25 years. Almost like fortunetelling itself. It's replicating itself like Japan. So, it's

quite clear to me that back in the year 2017, not many Thai people actually understood what was going to happen. There was certainly not enough media coverage on this and the younger generation weren't aware of what is going on with the ageing population issue. So, a lack of information for retirees as well. Actually my mom's friends, for example, were generally very confused about nursing home situation and what their future might look like. And that's a concern, real concern of the Thai people in their 60s, in their 70s, as well as 50s. So, this is a matter for the entire nation and is a very timely topic I think, that's why I chose it.

The speakers at this symposium urged for more researchers to come on board their journey to help bring out other aspects about this issue and do publications and that sort of thing. So, I decided to take up on their recommendation and begin my own little research on Thailand's ageing population. Some researchers at this symposium also suggested that maybe Thailand should really be looking at other countries and what other countries are doing. For example, neighboring ASEAN countries, looking especially at South Korea, Japan, for example, and Thailand should try to find out what kind of successful solutions and even draw on the lessons of Japan's experiences.

So, whatever is happening in Japan right now is like fortunetelling. So, it might also happen in Thailand in the near future. So, again, this is where I decided to narrow down my research to find out what kind of collaborations are happening right now between Thailand and Japan, whether it be on a kind of governmental level, whether it be business to business level or even at the individual level. And so, I decided to take on the governmental level because it's quite clear JICA is doing a lot of work in Thailand. So, this is saying that Thailand is borrowing or emulating certain ideas or policies from Japan and I am analyzing the process, the actors, and the implications of doing so from the framework called Policy Transfer.

So, let's talk a little bit about this framework. This policy transfer framework was developed by David Dolowitz and David Marsh, two people called David, to explain why and how policy transfer happens. So, let's just read the definition for a second. 'Policy transfer is the process in which knowledge about policies in one political system is used in the development of policies and administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political system.' So, basically taking something from another political system like Japan, implementing it in Thailand, for example. So, this term is very much a catch-all umbrella term. Lots of other scholars actually use similar terms like bandwagoning and policy convergence, for example.

So, actually the concept of policy transfer is a little bit misleading also because of the word 'policy' in there, although the name suggests that policy transfer involves policy-related subjects. It is not limited to non-governmental transfers. It can be extrapolated to talk about rhetoric or foreign concepts or strategies or inspiration and that sort of thing. So, not just about policy itself, but also can be about entrepreneurship and that sort of thing. So, quite a wide and board thing to talk about.

So, the framework is based on these questions here. So, who are the actors of policy transfer? There are people involved obviously. What is being transferred? From where are lessons drawn? What is the purpose of the transfer? What is the degree of transfer? So, there might be a voluntary degree or coercion going on. And what is the context of the ideas articulated? And what is the anticipated long-term effect or consequence of doing so? So, this is the framework that I use my data to gain some answers. So, this is the particular case study that I will be talking about.

This is Japan International Cooperation Agency, from now on I will use the word JICA, and I will later introduce Ratchaphiphat Hospital, which is located in Bangkok. The program that belongs to JICA has a very long name, it says Seamless

Health and Social Services Provision of Elderly Persons Program, also known as Seamless Care or S-TOP. It is to facilitate hospitals with intermediate care in order to help the elderly recover from stroke, to rehabilitate them from spinal cord injury, traumatic brain injury. These are three very prominent disorders among the elderly in Thailand and S-TOP and then [ph] in the elderly, which in turn will allow them to return as active members of society, as able bodied individuals. And this is his vision. This is Mr. Akio Koide, the director of S-TOP who is explaining this. I had the opportunity to interview him several times from 2018 through to 2019. So, this is his vision, to envision a second chance for the elderly because there is a time period in which the body of an elderly person can actually recover if given the right training and the right kind of exercise, to not just recover, but potentially could come back to society in whatever capacity, to volunteer or to do something, but still be of use in society, may be even get a job. But this is the kind of hidden resource in Thailand that is being lost and being discarded because of the lack of facilities.

So, these pictures here are taken last year with the permission of families and hospital staff, this is me. Unfortunately, my camera isn't working today, I apologize for that. That's me, I'm doing hospital visits and home visits with the hospital staff here. So, this is a nationwide program that is being implemented in eight pilot sites all across Thailand; so north, north-eastern part of Thailand, central, northwest and southern provinces. I'm only doing one particular hospital in Bangkok because it's close to where I was staying at the time. Okay, so, S-TOP first began in 2017, as you can see here the signing happened between the ministry of public health, that's the official signing, with JICA and it is planned to end in 2022.

So, essentially JICA is transferring their knowledge in this program to eight pilot sites and I am concentrating on the Bangkok one. For some of you in the audience, you might be thinking, 'well, doesn't Thailand already have some kind of

rehabilitation system already?' And the answer is absolutely, yes. Thailand does actually have a very long history of rehabilitation, massages, and Thai massage is very, very popular and famous. However, it is very expensive in Thailand, mainly targeting the high-to-middle income earners in Bangkok, mainly focused on serving the middle-aged working people who, may be, need rehabilitation for a car accident, a car crash, office syndrome and that sort of thing. And there is no particular system in place for elderly people, certainly not affordable rehabilitation specifically for the elderly. So, it's very timely. It is necessary to have such a system put in place, especially as Thailand is one of the fastest ageing countries in ASEAN. So, the hospitals will need a specialized ward, a proper system put in place and the elderly people obviously need it, but their families need it also.

Let's have a look at the recipients. So, Ratchaphiphat Hospital is located in Bangkok, first built in 1996, located on the outskirts of Bangkok actually. It is located two hours west of Bangkok, close to the border of another province called Nakhon Phanom. The land was donated by a very wealthy family and actually the abbot, a monk, was actually the first person to start building and collect funds to build the hospital. So, it is very much a community hospital, built by the people. Its grassroots connection is very, very strong. This is one of the main characters that make this hospital quite famous in the area. The hospital serves people in four – sorry, five areas, in Bang Khae, which, unfortunately, I was not able to include in this map; Nong Khaem, here; Thawi Watthana next; and Phasi Charoen, as well as Taling Chan. All of these areas are low socio-economic areas. They are poor, cannot afford rehabilitation.

So, from interviewing the nurses at this hospital, they described that there is an increase in elderly admission at the hospital from these areas in particular, especially when the elderly seem to be living alone. It seems like the younger generations are

leaving these five areas to go to work two hours away in Bangkok, the capital. So, we're beginning to see a glimpse of the family structure decentralized and family members are separated due to working opportunities and urbanization. Now, let's have a look – oh, sorry, this is the team that I had to interview, this is back in 2019. So, they have a very small team, but very much connected to the community.

Let's have a look now at the actual model that is being transferred. This is the S-TOP intermediate care roadmap, the model that JICA is transferring into this hospital. So, this diagram here was given to me by Mr. Koide as a draft of what the program might look like and there are errors, as you can see, to represent the pathway for the elderly patient once admitted to the hospital. And this is a roadmap that was adapted from the Japanese version, a real working model that is actively being used in Japan, has been adjusted slightly for Thailand. As you can see, it's all written in the Thai script for the nurses and the doctors to understand. So, it's important that what you see here is called intermediate care.

So, intermediate care means that it is ongoing. It pans throughout from the very beginning, that's why it is called seamless, you see. So, they're using this word seamless to illustrate this point that it is almost invisible to the patient, invisible in that there is no starting, no stopping the treatment. It exists until the very end-of-life stage or fully recovered stage. So, I'm going to take you through a little bit.

So, the first is obviously admission to an acute care hospital. So, let's say the elderly patient has a fall or have a stroke and they are admitted to the hospital. This is a rather larger kind of hospital in the city and they are, after being treated for acute care, the condition of the body is now stable, it is no longer an emergency anymore and the elderly patient is transferred to a second-tier hospital or the community hospital, which is Ratchaphiphat Hospital and this is where rehabilitation kind of starts.

This is where the JICA experts come in and try and help the second-tier hospital become more advanced. If the patient responds well they usually can go home. So, this is a picture of him, the elderly patient at home. The doctor assesses by looking and measuring what's called ADL.

So, I'm going to show you very, very briefly, ADL, this is Activity of Daily Living. If the patient can walk, if the patient can turn over in bed, if the patient can eat on his own/on her own, if the patient can go to the toilet, can get dresses on his own/her own, then they can go home. So, essentially this is followed up by home visits, as you can see here in the bus. This is a home visit by doctors, a team of doctors actually, not only to look at the patient's wellbeing, but to assess the house. So, they're looking at the steps, the road, pathway that needs redoing; the tiles and the floor, make sure they are non-slip, et cetera. So, these are some of the photographs that I took of the home visits.

So, up to 10 to 12 people actually visit in these home visits, so a lot of people actually. There are student doctors, junior doctors, occupational health therapists, and other specialists there. This is a really, really new concept for Thai doctors to be doing this. It's not really their role to go to the house, but now they are in a situation where they have to go to the house and have a role in commenting on what – they actually need to go to the home and do recommendations on new furniture, railings, steps, and that sort of things. So, this is all learnt through the S-TOP program by the JICA people, quite incredible actually, I think.

And the reason why you may be needing a lot of people in the house, as you can see here, is also because S-TOP program tries very much to stop people relying on the hospital. They're trying to stop dependency on the hospital resources. They're actually training someone in the home, the daughter, the niece, the son, anyone, any-

one at all in the family, to take care of the elderly properly. So, that's why there's a whole team of people there.

If the elderly person lives alone, then they call up the neighbors. They actually go and knock on the neighbor's door and say, 'hey, come and have a look, come into the house and learn how to change oxygen tank; learn how to take mucus out of the lungs; learn how to do procedures during an emergency, if there is an emergency'. So, all of this kind of knowledge needs to be passed on to someone else in the community because as Thailand becomes an ageing population, there is more and more elderly people who need that help and there isn't enough doctors and nurses to go around to everybody. So, this is relieving pressure from the hospital resources. This is something that Mr. Koide actually mentioned to me as well, it's taking ownership of your own recovery and independence to not rely on the hospital. So, S-TOP program is a good example of mixing the existing services like volunteers in the community and JICA is giving additional recommendation to enhance these services.

So, let's just keep moving along. Actually Mr. Koide stressed this quite a bit. There are more pictures here of the elderly person demonstrating that he can walk. The gentleman in the glasses, in the middle there, he commented on the floor and how the floor is a little bit too slippery. There's also a lady in the background there, on the right-hand side, wearing the red shirt, who is the niece, who had been trained by this team to change the oxygen tank and that sort of things. So, it's very much an actively working group. And Mr. Koide also stated that 'I believe that the volunteering community in Thailand is still very good and very strong system, and I think this is the asset, that's a great asset for Thailand and it's a difficult thing to find in Japan right now'. And I think he is correct because in Thailand we have a very good network of community, our neighbors know each other, neighbors know exactly what's going on with each other and we can lean on them. As Mr. Koide is trying to say,

we should lean on this asset, a cultural asset, that we have and try and bring them on board with the medical procedures.

Okay, so, this brings me to explain briefly about the data from the interviews. I interviewed them in Thai, English, and in Japanese. This is a semi-structured interview, open-ended interview that occurred between 2018 and 2020, before the coronavirus actually started to appear in Thailand. So, these stages is very important. During the interviews I was a bit – I was able to identify three stages of policy transfer. Stage 1 is the initial adoption. Stage 2, Japan training, which means that every nurse and doctor and board directors, everybody in the hospital actually had to go to Japan and have a look for themselves what S-TOP is about.

There's also the action plan and implementation where everybody comes back to Thailand and tries to implement S-TOP in the hospital themselves. So, I think it is important here to also note that this is really a very long process. It's an ongoing process of negotiation, changing the program again and again, pivoting. The first stage took almost two years, just from the first stage of initial adoption from 2017 all the way to 2019. They haven't really done anything in this time period and so, this is not as simple as a copy-and-paste scenario at all. It's very long, very complex and then lots of talks and negotiations. So, this is the very first stage, talks, negotiations, conferences; more talks, more negotiations, more conferences.

In the initial stage the head nurse actually spoke to me and she said, 'Let's talk about what would happen if S-TOP didn't come to the hospital.' She gave me a scenario that said, an elderly man in his 60s was presented to the hospital with pneumonia and he was admitted for two weeks to be treated for his condition. He recovered fully from pneumonia after the two weeks and was able to return home. However, there was a new, very concerning set of problems, that appeared over the two weeks

and that was that he was losing muscle in his limbs and as a result he became bedridden, immobile and so, his predicament rested in the hands of his children, whether they would choose to take care of him or not or place him in a nursing home.

And although the treatment of the initial illness was successful, the unintended effects had left the patient completely immobile and reliant on everybody. So, she said to me, it's like the hospital doesn't care when the patient's ADL level drops. While they're in the hospital, it's a problem, but they get sent home anyways because the initial illness had been cured. So, this is a real problem that occurred, which also means that, let's say, patient had a stroke and they had some kind of recovery, but then they go home and they may have a fall again. So, they come back to the hospital, they go home, come back to the hospital, it's almost like a cycle that these nurses have to deal with. She also mentioned that 'Initially we didn't have S-TOP at the hospital, and the elderly patient might get better after being treated, but they will return home disabled and their relatives might also readmit them back into the hospital asking for more rehabilitation or they may choose to put the patients straight back into a nursing home where they become very immobile and they don't do anything.'

Let's have a look at the second stage of transferring S-TOP now, which is the Japan training. This stage means JICA funds for the educational trips, two-weeks, and it is one of the most essential parts of this process actually, the learning process, which requires them to actually be in the country, look at the hospitals, to see for themselves what S-TOP is really about. This is typical of most JICA projects actually and it's the main component is for them to bring trainees from Vietnam, from the Philippines, from Burma, from abroad, to come to Japan before implementing the real project in their home country. So, this is all funded by JICA of course, two weeks, twice a year, board of directors, doctors, everybody, take turns to be in Japan. They go through talks. This is a small part of their itinerary that I was able to get,

where they go to Saku General Hospital and they learn about the grassroots communities there.

Some of the comments by the participating nurses that I interviewed said that the Japanese staff members at the hospital really emphasized the benefits of introducing intermediate care immediately after the acute phase. This is quite important intermediate care can prevent the patient from becoming bedridden and the patient can maintain muscle mass even while they are recovering from another disease, something like pneumonia for example. The nurses were taught – 'The Japanese people taught us that a plan is needed from the get go, to have ready a plan in place from the beginning of the hospital cycle.'

Another comment is that the way the doctors and nurses do home visits in Japan is very different from Thailand in that at Ratchaphiphat they conduct home visits to examine the condition of the home, but in Japan home visits go even more detailed than that. They examine the distance of the patient's home to the workplace. They look at the condition of the road, how long it takes for the patient to commute to shops and that sort of things. These details are very new to the concept of what a Thai doctor has to do. So, it's a very eye-opening experience in Stage 2.

Let's have a look at Stage 3 now. Stage 3 shows that every participant returns to Thailand to create an action plan and implement some ideas of what they've learned at Ratchaphiphat Hospital. An action plan is basically a form that they have to complete. Unfortunately, I don't have the example of a form here, but they have six building blocks that they have to fill out, and in doing so they write it in Thai, then they translate that into English and send it off to JICA to be corrected, to have feedback, and then they do a meeting. This is an ongoing process that goes through every trimester. They have meetings and more meetings and more forms to do. So, cases

presented for intermediate care at Ratchaphiphat Hospital involves mainly the elderly recovering from a stroke and within this group there seems to be a problem. So, a very large proportion show slow recovery and inconsistent physical improvements after rehabilitative training due to depression or dementia.

So, it seems like after the feedback and after all the forms that they've done, about halfway through 2019, almost at the end of 2019, they come to me and I ask them what are some of the issues that you're seeing that is unexpected and JICA did not expect also. The head nurse presented this case to me that as most patients with dementia also suffer from a degree of depression, it is very difficult to tell it apart, to distinguish which symptom belongs to what.

So, while the patient with dementia shows some improvement with the rise in ADL, so activity of daily living, after rehabilitation, this is only very temporary and so they seem to not be able to retain the memory of what they were taught during the training process. And so, without being able to demonstrate that they can reproduce these activities of maintaining physical needs like going to the toilet, eating by themselves, drinking, getting dressed, the patient is sent home. And I asked her, why are they being sent home? Her answer was that obviously there's not enough beds available to keep these patients for longer than a month and it seems that in these cases the family also has enough resources to take the patient home. However, at this point further complications can occur.

Further complications means that there is a cycle of hospitalization after a fall, again they have to go through this whole training and rehabilitation process that would take months and months, which takes up the resources of the hospital yet again. So, they're trying very much to cut this vicious cycle, try very much to not also have the patient go back to a nursing home, but return home fully functioning.

However, with patients with dementia or showing signs of a mental health issue, it's very difficult for them to recover fully. So, what do you do? And this is the current problem at the moment, of 2020.

Let's have a look at another scenario; a completely different kind of scenario that the head nurse told me. 'We usually talk to the relatives beforehand about our goal that in one month the patient would be able to walk again. But once the patient achieves this goal, the relatives worry about what would happen to the patient returning back home, who can look after the patient as well as the doctors and nurses can at the hospital. They start to negotiate for a hospital extension. So, it seems here that the family members themselves are experiencing a level of anxiety and feelings of incompetence. They're feeling overwhelmed and unprepared to deliver the same kind of care as the doctors themselves.' With this logic, they are requesting an extension of up to two weeks as they feel that the patient is safest in the care of doctors.

However, Ratchaphiphat Hospital has very limited space and resources as you can tell from the team, it's a small team. Bed availability is very small as well and so, hospital stays extension are only reserved for very, very special cases and they mostly decline and have to take the patient home. Nevertheless, the general tendency is for the family members to persist for the relative's extension on the return date and some of them don't even pick up their parents from the hospital. This is a very, very big problem that they are seeing since about January of 2020, so this year. They're starting to see people leaving their parents at the hospital, which causes a lot of confusion for the patient himself or herself, because they have done all of this work to come to a point where they can walk. They've done all the training that they needed to do. They've completed all the goals and then they're not picked up, they can't go home, something has happened and there's a lack of communication. So, this causes a little bit of trauma that goes on with the patients themselves and the nurses have to

deal with not just the physical rehabilitation, but now the mental rehabilitation of the patient themselves. So, there's a lot of work, a lot of layers goes on in this process.

And several reasons can occur because of this. It can be a feeling of reluctance for their relations to return home. There's a phrase in Thai, which is **'หมอเป็นเวาดา'**, (hĕn h̄mx pĕn thewdā) which means that people see doctors as 'devas.' They see the doctors as being almost like a godly being in a godly realm so they leave it up to the doctor. But at the same time, they are unable to professionally deal with their own parents when it comes to care. So, they're feeling overly worried about not being their best care for their ageing relatives and it's a very sensitive issue in the Thai culture as well because we place a lot of emphasis on filial care and there's a lot of pressure on female members, of the family especially. There's a rising sense of expectation for the daughter to care for their father-in-law, the mother-in-law, as well as the children, also work, all at the same time.

So, when negotiating the return date, relatives who do pick the patient up, seem to display a little bit of mental health issue themselves, such as depression and anxiety. The head nurse also discussed other underlying reasons that might be going on, such as the relative works really far from home, in the city, in Bangkok, and are unable to care for their aged relatives and so on. However, these reasons relating to work or lack of time are often not discussed. So, it's a very secretive, sort of under the carpet issue, as the relatives are afraid of being judged, viewed badly by hospital staff who are, of course, seen as these great beings. Relatives fear being judged for prioritizing work over taking care of the aged relatives. There's also another probably underlying issue in this and that is money. Most nursing homes costs quite a bit in Thailand and there's a lack of them in the outskirts of Bangkok at the moment. So, that is one particular issue that I didn't list here on the screen.

Another particular problem that also came up is that dementia and depression cannot being picked up by ADL. So, ADL is the measurement of activity of daily living that nurses and doctors really concentrate on when patients are doing rehabilitation. But when it's regarding mental health issue measures for these illnesses do not show. So, they have to go through some kind of adjustments in the measurements there as well. So, let's have a read of the head nurse's another anecdote here. 'The elderly patient seems to experience more anxiety, especially when it comes to their relationship with family members, during the rehabilitation, while patients experience anxiety and depression, it is a real struggle. Sometimes, to try and fix this, we bring in a psychiatrist to diagnose, to prep the patient mentally first, but even if we diagnose the patient, it's also usually connected to the mental health issues of family members at home and that is not something that we can fix. In the end, the patient eventually needs to go home, but within a month or two they come back because their ADL has dropped, which means that they go home and they might have had a fall or cannot walk, cannot talk anymore and they need to come back for another round of rehabilitation.'

Let's go through some of the discussion points and a bit of the conclusion. I can see from the time here that I'm losing a bit of time. The challenge now is to analyze how successful S-TOP is and I am doing another chapter on that at the moment actually to answer how well the program has performed so far. We also need to understand that the program is still on its way. So, it is a five-year program. It is currently 2020, they do have another two years to go and this is going to be an ongoing process even after 2022, even after JICA pulls out its resources, Ratchaphiphat needs to deal with this on their own, with their own strategies as well.

So, there seems to be an underlying mental health problem in the diagnosis of not only the patients themselves but the family members and this is a real obstacle

to the program as they need the human resources of the house, of the community, of the home for this S-TOP to run smoothly and be successful, as you can tell from the diagram of sending the people home. At the home visits they are trying to train people in the community to get much more efficient system going. So, I think S-TOP is struggling in that issue. It is also important, like I said, to understand that this is an incomplete process and that technical assistance is going as far as 2022, but Ratchaphiphat needs to handle this on their own once the training wheels are off.

So, another dimension of this is that JICA tend to focus on the physical rehabilitation more than the mental and psychological rehabilitation of the patient and it seems like the JICA team don't seem to pick this up from the very beginning and therefore, it is creating this undesirable self-perpetuating cycle of being re-hospitalized. This is costing resources for both the families and the hospitals themselves. There also appears to be an issue of human resource deficiency, as you can tell from the team. It's only a handful of people there in such a hospital with such a broad area, five huge areas that they need to cover and only really a handful of staff members there. So, I think they need to find more resources to cover that, not only the rehabilitation, but, as I said, for mental assessment as well.

So, in conclusion, I think it's important to understand that ageing population itself, having more elderly people living longer, none of these things that we have talked about are actually a problem, but it is a challenge. They become problems if the infrastructures we put in place for a younger population cannot fit the purpose of serving the older population as we can see here happening in Thailand, especially in the outskirts of Thailand. In the capital city, it's a very different kind of environment with younger people, but there are not enough resources flowing into these hospitals. With the lack of human resources, we have to prepare to make some kind of switch and that is a problem at the governmental level.

So, by planning early, like what JICA has done helping since 2017, we give ourselves times to adjust and experiment, which is what Ratchaphiphat has done. Thailand is additionally challenged by its own economic and fiscal capacity to sustain an older population and so, it is well worth our time to have a look at what is being collaborated, the borrowing of the ideas, as you can see here in three stages and see whether culturally Thailand could adapt these strategies before time runs out, as I suggested earlier, 20 to 25 years, before we become a super-aged society like Japan. So, that is my conclusion. I hope we can do a bit of discussion after this. Thank you very much for listening to my talk.

Zhong: Okay, thank you, Nalanda, for the detailed introduction of the S-TOP program. So, let's open the floor for questions. Anybody can share comments and questions. I can start by asking a very simple question. Is this hospital the only case of the program, of the S-TOP program specifically?

Robson: So, they're only doing these in hospitals, that's correct. So, throughout Thailand, in the north, northeast, in the southern provinces, in Bangkok, eight pilot programs, all in hospitals. Small hospitals in the outskirts and sort of like the underdog hospitals, the second-tier community hospitals that they're concentrating in.

Zhong: Okay, so the hospital you introduced here is one of those underdog hospitals?

Robson: That's right, yeah. That's correct.

Zhong: Okay. It seems there are more obstacles, problems, than successes.

Robson: Yes, it does seem like that and in the initial stages it seems to be very smooth, it seems to be a smooth sailing kind of process, everyone's learning, ev-

eryone's so excited with the budget of going to Japan and seeing as if 'Oh, we have a roadmap, we just go back to Thailand and implement it. We have some facilities, let's try it.' But when they really did try it in 2019, it was very quick that they saw that the immediate problem was not just the physical rehabilitation, but it was mental, there was mental health there and that was quite unexpected for them.

Zhong: Did the COVID pandemic further created a problem for the program to continue or expand?

Robson: I think so. In 2020, I had a little glimpse of pre-COVID. So, they had quite full facilities. The elderly were kind of coming in on their own sometimes or sometimes with another family member, but I tried to contact them when I came back to Australia, I tried to re-interview them via Line, I tried to call them, and it seemed like they were very, very heavily inundated with a lack [ph] of staff, obviously, but also the elderly are very vulnerable in that area for treatment of COVID and there's a second wave going on in Thailand at the moment. So, I think even the second wave is more serious now.

Sonoda: I have one question, no, two questions. Nalanda, as this is my first time to listen to you on your presentation on your thesis, dissertation project, I really enjoyed your presentation. My first question is addressed to the incentives for Thai government as well as the Japanese government when it comes to the so-called policy transfer. In today's talk, you just focused on the process from the beginning up to now, but I wonder what sort of negotiations took place between the two governments when it comes to introduction of policy from Japan to Thailand. In other words, I was wondering whether Japanese government was willing to – took the initiative to push the transfer into Thai society or Thai government was really in need of introducing some policies from Japan. This is the first question. The second question has

to do with the institutional analysis in your dissertation. I think one of the systems which you didn't refer in your presentation is that of insurance, probably medical care coverage might be different from Thailand to Japan, but I wonder – and, of course, family issues were frequently referred in your today's presentation, but how insurance system will be playing a role in your case study. These are the two questions.

Robson: Thank you. Yes, these are very in-depth and very interesting question, especially the first one. There is obviously a hovering, kind of overbearing incentive going on for Japan. There has to be, there has to be some kind of sort of thing. Thailand has to need something, but also Japan has to also have some kind of incentive to do this, to take and bring all these resources to the doorstep of Thailand, but they're also in need of something. So, I think Thailand definitely is in need of the help and they are absolutely willing, with open arms, to receive any kind of help in regards to their ageing population concerns. But for Japan, I think, they need to outweigh the influence of China at the moment that is coming into ASEAN and especially coming into Thailand. There's a huge role that China plays in how Japan is strategic in their movements here as well. So, for example, recently with the construction of roads, construction of new hospitals that China is bringing a lot of money into the table here, very recently from 2016 forward, after that. And I think Japan is seeing this as a good strategy because they are also – strategically they are also very specialized in ageing population issues and technology and so, they are willing, very willing to become the expert in the area, the big brother to give, willing to give out this kind of knowledge, but also in turn, at the same time, they want cooperation to balance out their level of power in the political arena there. So, it's a give and take for sure, absolutely.

With your second question, the institutional system with Medicare coverage, the Medicare coverage is a little bit limited. There is one Medicare, particular, very famous one, is called **สามสิบบาทรักษาทุกโรค** (Sam sip baht rak sa tuk rook – The

30 Baht Scheme) that can cover all kinds of illnesses. That is very famous insurance scheme, medical scheme, medical care there (in Thailand). However, that is only limited to a few that has the ability to enroll and register for that particular type of Medicare. I think JICA's role here is really seeing a gap. They are seeing a gap in the demography; they're seeing a gap in the population who can't afford good care. So, these are the people who are really at the low-socioeconomic point. Very poverty stricken, living under a bridge kind of elderly people who are in the outskirts, who don't know about Medicare, who aren't able to get access to those resources and JICA identifies this gap. So, they're pushing themselves into that gap by facilitating this service, and I think Thailand needs it. Thank you.

Sonoda: Thank you for your responses. I think if you put the kind of the concept of policy transfer as a main concept in an argument, it is better for you to describe the environment in which Thai government and Japanese governments are situated. I think it's better to prepare some introduction part or chapter 1 to explain some macro conditions where policy transfer from Japanese government to Thai government takes place so that the readers can easily understand the situation in which the particular programs work. As to the second point, yes, I think it is really necessary to touch upon that kind of institutional issues, especially at the time of your evaluating the effectiveness of the policy transfer. Thank you.

Robson: Thank you so much for those comments. Thank you.

Zhong: Okay. Anymore questions, comments, observations?

Robson: Those two comments are very, very good actually because my supervisor has also touched upon those comments, seeing a need for me to write a bit more, write a bit more about the macro conditions. That particular point actually I am do-

ing right now. So, thank you for that. Good observation there.

Zhong: Yeah. I think it's obviously very informative with your very specific project, in a larger context, right? And you mentioned that actually, an interesting point that in Thailand too, like in Japan, filial piety, I don't know if you use the term, but it's like care for the elderly is expected, right? It's believed to be a duty, a responsibility, right? How does that kind of cultural value play into the chance for a program, I mean a successful – the extent of success or failure, probably is also an interesting perspective, right?

Robson: Yes, this is a very interesting idea as well. From the point of view of the actual family members themselves, they view this program positively because it means that they don't have to chuck their mother and father straight into a nursing home. There is a chance for them to come back and be a bit more active and livelier and sit at home or do something at home. There is still a second chance, like what Mr. Koide said, for the elderly to come back instead of putting them straight into a nursing facility and there is a lack of them in Thailand. There is a sort of a taboo, especially for the older kind of generation, there is a taboo for me to be put into a nursing home. That's abandonment and that's quite, for a Buddhist country, I think it's – I think it's throughout Asia, this is a common cultural belief.

Zhong: Yeah, that can be actually modelized by the program, right?

Robson: Exactly, yes. The actual – there's a little condition that JICA gives to these hospitals, these recipients, is that if the S-TOP program is successful, at the end of the program they have to somehow recruit other hospitals to also implement S-TOP. So, there is a little bit of a condition going on here. It's not just to accept the program for free, but there is a condition that you have to kind of help us try and spread S-TOP throughout Thailand. Try in your best capacity to get your sister hospital here

or there, to really try S-TOP as well.

Zhong: So, here you see actually a potential emergence of a discourse, if not ideological, at least a way of formulating these practices, right? Integrate it with values and kind of policy, right?

Robson: Yes, policy transfer being integrated into that moral value for a Buddhist country like that. This is a great setting, this is a good setting for it.

Zhong: So, in the long run, maybe you can see a way of talking about it, become a discourse that can add power, legitimacy, and attraction to the practice itself would become more socially established.

Robson: Yes, I think. It's a good point. Thank you for that.

Uchida: Can I ask one question? Thank you for your interesting presentation based on interviews and other case study. My question is, just from curiosity, you said that this program is ongoing and two more years, right? And your hope is to write a dissertation in one year. So, this means you want to write a dissertation, not seeing the end of the program, right?

Robson: That is correct, yes.

Uchida: If so, I wonder if there will be a big turbulence or big event at the end of the program or not or you can otherwise – can you predict the happening, what will happen at the end of the program?

Robson: Interesting, that's a very interesting question. Thank you so much for that

question. It's actually something that my supervisors and I talk about quite a bit, that is we try to frame – policy transfer framework as a very ongoing process. This process can go on for 10 years. So, although JICA is pulling out their resources in 2022, this is going to be an ongoing experience for Ratchaphiphat to tackle themselves, twist and turn the roadmap however they like and so, there is no really an end to policy transfer. This is my argument anyways because my experience as a writer, as a PhD student needs to come to an end some time, right? But the policy transfer process is ongoing for quite some time, forever.

Some argue, some scholars argue that there is no ending because as long as the policy is there in a different country, it's still going, it's still ongoing, managed by several different people and for generations it can be still ongoing and twisting and turning and shaping into a different thing. So, yes, for your question, I need to end my thesis, but there is a prediction that I can possibly – I can make a sort of kind of guess, possibly, an educated guess based on the evidence that I gather and I'm going to have some new rounds of interviews soon, online. So, I hope to be able to come to a conclusion with that prediction, with that, yeah.

Uchida: That makes sense. Thank you so much.

Robson: Thank you.

Zhong: Great, thank you. Now, it's five, I think it's time to conclude today's seminar and I thank Nalanda for the very interesting presentation and for all the questions and the comments. Okay, let's stop here. Thank you everybody for participating. I will see you next time again. Thank you, Nalanda, for the great presentation.

Robson: Thank you so much. Thank you everybody. Thank you. Have a good day.

5 第22回GJS講演会「グローバル時代の日本学研究」
The 22nd GJS Lecture "Japanese Studies in the Age of Globalization"

パトリシア・スタインホフ（ハワイ大学マノア校社会学部教授・学部主任（当時））
Patricia G. Steinhoff (Professor and Chair, Department of Sociology, University of Hawai'i at Mānoa (at the time))

Date & time: June 14, 2017 (Wed.), 3:00-5:00PM

Venue: 1st Meeting Room (3F), The Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia, Utokyo

Language: English

Sonoda: Today, I am very happy to invite Ms. Patricia Steinhoff who came all the way from University of Hawai'i at Mānoa. And I still vividly remember when I was a freshman, I read the book titled *Akai Yuki (Red Snow)* written by Kakuma Takashi, who vividly described what happened among so-called Armed Left in Japan. But it is about one decade after that I realized that Professor Steinhoff has been interested in that kind of activities.

As you might know, the topic of the book was published through Iwanami Shoten publishers, titled *Shi heno Ideology*. You can easily read it. Today Professor Steinhoff will be delivering a lecture to touch upon two different issues. One is about her own research project about understanding what sort of activity movements is taking place in Japan, mostly using interview data. And then another one, which is more challenging or fascinating for us, is about her own idea and other issues about how we should do for the further development of Global Japan Studies. As is well known, Professor Steinhoff has worked with the Japan Foundation for a long time to understand what sort of Japan experts have been doing, mostly in the US but also in European countries as well. So, she has a very extensive network with Japan Study experts, so I really want you to put questions or comments about her presentation today. Pro-

fessor Steinhoff will be using 45 minutes, or a little bit longer than it, about the talk titled “Japanese Studies in the Age of Globalization”. Please give Professor Steinhoff a big hand.

Japanese Studies in the Age of Globalization



Thank you. I am honored to speak today to the Global Japan Studies Program. My own academic career has followed two separate tracks, which Professor Sonoda has just pointed out to you. Both of them concern Japan but in very different ways. Since my dissertation research in the late 1960s, I have been studying the Japanese Left, particularly the post war New Left using interviews, participant observation, and primary and secondary writings.

Since the late 1980s, I have also carried out a series of surveys of Japanese studies in the United States and Canada, with support from the Japan Foundation and strong cooperation from the Japanese Studies Programs, librarians, and Japan specialists who contribute the data for these studies. Today, I want to use what I

have learned from both of these lines of research to think about the future, which I have framed as Japanese Studies in the Age of Globalization. What I propose to do is to take some of the sociological hallmarks of globalization, as discussed in the sociological literature, such as Giddens and Sassen, and discuss their implications for Japanese studies by relating them to my knowledge and experience of Japan and Japanese studies.

Here are some hallmarks of globalization that relate to Japanese studies: the **compression of space and time** which is technologically based, but is the core that drives the rest of globalization. Then **transnational movement**, not necessarily migration, but transnational movements of people, ideas, and commodities, and **cosmopolitanism as an attitude toward the world**. These three form a cluster of relatively positive aspects of globalization. On the other hand Contemporary Neoliberal Globalization, as it is currently happening, contains a lot of negatives. We usually put the two words "neoliberal" and "globalization" together when we talk about it in the US, because despite the positive aspects of globalization, we are horrified by all of the new neoliberal things that are happening. These elements are not essential



to globalization, but are part of what is happening today. Neoliberal globalization incorporates these negatives: increased personal **risk**, **competition**, and **inequality**.

I very much subscribe to Saskia Sassen's sociological view of globalization, which says that globalization is not just about supra-national institutions and economic and political processes that transcend nation states, but is also deeply embedded in local contexts that are altered by globalization, which is now called "glocalization". Hence, we can ask about the impact of globalization through the local traces that we see within Japan and within Japanese studies, at any scale we choose. Some will be impacts that have affected Japan as our collective focus of study. Others may be about the people who are involved in or attracted to Japanese studies. And still others may concern what we teach and study as Japan specialists. We can ask all of these questions about the past and present, but with an eye to the future.

Two Lines of Research

Sociologists always want to report their methods, so let me begin there. I have pur-



sued two lines of research using two different methods. One set of studies concerns the Japanese Left, both prewar and postwar. The other is completely different and involves how Japanese Studies has developed in the United States and Canada. For both I use sociological methods, but quite different techniques. Like many others in Japanese Studies, my fascination with Japan began with Japanese language and literature, which I studied as an undergraduate. Then in graduate school I became a sociologist, to give some disciplinary structure to my study of Japan.

For my dissertation, I studied the repression of the Pre-war Japan Communist Party in the late 1920s and early 1930s, through the Peace Preservation Law of 1925, which made it illegal to participate in any organization that wanted to change the "*Kokutai*" or national polity, which encompassed the emperor system and the private property system, or capitalism. In effect, the law criminalized participation in the communist movement in terms of its key ideas, which rejected the emperor system and capitalism. This became sociologically intriguing because of how the law was implemented. In response to heavy pressure from the state, the overwhelming majority of the people who had been arrested under the Peace Preservation Law because of their ties to the communist movement, ended up renouncing their political beliefs in a process called "*tenkō*", which can be translated as ideological conversion under pressure. For this research my methods were studying the participants' own accounts of their experiences, studying the documents produced by criminal justice system officials about the process of *tenkō*, and interviewing some surviving participants who were still alive in the 1960s. With these materials I tried to reconstruct the social and institutional dynamics of what had happened, in order to understand *tenkō* from the perspective of those who had been directly involved. The dynamics involved both the participants in the communist movement who had been sent to prison for their ideological beliefs, and the national bureaucrats who were trying to get their prisoners to renounce their "dangerous" beliefs.

There are other Japanese studies of "*Tenkō*" (much more famous than mine) that focused on political leaders in the communist movement and tried to trace the changes in their ideas from an intellectual history perspective. Other studies focused on literary figures involved in the communist movement, who had experienced *tenkō* in prison as a spiritual conversion to Christianity or to some Japanese religion that affected their subsequent writings. I examined those prominent types of *tenkō*, but I was much more interested in the other people, who were not intellectuals or leaders but had also ended up in prison for their involvement in the same movement. It seemed to me that the great majority of Japanese who were arrested for their participation in this movement had simply found it impossible to sustain their political beliefs when they were isolated in prison without any social reinforcement from their comrades, families, and social networks. And of course, they had very minimal legal protection at the time. I analyzed those three types of *tenkō* as different responses to the situation, and then discovered in the publications of the bureaucrats who had created and administered the policy, that they had also identified the same three types, even though the existing literature only talked about the more prominent political and literary figures. They called the third type, which was the most common, "*shimin-teki tenkō*" [citizens' *tenkō*].

After the dissertation was finished, I wondered how the structural changes in early postwar Japan that stemmed from the rights enshrined in the new constitution and major changes in the educational system, might have made the young postwar generation of Japanese better able to resist such ideological pressures from the state. I began looking for a postwar situation in which the state was again putting pressure on people through arrest and prosecution because of their political beliefs. I viewed it as a sort of natural experiment, to see if young postwar Japanese might respond to pressures from the state differently. Because of the timing of my initial research and my own generation as a college student in the 1960s, the natural experiment I was

seeking could be found in the New Left political protests of the late 1960s and early 70s, during which large numbers of student protesters were arrested and prosecuted for their politically motivated actions. Actually I was in Japan in 1967 and part of 1968 when those protests escalated, but at that time I had my head in the library at Shaken (Shakai Kagaku Kenkyūsho at Todai) to study prewar *tenkō*, so I wasn't paying attention to what was happening out in the streets.

My initial foray into this postwar topic was quite global, because I was able to interview the surviving young Japanese perpetrator of a terrorist attack on Tel Aviv airport in Israel that happened on May 30, 1972. I met the survivor, Okamoto Kōzō, in August of that year, just after his military trial ended. I received permission to interview him and went to Ramleh Prison in Israel where he was incarcerated. I then had one person for my new study. But as a sociologist, my research tools are for the study of groups and how they work. I can't study just one person as I might if I were a psychologist or historian. That interview reinforced my sense that this was the perfect natural experiment for my comparative study. I began to work backwards to try to understand the social context in late 1960s Japan that had led Okamoto Kōzō to get involved in the protests in Japan and then, through his indirect ties to a group called the Red Army Faction, to an attack on Lod Airport in Israel. I did not know it at the time, but I happened to have chosen a particularly appropriate group to study, because the Red Army Faction ended up getting involved in international activities that kept them alive long after most of the New Left in Japan had faded away. Right from the beginning, they had a more global outlook.

As I learned more about the Red Army Faction, I found that the group had emerged in 1969, when it was ejected from a much larger public protest group because it believed street protests had reached their limit and it was time to form a Red Army and escalate to more violent tactics. Early in the fall of 1969, the newly inde-

pendent Red Army Faction had invented some crude weapons, which today would be called IEDs, or incendiary explosive devices. Their leaders organized a weekend retreat at an inn on Mount Daibosatsu, in the mountains between Tokyo and Kyoto, for the members to learn how to throw their hand grenades and pipe bombs without blowing themselves up. Since they had until recently been members of a larger, public group that was well-known to the authorities, the police followed them to the inn where they were staying on Mount Daibosatsu and they were all arrested. That was the first big public incident of the Red Army Faction.

As a result of those arrests, there was tremendous pressure on the known members of the Red Army Faction. Those who had been arrested were held in jail while they awaited trial and were subject to intensive interrogation. Meanwhile, those who had not gone to Daibosatsu were put under heavy personal surveillance and soon went underground. Then in spring of 1970, nine of them suddenly made front page news by hijacking an airplane to North Korea. This was known as the Yodogō Incident after the name of the plane they hijacked, and you may have seen clips of that event that appear on Japanese television even today in descriptions of the period of New Left protest. Then, in 1972, the remnants of the Red Army Faction were involved in a very famous siege at a mountain lodge in Karuizawa called Asama Sansō (which also always appears in these TV retrospectives). The previous year, the Red Army group had merged with another underground group that had stolen some guns and ammunition from a gunshop in the town of Mōka. They called themselves the United Red Army and retreated into the mountains for the winter with their weapons. Many of those with the group were already wanted by the police, and several were on Japan's ten most wanted list. The police finally tracked them down in Karuizawa, arrested some, and chased the five remaining members to the Asama Sansō lodge, where they took the housekeeper hostage and held out for nine days, surrounded by 3,000 police who did not want the hostage to get hurt. The standoff finally ended

after the police brought up a construction crane with a wrecking ball, smashed open the top level of the heavily fortified building to get inside, and eventually brought everybody out alive and unharmed.

Using essentially the same qualitative methods of reading their writings and interviewing participants that I had used for my study of prewar *tenkō*, I have been following the most radical factions of the radical New Left in and out of prison ever since. Of course I never expected I would still be studying them forty years later. The general answer to my original question about "*tenkō*" in the first completely postwar generation of young Japanese was that the state was no longer focused on pressuring those students to change their beliefs; they mostly just wanted to get them safely in jail and off the streets. But the idea of "*Tenkō*" kept popping up unexpectedly in other places throughout my research. For example, both the students who were being arrested and people from the older generation who supported them were well aware of the prewar pressure for "*Tenkō*" and more broadly for confession, which is still really central to the Japanese criminal justice system.

As standard practice after an arrest, the Japanese police don't look for evidence, they first try to get a confession. If they get one, then they check the details against other evidence. Understanding how the Japanese criminal justice system operates, the people who were trying to protect the arrested students developed a system to provide support for them when they were arrested. That system was explicitly designed to help them resist the pressure to confess. The way to do that was to teach them not to talk at all, because if you start to talk, the police and prosecutors doing the interrogation will get you talking about things you don't want to reveal. But if you stay silent, which is your legal right under the postwar Japanese constitution, the energy that goes into keeping silent strengthens your resolve to resist. The support system that they created included lawyers who would visit the arrested students in

jail to provide legal support, and ordinary people who provided various kinds of social and material support, so these postwar arrestees were better able to endure the hardships of prolonged isolation in solitary confinement. That support system has become a very important part of my research.

In the course of my study, I discovered that while the group was isolated in the mountains in the winter of 1971-72 (before the 1972 Asama Sansō siege), they were very concerned with resisting police pressure if they got arrested. In an effort to strengthen people against what they imagined the physical arrest pressures would be, they ended up torturing some of their own members to death in what became known as the United Red Army purge.

Ironically, at just about the same time as the United Red Army purge when the group in the mountains of Japan was trying to toughen up its members to better resist confession and *tenkō* pressures if they were arrested, the Red Army group that had hijacked a plane to North Korea in 1970 was being subjected to sophisticated thought reform pressure by the North Koreans and they converted from their Red Army ideas to the North Korean "Juche" ideology. North Korean thought reform is another form of *tenkō* that was also rooted in the prewar Japanese criminal justice system that extended to colonial Korea. Needless to say, Japan's colonial rule over Korea is also part of an earlier form of globalization.

As I have followed these groups over time, I have used the material to examine many different questions both on my own and in collaborative comparative work with scholars of similar groups in the United States and Europe. For a long time, studying the New Left was a rather taboo subject within Japanese academics because so many universities were traumatized by New Left student strikes in the late 1960s and early 1970s. However, as a foreigner, I could pursue the topic and the Institute

of Social Science at the University of Tokyo has always welcomed me and supported my work. I came to understand that scholars living and working outside of Japan can make useful contributions by studying topics that are too sensitive for those who have to survive within Japanese academics, or that people living inside Japanese culture feel are too mundane or irrelevant for academic study. Nowadays, Japanese Studies is quite globalized, and both foreign Japan specialists and Japanese nationals who study abroad use their outsider perspective to study topics that are marginalized within Japanese academia.

My second area of research also came about more or less by chance. In the late 1980s, the Japan Foundation was looking for someone to produce a directory of Japanese studies in the United States. I knew how to do basic survey research and I happened to be involved in some Japanese Studies organizations in the US, including both the Association for Asian Studies and the American Advisory Committee of the Japan Foundation, so I volunteered. I approached it as a sociological study of an interesting interdisciplinary field that was small but tightly networked. I already knew it quite well, because Japanese Studies in the United States was the academic world that I lived in. The Japan Foundation was very obliging; they let me ask whatever I wanted, even if they didn't really understand why I was asking such questions. Even at that time, when people were not really thinking about globalization, I knew there was a lot of cross border interaction among Japan specialists, so I recommended that the study should encompass Japanese studies in the United States and Canada. Although the scale and organization of Japanese Studies is different in the two countries, scholars from both countries participate in the Association for Asian Studies. The Japan Foundation agreed, and a Canadian collaborator took responsibility for the Canadian data collection.

I then ended up doing a whole series of these studies over three decades. The

first one was just a directory in two volumes, one for institutions and one for specialists. Japanese Studies was a relatively small interdisciplinary field, and I knew where most of the programs and Japan specialists were located. This was different from normal survey research in which you use a statistically correct sample. I did not sample because I was trying to include everybody in a public directory. The field wasn't that big to begin with and I knew many of the people. Through my ties to the Association for Asian Studies, the AAS sponsored and housed the study. I had access to their mailing lists and used their programmer, who taught me the magic of relational databases, which made it possible to collect and analyze the data and then format and print the directories using the same relational database.

We were able to obtain much higher response rates than a normal survey. This was partly because the goal was to produce a Directory and partly because the Japan Foundation was interested in both the individual specialists and the Japanese Studies programs. I reached the specialists through the programs where they studied and taught, and I could also follow up with people if they didn't respond. It wasn't like an anonymous survey, so I could triangulate between programs, specialists, and graduate students. I used a Who's Who format to collect extensive biographical data on the careers and activities of the Japan specialists, and I used detailed questionnaires to collect information about Japanese studies programs, and library collections. Then I asked both programs and specialists to report information about current doctoral students in Japanese studies. I asked both programs and specialists who are your doctoral students in Japanese, what are they working on, and who are they working with? By putting the information together, we got a fairly good picture of who the doctoral students were and what they were studying, which we used subsequently to follow up where they went afterwards.

When the first directory was compiled and published in 1989 covering the US

and Canada, I was just producing a directory, but as a sociologist I couldn't resist including a long introduction in which I did a rudimentary analysis of the data. I also added a methodological appendix detailing how we did the study, and included several indexes to make it easier for people to find the information they were looking for. The Japan Foundation came back a few years later requesting not just a directory for the United States and Canada, but also a separate monograph, analyzing the current state of Japanese Studies in the United States. So, in the early 1990s we redid the study and produced a three volume directory as a boxed set with the third volume containing indexes to everything in the other two volumes.) In addition, I wrote a separate monograph analyzing the new data I had collected for the directory and comparing it to the data collected earlier.

That was followed by another study based on data collected in 2003 to 2005. By that time the AAS was no longer able to host the study, but I was able to do it through the University of Hawai'i. The results were published in 2006 and 2007. Then we did another study, which came out in 2013. However, by the time of the last one, printing had gotten so expensive that it doubled the budget to print these heavy boxed sets, so I suggested we put them on a website instead and the Japan Foundation agreed. We created a searchable public website through the University of Hawai'i at http://japandirectory.socialsciences.hawaii.edu. Based on the same technology that created the indexes in the relational database, users can search the website for virtually any combination of information.

I didn't know if the Japan Foundation would want to print the 2013 edition separately in Japan at their expense to give to programs and libraries, which was what they had done with the earlier printed volumes that we created for them. So we produced PDF files that were ready to be printed, which are also posted on the website. If you want to have something that looks like the print volume, you can

download and print it out yourself. The Japan Foundation isn't allowed to charge for these products, so there was no problem with posting the pdf files on the website and letting people download them. There have now been three monographs analyzing the state of Japanese Studies and in each new monograph I have tracked the changes in the field by comparing the new and old data. We also were able to do a limited follow-up study in 2016 because new PhDs were concerned that the data on the website did not show where they had gone after they completed their doctorates. (The directory is no longer being updated, and the posted data will gradually become out of date, just as printed books do.)

Since the first directory in 1989, I have also been tracking all the doctoral students in Japanese Studies in the US and Canada, and trying to follow up where they came from and where they went afterwards. Now many of them leave Japanese Studies or leave academics entirely and I lose track of them, but we have a tremendous reservoir of information for the last 30 years. In addition, from the second directory on, when I sent out the request to participate, I included everybody who had been in a previous directory, even if they were no longer in the United States and Canada. The Japan Foundation scratched its head over that one and asked "What's your definition for inclusion?" I felt that Japanese Studies was a loose, long-term network that people remained connected to even if they moved away from the US and Canada. People are often in Japan for a year or two, and then they come back to North America. So, this was a way to make sure they were still in the Japanese Studies network, even if they were no longer in the United States and Canada. Because of the details that were reported by the Japan Specialists in Japanese studies programs, plus these longitudinal strategies, we have captured over the years the growth of Japanese studies in the United States and Canada plus intriguing evidence of the globalization of Japanese studies from the perspectives of its transnational flows through the United States. If a person came through the purview of this study in any of the years it

was produced from the late 1980s through the second decade of the 21st century, we caught them, even if they were absent before and after.

Core Elements of Globalization

Now with my two areas pf research in mind, let's look at some aspects of globalization as a phenomenon and see what that lens suggests for the future of Japanese studies, using both data from the surveys and some random examples from my research on the New Left.

As I noted at the outset, Technological Development has made possible the **compression of time and space** which underlies all the other aspects of globalization. That compression of time and space is closely related to **transnational movement**, which has become much easier because of time and space compression. It is also related to the cultivation of **cosmopolitan attitudes and behaviors**, which is a kind of openness to others and to learning new things that has become a marker of globalization. We can see traces of these phenomena everywhere we look in Japanese studies. First, these aspects of globalization have changed Japan itself, our focus of study, whether you want to look back historically at earlier periods of transnational contact of the Japanese Empire or Japanese labor migration in the 19th and early 20th century, or Japan's emergence as a dominant figure in the global economy in the latter part of the 20th century.

I should point out that globalization scholars argue all the time over when globalization actually began. Many people go back several hundred years and see the globalization processes as starting a long time ago. All of these social and historical processes have been studied in their own right under other rubrics from many perspectives, but they can also be understood and examined now as aspects of globalization. This is as simple as asking questions that come from globalization research,

questions that enable you to see new aspects in phenomena that have been there all along. The questions that globalization raises can lead to different research questions and different analyses.

The global perspective also implies that some aspects of Japan can be studied not in Japan, but elsewhere in the world. We already have a fair amount of research that does just that, but it has sometimes been treated as marginal or outside the proper scope of Japanese studies. I suggest that it is all fair game now and in the future, no matter where it takes us, and we can wave the globalization flag to say, of course, we can study Japan in England or Iran, or Africa. People have been doing that for decades, but there was some question about whether it was a legitimate part of Japanese Studies. In the age of globalization, there is no longer any question of its legitimacy.

Our series of surveys, combined with some earlier studies of what was then the very small and obscure field of Japanese studies, has traced how the field has grown and changed. Prior to the 1980s, Japanese Studies in the United States was a small field populated only by people who were willing to tackle the difficulties of learning to speak and read Japanese, and for whom virtually the only available employment was in academics. The field was quite interdisciplinary: there was little academic work written about Japan in English and everybody read all of it. There was plenty of time to do that while spending a decade mastering the language. I was trained in the 1960s, so that was my experience of Japanese Studies in the 1960s and 1970s.

That all changed in the 1980s when Japan became a major economic competitor of the United States and interest in Japan exploded. Some of the earliest indicators of globalization's contemporary impact on Japanese studies came about in the 1980s, when American companies discovered that they needed people with expertise on

Japan in order to compete with Japan as an emerging world economic power. They needed lawyers, businessmen, journalists, economists, architects, engineers, and scientists who knew enough about Japan to interact at a professional level. Special programs were created to fast track that specialized knowledge for people who were not willing to spend years learning Japanese history, language, and culture in order to get to the little piece that they needed. Some of those programs succeeded and others outlived their usefulness and have disappeared.

I think the most basic lesson that we traditional Japan specialists learned from that period and the new kinds of questions that were being raised, was that we were no longer the sole arbiters of knowledge about Japan. Prior to that, anybody who wanted to know anything about Japan needed to find one of these obscure Japan specialists tucked off in a corner and ask them the question, and they would try their best to find an answer, because there wasn't anybody else to ask. But now we were being asked questions that we could not possibly answer. We had to recognize that there was a lot about Japan that we knew nothing about. We didn't know anything about how they make cars, or how they do science or whatever. We might not know what these professionals needed to learn, but we could help by facilitating access for those who wanted such specialized knowledge. As a result, people with other sorts of professional training began going to Japan to explore very different questions. As some of these professionals went deeper into the study of Japan, we also welcomed them as colleagues in the academy who had valuable expertise to share.

Although the Japan economic bubble burst in the early 1990s, our second survey, which collected data in 1993 and 1994, showed a large increase in Japan specialists. When we asked Japanese Studies programs who was working on Japan at that time, lots of people said they were, and they filled out our questionnaires. At the time, I simply thought the field was growing very rapidly. When we did the next



study in 2005, I puzzled over why some of the numbers were going down, even as the field continued to expand. This slide shows the growth in Japanese Studies in the United States over the four studies, and the data illustrate what happened as Japan's status in the world changed. I have put an asterisk by 1995, because that number was inflated by the Japan bubble, which was not apparent until you look at the numbers before and after it. The number of specialists we reported in 2005 was bigger than in 1989. But it is considerably less than the number we reported in 1995. That 1995 number was real, because it represented people who were reported by Japanese Studies programs and who completed questionnaires. The same thing happened with doctoral candidates and Japanese Studies programs. There was a lot of interest in Japan in the early 1990s, some of which did not survive the bursting of the bubble economy.

As I tried to make sense of what is going on, I discovered two quite different factors. One was a demographic anomaly, because Japanese studies was a young field in the United States. It is essentially a post war phenomenon; there were just a handful of people studying Japan in the US before World War II, so through the

end of the 20th century, virtually everyone who had ever been a Japan specialist in the United States was still alive. The field was growing, and new people were being added, but it wasn't yet a normal demographic process where people retire and die and young people come in to replace them. Now there is a much more normal progression, because that first generation is gone. If you knew any basic demography, you could make sense of that part of it.

The other part was that for a lot of the people who reported studying Japan in 1995, it was only a temporary interest. By 2005, those people were off studying something else. Many of those were social scientists who saw Japan as an interesting case for a particular project, often a comparative study. Then they moved on to other topics without making a really heavy investment in Japanese language study or a long-term commitment to the study of Japan, so by 2005, we had lost a lot of those people. Yet by the 2005 study, we were also welcoming people from a much wider range of disciplines into the directory as Japan specialists. We acknowledged the different kinds of knowledge they had and they were being recognized by their local academic peers as part of the Japanese studies community. So I tried to make sense of the changes that had happened in Japanese studies in the United States by the early 21st century in a broader way, reflecting the historical conditions and intellectual currents in the United States over half a century.

Three Paradigms of Japanese Studies in the United States

Japanese Studies in the US is quite distinctive compared to its counterparts in Europe or Japan. I identified three dominant paradigms that began at different times and have overlapped. The first was how people learned about Japan in the 1950s, 60s, and 70s. During that time substantial government support helped to create many Japanese Studies Centers and programs. The US government believed that as a matter of national security there needed to be a larger pool of people who could speak



and read Japanese. With federal support, these programs offered scholarships for graduate study at designated universities, using a paradigm called **language and area studies**. The core was the study of Japanese language, primarily at the graduate level, and then they taught a little bit of sociology, a little bit of history, a little bit of literature, a little bit of political science, and a little bit of economics, from people who were specialists in those disciplines. The aim was to produce an interdisciplinary understanding of Japan as a more holistic kind of knowledge.

Generally, at the Master's level training concentrated on language training and initial exposure to a lot of disciplines. Students who went on to the doctoral level then chose a discipline in which there was already a doctoral degree being offered, preferably with a Japan specialist available to supervise the student's work. The students took their interdisciplinary knowledge of Japan and Japanese language into that discipline and after getting sufficient foundational disciplinary knowledge, they did disciplinary research on a Japanese Studies topic at the doctoral level.

Then, because of the economic shift in the 1980s, there emerged what I called the **economic competition paradigm**, which viewed Japan as an economic compet-

itor and a potential source of wealth for Americans who chose a Japan-related career. It was prompted in part by Ezra Vogel's "Japan as Number One", which was a runaway bestseller, that suddenly made people see Japan not as an exotic culture to be explored, but rather as a powerful economic competitor of the US whose secrets of success we needed to learn. That phase was soon supplanted by **the cultural studies paradigm**. Actually, the cultural studies paradigm was already there, but it was buried behind the economic competition one for a few years until the Japanese economic bubble burst. The cultural studies paradigm involved a more multifaceted and multicultural approach that included not just the high culture that had been studied in language and area studies, but the popular culture of subgroups in the society, which stimulated new questions and offered new resources for the study of Japan.



These paradigms matter because they define how programs developed. The history of the programs reflects when, under what paradigm, they were created. These paradigms shaped the Japan specialists who were trained in one or the other of them; they affected who entered Japanese studies, what they learned, how they were trained, and what they would then study. Japanese Studies in the United States now

contains people who came up through each of these three paradigms. In fact, the largest and oldest programs have accommodated each new paradigm as it emerged, but younger, newer programs are marked by the paradigm under which they were created. So, the newest programs were created under the cultural studies paradigm and they are quite distinctive in their approach. This is not the end of time and so there are going to be new paradigms. Right now, we may be at the closing end of the cultural studies paradigm and it is possible that the next one is globalization, but I do not have data revealing that.



I believe these paradigms are important for understanding American Japanese Studies. But Japanese studies in the United States is also affected by the American **academic structure**. Japanese Studies as it is taught in the United States is part of a system of education that is different from either Europe or Japan. Colleges and Universities in the US are organized primarily by academic disciplines. Smaller interdisciplinary programs also exist within American higher education, often as a way to accommodate something new that does not fit the disciplinary structure, but the dominant part is academic disciplines.

American undergraduate education is different from the dominant pattern in Europe and Japan, in which students are admitted to a particular faculty from the beginning and trained within the disciplines included in that faculty. In the US, the first two years are devoted to broad, general education, followed by disciplinary specialization in the last two years. The University of Tokyo, because it has two distinct campuses, is closer to the American system, with broad general education for two years at the Komaba campus and then a narrower concentration after students move to the Hongō campus. In the American system, the credits for individual courses are the basic units for both general education and the major. Usually there is a lot of flexibility for students to choose the courses they want to take, both within general education and their major. In the sciences in the US there may be a prescribed course of training, but in social sciences and humanities, the offerings are broader and more flexible. However, increasingly now in the 21st century, there is a neoliberal aspect to it.

The economics of student demand for particular courses has become more salient as colleges and universities are under neoliberal pressures to demonstrate their value. The metric is, how many people are taking this class? Can we afford to offer it? Can we afford to pay somebody's salary to teach it? This applies both to majors and to general education, which includes foreign language requirements. So if a lot of people want to take a particular course, the institution makes money and is happy to offer it. Now, it is one thing to major in a foreign language, but American students often just fulfill a two year foreign language requirement, which doesn't give them functional capability in any language, certainly not in Japanese. At most colleges and universities, everyone has to take one or two years of a foreign language, as part of the way the higher education system is organized. For the past two decades, this economic metric has really favored Japanese studies programs. Japan has been attractive for a number of reasons that are tied to both the economic competition and

the cultural studies paradigm.



I argue, from my long experience within Japanese studies in the United States, that people do not generally choose to study Japan or Japanese language for rational and instrumental reasons. That happened only during the economic competition period, when people thought there was money to be made by studying Japan. Some of them succeeded, but a lot of them discovered it was a lot of hard work and they might not get to the money tree. At any rate, my strong contention is that people get hooked on Japan, through either a personal attraction to something about Japanese culture, or through some form of direct exposure to Japan, or a combination of both. The nature of both of these factors has changed over time. Japan used to be both distant and exotic; a relatively small number of people were directly exposed, but the attraction was powerful, and it tended to be related to exotic features of Japanese classical culture or Zen Buddhism. That is what brought people into Japanese studies in the 1960s and the 1970s.

Thanks to globalization's compression of time and space, there are many more

opportunities now for young Americans to get directly exposed to Japan, through travel and study abroad, or through the availability of Japanese popular culture within their own country. The cultural attraction has changed from the exotic classical culture to globalized Japanese popular culture, which doesn't seem so foreign because everyone grew up with it. Americans saw it on television as children, just like everybody else, so it seems familiar. Once students are hooked by any of these means, some of them will continue to study Japanese language, which is now much more readily available at both the high school level and the college level. Japanese now seems much less intimidating, because if they were hooked on Japanese popular culture, they have been seeing and hearing elements of Japanese language and culture even if the manga or anime is translated. These media are also very visual, so Japanese doesn't seem like an impossible thing to learn. All of this has led to a big increase in enrollments in both Japanese language and other courses about Japan. Under the cultural studies paradigm, young faculty who also had come into Japanese Studies through their attraction to Japanese popular culture, were very clever about redesigning or re-labeling their courses. So, courses on Tokugawa period Japanese history, are now called Geisha and Samurai. Once you get there, it's the same history course. There are courses throughout the curriculum on Japanese popular culture. This has led to huge enrollment increases so the university is happy to have people studying Japanese and they are happy to hire Japanese language teachers and other Japan specialists to meet this student demand.

Now, as I will suggest later, this may now be waning, but it's been very positive for Japanese studies up until the present. By the 2005 study, I was also seeing major changes in the topics that Japan specialists studied. I have used both the dissertation topics reported in the four studies and new areas of expertise reported by scholars. We started out with a very long list of subject matter classifications related to Japanese studies. People responding to the questionnaire could check specific

areas in about 10 different subject domains, as areas in which they had expertise. In a survey there is always a place to write in new categories that were not on the list. Right from the first study, people started writing in categories they didn't find in the list. I soon learned that the write-in answers were telling me where the field was going. Those topics were not listed yet, but somebody was studying them and that was how they wanted to describe their expertise. The studies first revealed increased interest in specific topics related to women. In the first survey, there was a topic called "women." There weren't that many women in the field at that point, but there was a topic called "women." By the second survey, there was "women in business" and there was "women in literature." It had proliferated because they weren't just studying women, they were studying something specific about women.

This paralleled the dramatic increase in the number of women in graduate school, including in Japanese studies in the 1980s and 1990s. As there were more women studying, they were more likely to be interested in specific topics concerned with women. In the second and third studies, there was also increased interest in minorities and subcultures within Japan, and in the materials produced by these subcultures, which are areas stimulated by the cultural studies paradigm.

I was by then a mid-career scholar, and I was not particularly influenced by the cultural studies paradigm. Yet it was reflected indirectly in my research, which had always required finding materials produced by New Left groups and individuals, much of which was considered by librarians as "ephemeral material". It was certainly not material that Japanese library collections in the United States could or would collect routinely. I did not expect the Japanese librarian to collect what I needed, as they might for faculty in literature or history. I expected to go to Japan and find it for myself, as I still do. I still subscribe to whatever newsletters from the New Left still exist. That material is absolutely essential to what I am doing, but I don't expect the library to be able to spend its budget to collect it. Fortunately, in the early 1990s,

my friend and informant, Takazawa Kōji, donated his vast personal collection of Japanese social movement materials to the University of Hawai‘i, because he knew that my students and I would make use of it.

Most of the materials dealt with the New Left and its predecessors and successors, and I became responsible for organizing and cataloging them with the help of my Japanese graduate students at the University of Hawai‘i. We have created a public website where all the bibliographies of the Takazawa collection are available in both English and Japanese, with annotations in English, at http://www.takazawa.hawaii.edu. Today, people come from all over the world to use the materials in the Takazawa collection. Just before I left for this trip to Japan, there was a delegation from the National Institute of History in Japan, (Rekihaku) borrowing materials from the Takazawa collection for an exhibition on the Japanese New Left. That is the kind of material we have and because it was not collected or studied in Japan until it had safely become “history,” we are one of the few places that has collected it. In recent years we have added a lot of additional material from both Takazawa himself and some other donors, and we are working to catalog it. Some of that is not yet displayed on the website, but it is available if people come to the collection.

American Japan specialists have often drawn a hard line between Japanese studies as a study of Japanese in Japan and Japanese Americans as the purview of ethnic studies research. Yet the Japanese diaspora has become an increasingly popular interest of scholars in Japan, who come to Hawai‘i, California, and Latin America to study both contemporary communities and the artifacts of earlier generations of migrants. That is why I was asking whether your program is actually about Japan outside of Japan. For example, Japanese language newspapers produced for local ethnic communities in western countries have been preserved in their local libraries outside of Japan, and are only now starting to be recognized as attractive objects

of study within Japan. We have a bunch of those Japanese language newspapers in Hawai‘i, and for as long as I have been at Hawai‘i, people have come from Japan to do research in those newspapers.

I understand that some of them are now being microfilmed so that they will be available directly in Japan, just as many important Japanese materials have been microfilmed and made available to libraries outside of Japan. In a sense, the increasing Japanese academic interest in Japanese Americans and other parts of the Japanese diaspora parallels the increased interest by American Japan specialists in Japanese subcultures and minorities. That fits naturally into the cultural studies paradigm, which is interested in smaller groups within the society and what's going on within them, whereas before the approach to Japan was more homogeneous. The cultural studies paradigm also encourages interest in popular media materials, prompted by research questions that come from the rise of the cultural studies paradigm in American Japanese studies.

Those kinds of materials about Japanese minority groups and the Japanese population in other countries had not been collected by either Japanese or American academic libraries, which had focused more on Japanese high culture. All of this is a reminder to us that research topics don't exist in some abstract neutral scientific sphere. They are a function of changes in intellectual paradigms that raise new questions for academics and their graduate students. Globalization itself is a real phenomenon affecting the world we live in. But it is also a set of sensitizing ideas that lead to new research questions. We cannot foresee what future paradigm shifts and their new research questions may be, but we can predict that they will arise and a new generation of academics and students will set out to pursue them in relation to Japan.

What I see in the 2016 update to our most recent study is an increasing number of research topics that ask explicitly transnational questions about Japan, which very clearly comes out of a globalization approach. Often people are simply utilizing a transnational approach to re-frame research that began much earlier and did not start with that in mind. For example, University of Hawai‘i Press recently published a book by my friend Simon Avenell, entitled “Transnational Japan in the Global Environmental Movement.” There are two globalization buzzwords here: “transnational Japan” and “global environmental movement”, and right in the title they tell you that is what this is about. It looks specifically at how Japanese scientists shared, at international meetings, what they were learning about environmental toxins in Japan from the famous pollution cases in the 1960s. The new study examines the role Japanese scientists played by spreading that information to international scientific audiences and contributing it to the global environmental movement.

Two years ago, I received an email out of the blue, asking me to contribute a chapter to an edited book on “Transnational Ties In The Armed New Left.” That is the part of the New Left that I studied, the armed part. It was edited by two Latin American specialists who were tracing the diffusion of core New Left ideas in texts from Latin America to Europe and the United States. A young Italian scholar who was reviewing the manuscript for a British publisher happened to know me. He recommended that they add a chapter on Japan, and he gave them my email address. I had never thought to write such an article. But I had all the materials readily available and happily agreed. It was a major learning experience for me, combining what I had already studied and what was available to me.

First, the Takazawa collection contained a large number of Japanese translations of Western books. Normally, an American Library would throw them out because they are not interested in Japanese translation of Marx in their library, who is going

to read that? They would have an English translation, but not other languages. But Takazawa told me that these materials were a very important part of his collection, because they showed what young Japanese New Left activists were reading in the 1960s. So, if people wanted to understand the context, they had to have access to those materials. I already knew that New Left activists frequently quoted such materials in their own writings, so it was clear that they read them. The Takazawa collection also contain materials donated by an older activist who had been a translator in the pre-war period, and who later also supported the postwar New Left. As a result of these two factors, the Takazawa collection database had 192 Japanese translations of left-wing books, starting with a 1907 translation of an early work by a person called Adoratskii. You may know who that is: Lenin. His real name is Adoratskii and his early 1907 book is in the collection. Obviously, this is not a complete record of all Japanese translations of Western left-wing materials, but it provided clear evidence for the extent and timing of such translations into Japanese.

I then found that in the 1960s, all of the major New Left texts from other countries appeared in Japanese translation within a year of their original publication in the West. Basically, there was no lag at all! I was astonished that the Japanese translations came out that quickly. What that tells you is, not only were there people who were eager to do that work, and who could do translations into Japanese from Western languages, whether it was Spanish or German or English or whatever; there was also enough of a market for such works among Japanese students to make it worthwhile to publish them. There were literally tens of thousands of Japanese students during that period, going up and down the bookstore district of Jinbocho buying and reading that kind of material. So, that was a dramatic finding.

For the second half of the chapter, I relied on my own research on the transnational activities of the Red Army Faction and its offshoots, the Yodogō group that

went to North Korea in 1970 and a group that went to the Middle East starting in 1971, and later became the Japanese Red Army. These transnational activities ranged from the earliest contexts, even before the Red Army had been thrown out of its predecessor organization, Bund. There were a couple of international conferences in Japan that invited New Left leaders from western countries to come to Japan. Consequently, Japanese New Left activists were meeting firsthand with these people in Japan. After the main conference, the students organized their own events. They took these small groups of foreign New Left students, their counterparts, on a tour to different universities throughout Japan, traveling with them and giving presentations with Japanese interpreters to big audiences of Japanese students. They were establishing these transnational contexts the year before the Red Army Faction became independent. The following year, there was another such international event with New Left guests from other countries. They were trying to coordinate attacks to happen later in the fall on specific dates, because they already had a vision of coordinating internationally.

But then, after the big arrests at Daibosatsu, the police found out that the group had actually been plotting to kidnap the Prime Minister and hold him hostage so he couldn't leave on an international trip to reinforce Japan's commitment to the Vietnam war. That raised the threat level posed by the Red Army Faction, even though their plan failed because they all got arrested. Suddenly everybody was worried about what these people are going to do because they had weapons and they were dangerous. So the pressure on Red Army members who had not been arrested became enormous. People told me about getting up in the morning and leaving their house with three plainclothes police surrounding them immediately on both sides of them, walking them to work, and then waiting there all day until it was time for them to be walked back home again. So literally, people couldn't move without being followed by the police. They were very frustrated. Their leader Shiomi Takaya, was

very good at inventing fancy words for what the group was thinking and feeling. He had invented the idea that they needed to form a "Red Army" and now he invented the notion that what they needed was "overseas bases". They would find friendly countries that would give them a safe base overseas and give them military training so they could then come back and fight the revolution in Japan.

None of that ever happened, but they did go overseas first to North Korea and then to the Middle East. Later, once those groups were overseas and they were staying there with local protection, they established direct relationships with government leaders in the Middle East, North Asia, North Africa, and Southeast Asia. It is precisely because of those overseas moves in the early 1970s that these groups survived. The New Left that remained in Japan was basically gone after about 1972-73, except for the ones who were in jail. Other people were still around but they couldn't do much movement activity. Because these two Red Army groups were overseas, they survived and persisted, and so I felt compelled to follow them for 40 years. Actually, I only followed them through their writings when they were overseas, because the places that they had gone to (North Korea and the Middle East), were not places for a nice little female academic to wander in to do research. However, I caught up with them when they got arrested or were deported back to Japan. Then I could interview them in jail and attend their trial sessions. I could also observe the activities of their support groups and their legal defense team, which was interesting in its own right, because that activity was protecting them and keeping them from making a *tenkō*.

From the early 1990s through the first decade of 2000s, there was so much new information coming out from these returnees from North Korea and from the Middle East that I was kept busy following their trials. Then to complicate matters further, some people who were in jail in Japan in the early 1970s for things they had done in Japan were freed by the Japanese Red Army in international hostage-taking inci-

dents and taken to the Middle East to join the Japanese Red Army there. A decade or more later, the Japanese police caught up with them overseas and had them deported back to Japan, where they went back on trial for the things they had done earlier. I had been planning to publish my book in English in 1994. But by then all these new things were happening, which led to another two decades of trials and prison visits, so I delayed the English version.

Now, I have just finished editing the English translation of Takazawa's own prize winning book about the Yodogō group in North Korea which is about to come out in English. Takazawa did the Yodogō group in North Korea far better than I ever could have, and found astounding things about it. I am now doing one volume that will basically bring my earlier book in Japanese up to date with what happened inside Japan, and then I plan a completely separate volume on what happened to the group that went to the Middle East, about which a great deal of misinformation has been published in English. I cannot tell the whole story of what they did in the Middle East, but I have enough material to get most of it.

On reflection, even my very early work on the pre-war Japanese communist movement had a strong transnational component. Not only were the foreign ideas they promoted important, but many of the activist leaders had spent time studying in the Soviet Union. I am not going back to revisit that study, but if I were studying it today, I would certainly be using concepts from globalization to think about those materials. So, globalization tells us to look at things that we may already have known about but thought were not important, and it makes them worthy of study.

In terms of my research on Japanese Studies in the United States, the time and space compression of globalization, coupled with easier transnational movements, has also produced a global community of Japan specialists who travel in and out of

Japan to do research, meet one another and interact all over the world, and can be found working and living all over the world. We meet at international gatherings as professional Japan specialists, and many are our former students and colleagues. Virtually any gathering of Japan specialists, including this one, large or small, happening anywhere, involves people of different national origins, coming together through their common interest in Japan. And nowadays, frequently, half of the people there are Japanese: they were born and raised in Japan, but they are living in England, or someplace else because Japanese Studies is truly a global community. Increasingly, such gatherings may take place using Japanese, English, or some other language that's relevant to the particular gathering. Viewed from the lens of globalization, this also suggests that the participants are cosmopolitans, who are curious about other cultures, interested in new things, open to new ideas, and can interact comfortably outside of their own original or native environment. If they are not Japanese nationals, then learning Japanese and becoming a Japan specialist has transformed them into cosmopolitans almost by definition.

Our surveys have also tracked this globalization of Japanese studies.

First, we could see the traditional notion of movement between Japan and the United States. Second, we could see that Japanese studies had globalized, through our data on their connections with the United States and Canada. And third, through some events sponsored by the Japan Foundation, I came to appreciate how much of global Japanese studies bypasses the United States completely. It seems natural that Japan specialists all over the world would be eager to participate in Japanese studies activities in Japan, but there is also increasing interaction between Japan specialists based in the United States and those in Europe and Australia. The Japan Foundation is also now encouraging interaction with Japan specialists in Southeast Asia and China. This increased international interaction among Japan specialists now constitutes a global community of Japan specialists, including, of course, those who

live and work in Japan, but travel abroad. I believe we must encourage our graduate students to participate in this global Japanese Studies community, precisely because they are likely to be entering a global job market for Japan specialists and a global arena for research on Japan. This global community of Japan is readily accessible through open participation in academic organizations that focus on Japan in Europe, Japan, Australia, and elsewhere. In the United States, there isn't a separate Japanese Studies Association to which most Japan specialists belong, but they participate actively in Association for Asian Studies and some disciplinary associations also have Japan-related groups. I have been involved for 20 years in organizing a small Japan Sociologists Network that meets both at the AAS and American Sociological Association. It is modeled after a larger and older group of political scientists who meet at the AAS and also at the American Political Science Association. I also have been participating in the European Association for Japanese Studies, which holds a big conference every third year in an interesting European city. So, if you are giving a paper, your institution may underwrite your travel costs to go to places like Ljubljana, Tallinn, or Lisbon. Now, who wouldn't want to do that? All of these organizations, unlike many Japanese academic organizations, are open to anyone who wants to join. Anyone can submit a paper for presentation at their meetings. You may have to pay your dues to do it, but you don't have to be sponsored by anybody; they are not closed associations and they are also very open to graduate student participation. These are opportunities which I hope all of you will begin to take advantage of.

I want to add just a little bit more about the fact that you can scale globalization down even further to undergraduate classrooms. Whether the students in our Japan-related courses intend to become Japan specialists or not, (and nowadays, most of them do not), by teaching these courses, we are contributing to the creation of cosmopolitan attitudes and behavior. This is all part of globalization. For the past three days, I have been reporting on the normalization of Japanese studies in American

colleges and universities. By this I mean that taking a course on Japan or even taking Japanese language is no longer limited to this specific category of people who want to become professional Japan specialists, which used to be the only people who took those things. Now, our undergraduate courses attract students who take them out of curiosity, to fill some general education requirement, or simply because the class fits their schedule. But whatever the reason, they are in those Japan classes, and they are learning something. By offering these courses, we are contributing to their broad general education. At the same time, the fact that undergraduates regardless of their major or career plans take courses on Japan helps to embed Japanese studies into the curriculum in the United States, and provides jobs for Japan specialists. The same applies to study in Japan, which is no longer a marker of a pre-existing long-term commitment to Japanese language and area studies, but conversely, may help a few more people to get hooked on Japan and become committed. Whether it does or does not get them hooked on Japan, from the perspective of globalization, it has helped to foster the development of the cosmopolitan attitudes and adaptability that are seen as essential qualities for success in an era of globalization.

There has been a drop in Japanese students coming to the US in the last few years, and American Japan specialists have been concerned about it and have discussed it with the Japanese government. In part because of that pressure, MEXT has been promoting study abroad and international education. As part of earlier neoliberal changes to make Japanese academic institutions compete for resources that used to come automatically as block grants, MEXT has offered a series of competitions to stimulate development and to promote international programs. The first was G30, which created silo programs, staffed by completely outside people and attracting mostly students from other countries. It is not clear what it accomplished except to accommodate foreign students from other parts of Asia. MEXT then moved on to develop other programs to bring internationalization more directly into Japanese uni-

versities. I suspect that your Global Japan Studies Program is in some way connected to one of these waves.

My sense is that these programs have tended to attract more non-Japanese students than Japanese. Some of them have been staffed by American-trained native Japanese, who otherwise would have had a lot of trouble breaking into the Japanese job market, but suddenly are very attractive candidates. I have placed several people in these jobs because they have all the qualities needed for such positions: they can teach in Japanese or English; they probably have taught in an American institution; and they can handle sending people on study abroad tours anywhere the program wants to send them. Fortunately, some of those positions also have led to more permanent positions for these talented and well-trained scholars. I see it as a big win for my graduate students but I am not sure how much of a win it is for the Japanese students that were supposed to be the beneficiaries of these programs.

I have not talked yet about the negative aspects of neoliberal globalization, the risks of everyday life that are being foisted off on individuals instead of being part of a social compact with the state. Under neoliberal globalization, the orientation to economic competition is relentlessly applied to other facets of life. Increasing concentration of wealth among global elites has produced much greater inequality and instability at lower levels in a society. Many people do not share in globalization's benefits, and globalization unquestionably produces winners and losers. We are not yet seeing great impact of these negative impacts on Japanese studies. The metric has worked in our favor so far, at least in the US with high enrollments in Japan-related courses. If those enrollments start to fall off, then we are going to see the other negative side of it. Consequently, I think we need to think about the normalization of Japanese studies in American institutions as a way of tempering our expectations about how Japanese studies will fare in the future. For many reasons that are outside of our

control, Japanese studies has had a great ride in the last half of the 20th century. Part of the steady growth in Japanese studies programs was due to the fact until 1990, virtually all of the Japan specialists in the United States were still alive, because the field was young and attractive. In the 1990s, just as the oldest generation of American Japan specialists were retiring and dying, Japan experienced its lost decade. And then a decade later came the triple disasters in Tohoku. In some ways, Japan has become more of a normal country with normal problems and less of a fascinating mystery. Study abroad, the JET Program, and Japanese popular culture all still draw young people to Japan, so some fraction of those people will get hooked on Japan and want to make it a permanent part of their lives. But that number may shrink over time and so, coupled with the reduced number of Japanese coming to the US to enter either graduate school or undergraduate programs, this is going to mean declining enrollments in Japanese studies courses. Right now, Japanese studies is embedded pretty well in about half of all colleges and universities in the United States, and staff numbers are driven by strong enrollments in Japanese language. If that declines, there will be an overall decline in demand. That does not mean Japanese Studies is going to disappear. If there are tenured faculty in an institution, because of the Japan boom, they are not going away.

And so there will still be Japanese studies. But it may mean that the heyday of Japanese studies as a special field with great cachet in an era of mystery, is over. In that case, Japan would simply take its place beside many other countries that offer language and cultural exposure to American students. Studying Japanese and taking history and literature courses on Japan would then become normal, just like studying French or German and taking French or German history and literature courses. There are worse fates than being just a normal part of a college education. But it isn't as satisfying as being special. I don't think this could happen overnight, but it could happen in the next couple of decades. I suspect that this also may be the fate of

American Studies and other area studies fields in Japan. In their place programs such as Global Japan Studies may provide the gateway to a cosmopolitan future.



Now I have just a few parting points to summarize what I have been talking about. What lessons are there here? First, globalization is all around us, embedded in and transforming Japan, and it is not going to go away. If you open your eyes, you can study it at any level and anywhere you look. Second, globalization may be next in the series of paradigms shaping Japanese studies. I have never tried to look at what the paradigms are that have shaped Japanese studies in Japan. It is an interesting question for somebody to look at, not me. I suspect that Japanese studies in Japan and in the US were probably different up until now but globalization may be the point at which they merge and that the next paradigm is the same for both. Third, globalized Japanese studies is becoming less special and more normalized, which also means institutionalized, and that's okay. Fourth, and most important, we are now all part of a Globalized Japanese Studies Community. There's much to learn from participating in this Global Japanese Studies Community. So I encourage you all to build global relationships by participating in research conferences, specifically

concerned with Japan, as well as the disciplinary organizations that also bring people together with academic and professional interests in Japan. I look forward to seeing you there. Thank you.

Sonoda: Thank you very much for very fascinating talk. I happened to be invited by Association for Indonesian Japan studies this November, where one professor explained about 50-year history of Japan studies in Indonesia, which is very different from US, but basically very similar. The professor also used three paradigms. You happened to mention the economic competition. But probably competition is a term for the US scholars in faculty of economics. Probably the direction of so-called Japan Studies in local communities has been influenced by the nature of Japanese society and politics at that time. This is my first comment.

As Professor Steinhoff clearly mentioned her own commitment to the social movements studies, and I guess she made a lot of efforts to create the Takazawa Collection. It shows very paradoxical dynamics of Japan studies. The locality of Japan is not necessary nor sufficient condition to be a good Japan expert. I believe those students who are interested in studying about extreme social activism in Japan's 60s and 70s should go to Hawai'i rather than studying in Japan. This is my second comment. This paradox can be connected with my third observation about the co-existence of mutual enforcement of globalization and localization. As Professor Steinhoff clearly stated that the establishment or promotion of global Japan studies has heavily led to Japanese university policies to increase an element of English programs offered in English. But one of the problems is that we have to ask ourselves what we have to teach. Do we have to teach translated English lecture in English or do we have to teach social sciences introduced from US in English? It's really a paradoxical thing. We have to find something normal. So, under Professor Nakajima's initiative, we started to create a new concept, Tokyo School, which is a very artificial

concept. Many historians talk about Kyoto school. But when we reflect on ourselves, what have the scholars in humanities and social sciences of UTokyo done? Probably we can find something very local in nature, which has something global. For example, the case of Professor Hirofumi Uzawa. His legacy has been disappearing in the Faculty of Economics, unfortunately. But still, he's a super big guy. We can learn a lot from him, by creating the new concept to make the matching between local concepts and global dimensions, this is my third comment.

Now I have two questions. One question is, you said that there were about 500 to 600 PhD candidates in Japan studies.

Steinhoff: That's current. Current graduate students, yes.

Sonoda: Right, then what sort of jobs do they have? Are they within academia or outside of academia? And, if they are working out of academia, what sort of job are they doing? As long as we use English or other foreign languages to be a member of global Japan studies community, we have a very broad thinking, have much broader and open attitudes, while Japanese-speaking communities of Japan studies will survive somehow. Then the question is, how we can merge or connect them together? I am sorry, I am not asking for complete solution. But I want to hear your ideas. How do you think that these two different communities should do together or should do separately? Thank you.

Steinhoff: Okay, I have to go in reverse order, because I have forgotten the first question. Now we are on the third. About the third one, obviously what it requires is people who can function in both languages, who can be the bridge. I lecture in both English and Japanese, but it's a whole lot more work when I have to do it in Japanese. So, I agreed to do this talk on the grounds that it would be in English. And I didn't take an-

other opportunity to talk about the same thing that required me to do it in Japanese, because it was too much work. But I do it. I often take such opportunities simply because it's going to force me to do it. Okay. There are lots of other younger Japan specialists who are much more totally bilingual who can do that without thinking about it. That's what you have to have, because if you are going to talk to a Japanese speaking only Japanese studies community, you have to talk to them in Japanese. The first step, I think, because it's an easier step, is publishing in both languages.

I encourage people to do that, and I have done it. And actually, I think I am better known in Japan because of that book I published in Japanese than I am in the US because of what I do in Japanese studies. So part of it is using the skill that is essential to what you do, in order to bridge the gaps. Okay, now, let's go on to the other questions. One was about doctoral students in the US and what kinds of jobs they get.

I have been very worried about what is happening to our doctoral students, because there is another parallel, neoliberal phenomenon going on in the US, which is that they are trying to use adjunct faculty, (term lecturers and temporary appointments) as much as possible, They don't want to make the long term commitment to tenured faculty, so universities are limiting those options. When I looked at the data, because we just did the follow up study, I was quite relieved because what's happening is, there's a gap after people get their PhD. In most cases, they do not immediately walk into the kind of tenure track job that in the past they would have expected to get. A small percentage of them do get a tenure track position right away, but otherwise, they have some kind of adjunct position for a couple of years, then a regular position opens up, and they get it. I was surprised that a very high number of our recent PhDs in Japanese Studies fields were getting good Assistant Professor level positions, but not right out of graduate school. I think that's not just Japanese

studies, that's across the board.

So, the fact that we have had high enrollments for Japan-related courses means that there is still a demand for people to teach them. For Japanese language courses, they can get away with hiring lecturers and not regular positions, but for the area courses, then they really have to hire faculty and I think that's happening. I am a sociologist, and I teach my graduate students who are studying Japan, that they have two tracks in the job market. You can focus on your Japan research, and try to get hired because you are a Japan specialist, but in fact, most American jobs in sociology are not labeled for Japan specialists; they are jobs for sociologists. I call those serendipity hires. If the Japan specialist by chance is hired on their sociological credentials into a sociology department, and if by the way, this person is also a Japan specialist, then in most cases, they can then begin to use their Japan specialization once they are hired on their sociology credentials.

If you think about it, in the real world, how many people actually get a job that is exactly in their research specialization? Very few. They are hired to teach undergraduate courses and maybe some other things, and they have a research interest. It is part of normalization, that Japanese studies is getting to be like that. But if you are a social scientist, trained in a social science disciplinary department, you have those two routes. My biggest fear about the cultural studies paradigm is that it pretends to be studying social sciences, but it is doing it through a cultural studies lens, and it is not teaching the methods and the foundational knowledge that a disciplinary social scientist is expected to have. So when they get out, they can get hired in cultural studies or a Japanese or East Asian Studies Department, and they can do interesting stuff there, but they are not going to get a job in a mainstream social science academic discipline, because they don't have the expected disciplinary training.

Sonoda: Okay. Thank you very much for your answer. From now, let's start the time of raising questions. Please identify yourself first and then try to ask questions.

Male postdoc: Thank you. I am currently a postdoc at the Faculty of Law, UTokyo. I am a historian of 19th century Japanese international relations. Can I ask you to comment on one of the emerging trends in global education which is competitive for international students? I earned my PhD in London at LSE and I was struck by the fact that there was some tendency to see international students as an easy way to get money, because they are paying higher tuition fee. So is that a factor in the recent trend in Japan studies in the United States, too? Is the enrollment supported by local students or international students?

Steinhoff: Interesting question. I think there is some tendency to see international students as a source of easy money because they pay higher tuition. That's not been what Japanese studies in the United States was built on. It was mostly built on an American audience, but in the last 20 years or so there have been more foreign students coming both at the undergraduate and the graduate level. If they come as undergraduates, they are less likely to be in Japanese studies courses because they came for other reasons. But a few of them do gravitate into it. And of course, if they do that, they have a natural advantage because they don't have to waste time learning Japanese. So, I think most of the cries about losing Japanese students were coming from Harvard. Susan Pharr is complaining all the time about it. What happened to our Japanese students? Part of it is that they can't pass the TOEFL at the level that Harvard wants. Well, we can't do anything about that. But I think it also may have something to do with Harvard and where the selection decisions are made.

At the University of Hawai'i in sociology we have had waves of graduate students from different countries over the past 15-20 years. We had a Korea wave, and

then we had a China wave, then we had a Japan wave, and now we have a Southeast Asian wave. But that has to do with the fact that it is a sociology department and where those people want to get the kind of advanced training that is going to advance their career when they go home. When Japanese students come to the US as graduate students, I don't particularly expect that they are going to do Japanese studies in the sociology department. And some of them don't. They do whatever they were interested in when they came. But some of them do gravitate to studying Japan, in part because our department specializes in comparative study of East Asia, which is a highly unusual specialization for an American sociology department, and in part because I can hire them to work on the Takazawa collection and they get hooked on those materials, which are inherently fascinating. And sometimes, if they are having any trouble with English, it is easier for them to do research in Japanese, particularly if there's somebody who will let them do it, who isn't going to make them translate everything into English before they can proceed.

So I think it depends on the place and the time. Clearly administrators see foreign students as a money pot, academics less so. We are more interested in whether this person is going to be an interesting student that I want to work with. So some of this is an administrative issue, because of neoliberal globalization. That kind of economic metric is driving a lot of other things.

Sonoda: Thank you. They are more interested in high quality, highly qualified students to maintain the high quality of research.

Steinhoff: Yes. Well, that's good. That's very nice. And it's also very nice that you are in a situation where there isn't any tuition differential, state universities are the source. I mean, at Harvard, everybody's paying astronomical amounts unless there's a big support somehow. But at Hawai'i, in state tuition is very reasonable. And out-of-state tuition is two to three times as much. So the incentive is there.

Sun: Thank you, Professor Steinhoff for the fascinating talk. My name is Sun Jing. I am a political scientist, and I am an associate professor from the University of Denver. I have two questions. The first question is, how do you define what a Japan specialist is? I totally agree with your argument that Japan studies has become truly, transnational, and that's a point that I am feeling on a day-to-day basis. The question is, power is crucial concept for political scientists. So, as I studied power, I can't help but realizing that as you and the coordinator mentioned, the job market in America has become a microscopic reflection of the power shift in Asia, and I am mentioning this because I am Chinese national, but I was trained in Wisconsin as a Japan Specialist.

So, the chairperson of my department at the University of Denver used to joke the reason for the University of Denver to hire me was buy one, get one free. Japan Specialist.

Steinhoff: And you get a Chinese specialist. Good.

Sun: And now that I am on the other end of the job market. For Japan specialist, or political scientists who are doing research about Japan, the job market is shrinking. 15 years ago, 20 years ago, an East Asian person usually meant a Japan person, but nowadays is a China person. So I am just wondering, what's your take on that?

Steinhoff: I will say, first of all that, through both changes over all in the demographics of who comes and who's available from these areas, and because of changes within the discipline of political science, it has become one of the more hostile disciplines towards any kind of area expertise. If you have it as a native speaker, that's fine. Okay. But they are not very interested in having people spend their time learning a foreign language. And they don't really think it is necessary. Why can't you hire a research assistant to gather the material or do it from indexes that are readily available in the

library? That's the kind of argument that I hear from political scientists, and the shift to rational choice within political science has been disastrous for it. I am sorry you are not finding so many people in the directory, but I can think of a couple of reasons.

First of all, we send things out at two levels. We have people who have never been in the Japan Specialist Directory, and so they get the specialist stuff, but whether they answer the questionnaire or not, I can't control. I can bug them. But if they don't want to do it, they don't want to do it. The other thing is, and this is where the bias comes, is that we work with Japanese studies programs. So, the places that have more visible organized Japanese studies programs are going to have an extra leg up in telling us who the people are. And they have some kind of a small vested interest in having all those people be in the directory. So, we usually work with them and encourage them to prod those who are slow or help them if they are older people who don't know how to do an online form.

But we only know about the people at those institutions because the institutional program is making us aware of it. Now, Japanese studies programs have been expanding. And we have been tracking that expansion. Within a 20 to 30 year period, there has been quite remarkable expansion in that the programs, the established programs, have gotten bigger and bigger. The number of programs that have really a lot of people in them is still a modest number, but it's so much bigger. I mean, the little programs today are the size that the big ones were 20 years ago. So there has been this expansion, which also means people are in more places. But it's also true that particularly in the social sciences, people are getting jobs because of their social science degree, not because of their area specialization. And so a lot of them are at places that do not have a formal Japanese studies program. Now, sometimes they go there, and they find that there are actually three or more people there who have similar interests, and they can kind of create a cluster. Usually first they start with Asian

Studies, and then when they have enough people they can branch out by country or whatever. But is University of Denver as an institution in there?

Sun: Asian studies.

Steinhoff: Yes. So that's usually the first level, the smaller programs, it's all under Asian Studies, it's harder for us to get the Asian Studies program to give us any help with the Japan piece of it, which may threaten their interests, if they may have two Japan specialists and four of something else in there. So that's part of it. But that also tells me that you are at a place which is at the lower level of extent of Asian interest, which means that it's harder for us to find you. The other thing is that political scientists typically and in international relations, by definition, you are studying multiple places. There are some foreign relations, international relations, people who are primarily Japan specialists, and it sounds like you were, who are you working with?

Sun: David Lainey.

Steinhoff: Yes. But he's not there anymore. You were at Wisconsin?

Sun: Yes. I was when I was a graduate student at Wisconsin.

Steinhoff: Right. He's not there anymore. He's at Princeton. Yes, he moves around.

Sun: IR.

Steinhoff: Yes, okay there are some people who are IR people who are primarily Japan specialists, but they are more likely to be working in two or more places, and therefore not to be as visible as Japan specialists.

Sun: Thank you.

Sonoda: Any other comments or questions? Whatever comments or question?

Yoneno: Good afternoon. I am Michiyo Yoneno-Reyes, Associate professor here. I had taught at the University of the Philippines for 17 years. And I recall in the 1990s till 2000 there was a strong pressure from the Japan Foundation to open undergraduate Japan studies program. And we resisted strongly. Because of our worries about the undergraduates and graduates, bachelors, degree holders in area studies without disciplinary background. But then recently, the Japan Foundation finally gave up that idea. So I think we were correct.

Especially now, when I heard from you, towards the end of your answering Professor Sonoda's questions that you expressed your worries about the cultural studies paradigm and students of Japan studies especially those who do not have a disciplinary or methodological foundation. So, my question is, in the United States in the 80s and 90s, was there any such kind of pressure from the Japan Foundation to support or open more undergraduate courses in Japan Studies.

Steinhoff: Yes. There was a thriving Japanese Studies community in the United States and they had already given million dollar endowments to the biggest programs that we are producing the PhDs. For a long time I described the situation in the US as being like a volcano, (because I come from Hawai'i). There is a big base of undergraduate programs and partial programs, and a small number that are producing PhDs, and they are producing many more PhDs than they can absorb. So, what happens is that the PhDs come out of the top of the volcano and go rolling downhill and get hired someplace else.

The expansion comes because these PhDs trained at elite institutions have to

find jobs elsewhere. The expansion of the number of places with PhD programs has been slower and more gradual. The Japan Foundation was most interested in populating new programs in the places that didn't have any Japanese Studies, but because of the structure in the US and their own budget, they were not in a position to put in a whole program. Instead, they would provide partial funding for five years if the institution would hire one person. That was a way to get their foot in the door. And so they were not dictating even what discipline the person would be in, they would have a competition and some institutions would win a Japan Specialist.

The problem was they got burned a lot of times because the institution said, Sure. And then at the end of the five years they would tell the person they had hired, we don't have any more money for you, we can't hire you. So, it didn't have the kind of permanence that they hoped for. But it did help. We have a lot of undergraduates in Hawai'i who major in Japanese language and literature as their academic discipline. They basically learn the language and they get a little linguistics, and then what do they do with it? When they graduate they have to decide whether they want to be translators, or language teachers or want to use the language for some other purpose. Hawai'i produces a lot of those people and I don't know where they go.

There are a lot of US programs that were started under the language and area studies model at the MA level, with an interdisciplinary program that is heavily language, but they also offer a smattering of other disciplines. That's similar to my own background, I don't have an MA, but I had an undergraduate degree from the University of Michigan in Japanese language and had taken some area studies courses as an undergraduate. I needed a discipline to go any farther and chose sociology. I leapfrogged over the MA level, because I had the language training before I was in graduate school and I went into a sociology PhD program at Harvard without an MA. But at the University of Hawai'i we also have an interdisciplinary MA in Asian

Studies, where you can specialize in Japanese Studies. As director of the Center for Japanese Studies I oversaw those MA students. They have interesting ideas, they have great depth in their understanding of Japan, but they don't have a disciplinary background. That shows when they are trying to write an MA thesis, and they don't know how to do it, because they don't have disciplinary focus and methods. In the US the solution is to give them the broad interdisciplinary training at the MA level and ignore the limitations in their thesis. If they are good enough to go on, you help them find a discipline and they get the disciplinary training at the PhD level. That doesn't make sense in either the Japanese or the European higher education system, because their PhD programs are basically doing a dissertation, not learning a discipline and then doing a dissertation, which is how the American system works.

Even in the US, there are a lot of disciplines that won't take a PhD student who has no background in that discipline so they make them do an MA before they can enter the doctoral program. Some sociology departments including ours are fairly loose about it, and people come to us from many backgrounds. We get ex-journalists, we get all kinds of people who have a sociological sense of the world. Some we admit (as Harvard did with me) directly into the doctoral program. We teach them sociology and they do fine. I think there are lots of disciplines where if you didn't study it as an undergraduate or at an early stage, you cannot start at the doctoral level.

Yoneno: Do undergraduates entering master program have disciplinary foundation?

Steinhoff: I think it's a combination. I used to be at the Center for Japanese studies half time, so I worked with those MA students. Increasingly, I think we have more undergraduates who have been in some kind of an area or interdisciplinary program, they are undergraduate Asian Studies students, and then they go into the MA in Japanese studies. And then at the end of that then, it's pretty late, but they are figur-

ing out a discipline. There is more of that now, because there are more undergraduate programs that are interdisciplinary. If they have had no disciplinary training up till then, I don't know. I mean, it really depends on the student if the student is bright and interesting, and has interesting ideas. In a lot of European PhD programs and a lot of Japanese PhD programs, when you are at the PhD level, you are done with the classes, you are just doing your dissertation. American PhDs are not like that. You have two years of courses and then maybe you can think about taking comps and then move to the dissertation, so it is a longer program. That is partly because there is not a lot of confidence that they have sufficient background before they were admitted.

Yoneno: Thank you very much for sharing.

Sonoda: Okay, any other questions?

Student 1: I am a master's student in this program. I have one question, I think you mentioned in your talk that there's a shift of trends in Japanese Study view that is to focus more on politics and economic affairs, now, they tend to focus more on the cultural study. So I am interested in the reasons behind this phenomenon. Is it because the culture of globalization process like the Japanese popular culture serve as soft power and it attracts more scholars to study about Japanese culture, or is it because, in general, they need the process the neoliberalism and the globalization made, that is, the emergence of the transnational capital may lead policy and Economic Studies?

Steinhoff: Okay, that's an interesting notion. And I don't know the answer to it. What I can say is that the paradigms that I have described are ways that the field organized itself and understood itself at different times. And so it's not necessarily

the way that students understood it, or what students wanted, it was simply the way the institution was organized at that time. And in the early period, it was all language and area studies. But then, because of the 1980s, Japan as number one phenomenon, there was suddenly a huge demand for practical skills like law and economics, because there was money to be made in Japan. So they created the programs because there was a demand in American society, there were jobs for people with that sort of training. They produced a lot of well-trained Japan specialist lawyers, most of whom went to work for big law firms, which may or may not have used their Japan expertise. Big corporations also hired Japan specialists, but they then put them into a regular rotation where only once in a while did they make use of their Japanese training. Only a small fraction of those people ended up in academics, as academic Japan lawyers. Even worse with economics, there were special programs to train economists about the Japanese economy. When they got out, their starting salaries were three times the starting salary of an academic so they didn't go into academics, They were working for all kinds of firms that needed them as economists, but they didn't populate academic Japanese studies. It is part of the normalization of Japanese studies that there are other jobs for Japan specialists outside of academics. You don't have to be an academic, because being a professor is not the only thing you can do with the Japan specialization. There are a lot of people with MAs who are journalists, or who are in the Foreign Service or in other government positions. They have MA level expertise, and their employers, government or private, would prefer that they have some language training, but that they also could be moved around. Companies wanted to send the person to Bahrain for five years, and then to Indonesia, and then maybe to Japan. They weren't really interested in their depth of Japan-specific knowledge. So, on the one hand, they went through Japanese MA programs and they are now employed, but whether they are out there as Japan specialists or whether they are still in the academy as Japan specialists are really open questions.

Student 2: Thank you, professor. I am also from the same department, and I am also one of the beneficiaries of this G30 program. I have two questions. One is for Professor Steinhoff and one is for Professor Sonoda. And from my observation, my Chinese classmates, if they are interested in Japanese studies, they will choose to learn Japanese and to do these kinds of research in Japan rather than choose the US. I wonder under this circumstances, can you say that the group of the Japanese studies well expanding at a stage? And the second question is for Professor Sonoda, you designed the ITASIA program?

Sonoda: I am not the one.

Student 2: What do you think, when you are working in this program, how will you combine the globalization and localization in the program? What was your answer to this question?

Sonoda: You are giving me a very delicate question.

Steinhoff: I think that probably for Chinese native speakers, it makes a lot of sense to come to Japan to learn Japanese, because of the overlap that you already know Chinese characters even if you have to relearn some of them. That is a more comfortable, natural way to do it. But for people from a lot of other places, it may be easier to learn Japanese studies in an American context. I think for a lot of Southeast Asian students, my sense is that they tend to use the American textbooks and to learn it the way Americans would learn Japanese. So really your cultural advantage or disadvantage may affect where you go, and distance and available scholarships may also affect it. I think we don't have that large a cohort of Chinese students coming to the US to study Japanese. We have Koreans studying Japan in the United States. They may feel that they would have more discrimination if they did it in Japan. I

don't know. I am sure there are many Koreans studying in Japan. But I meet many more Koreans who are doing Japan topics in Hawai'i than I do Chinese.

Sonoda: It is my time to answer the question. As you know, ITASIA program is a kind of joint venture between Interfaculty Initiative in Information Studies and institute for Advanced Studies in Asia. But what we mean by the word "Asia" is something lacking Japan. For example, Global Japan Studies has been initiated and manipulated by the professors in this institute. But before that, there were some differences or discrepancy between Japan on one hand Asia on the other hand, that is, is Japan not included in Asia?

That's what I want to say. Asian studies in UTokyo or other universities in Japan is something that are focused on Asia out of Japan. But I found that, even though we are using Asia, but as you know, that many students who join the program want to know something about Japan. So that's the reason why I said that localization is leading. I think it is a very good timing for us now to provide more professors and researchers into the ITASIA program that can enrich the definition or understanding of Asian Studies, just by putting Japan on our cognitive map of Asia.

Steinhoff: Yes. I think the Japan Foundation also for the last decade or so has been very much pushing the notion of Japan in Asia. Before the 80s Japan was part of Asia. Then starting in the 1980s it made more sense to compare Japan to Western democracies, because it was so different from other parts of Asia. Now the rest of Asia has changed, and its makes sense to put Japan back into its Asian context again.

Nakajima: Sorry for being late. I chaired the new library meeting. That was also about the notion of Asia, the library is entitled as Asia Research Library. So, today, we talked about the ideal of this new library. So there was a question. Does this Asia involve Japan, right?

Steinhoff: Yes. Sure yes.

Nakajima: I said definitely. Japan is in Asia but there is a kind of a dispute of faculties. I share the strategic optimism with you. We should focus on the brighter side of globalization. So, putting Japanese studies in much wider context.

Yes, that must be fun. Professor Sonoda said that we have very hard Japanese studies like Japanese history, Japanese literature. They were made before us as national history.

There still remains such a kind of transparency between such national and global Japanese studies.

So how do you overcome this unhappy situation? Right. That's aims in this regional studies. So Professor Sonoda said, we are trying to find a new angle to intervene in the situation that means by using the notion of heuristic motion of Tokyo School, and to find a new place of thinking on Japanese Studies. Maybe from the social or logical viewpoint, you can say something about disputesin Japan studies.

Steinhoff: When I think about what you were saying, I realized, yes, if you are a student of Japanese history in the United States, you will study premodern as well as modern history to some extent. And you may study with a more traditional Japanese history specialist for whom that is national history. And if you are studying Japanese literature, particularly pre-modern literature, you may be studying with a more traditional kind of a scholar. Those scholars have networks with the people that they studied with in Japan. Social scientists are a bit different. They share a different body of theoretical material, which is not the same as the Japanese materials you are going to study in the humanities.

Does the notion of transnational interactions, that Japan is interacting with the rest of Asia, open a space for certain kinds of questions? Not for everything, but how

can you not talk about Japan when it is interacting with other countries in Asia?

Nakajima: Maybe a very important point is the thinking on the circulation of concepts, ideas and other materials. How can we focus on this circulation? That's one of the very important topics. Coming Japanese studies, I think, right? So if we focus on this, I have to say by using the heuristic culture Tokyo School. Tokyo School is a kind of name on the first globalization in Japan. Pick up National history, national religion, or national language. Altogether in this.

Steinhoff: Interesting. Okay, very nice.

Student 3: Good afternoon Professor Steinhoff, thank you very much for your very decisive lecture on studying how we study Japanese studies. I got very interested in the discussion about the prospect for the emergence of a new paradigm; the Japanese Studies because all the coursework that I did when I was in my MA studies like my colleagues, contemporaries in the graduate school were all interested in migration studies, identity politics, gender studies, specifically Japanese masculinity studies in contemporary Japan, I would normally see name some scholars from the OCEANIA region.

So although of course my observations are not conclusive, I was wondering if you could give us or if you have any information about Japanese studies in other countries, for example, in Latin America. Now will you mention globalization as the potential paradigm, I immediately think of the dominant discourse, which is the homogenizing discourse of globalization, but it seems that we are having our specialization, context specific. Also in region specific topics in Japanese studies. So you were talking about—

Steinhoff: Okay. First of all, I really don't know what's going on in Japanese stud-

ies in Latin America, but I know a little bit about what is happening in Europe. But again, in Europe there's a divide between the classical Japanology traditional way of learning, which starts with philology, or the more social science approach to contemporary Japan, and they often are taught in two different places, because the divide is there very strongly. I think that in an area where Japanese studies is just developing, you have more freedom to make it what you want it to be and to deal with contemporary issues. And, to me, globalization is not really about homogenization, because localization is an important part of it. The political science literature about globalization is all about these supranational institutions, but as a sociologist I would rather look at what is happening every day, all around us. You can find "glocalization" anywhere. You can look at the interaction between this local place, and how it is impacted by globalization. I think you are already on the cutting edge, because the topics you are mentioning are very contemporary topics. So hang with it, you are on the right track.

Student 3: Thank you very much.

Sonoda: Time is approaching but I'd like to ask some members from the division of international affair to put more practical questions from staff perspective. Complete questions, say what University of Tokyo can do with the University of Hawai'i, don't have any question about that.

Do you have any ideas about what you can do? Or why I can do it? Completely, to promote more content new type of global Japan studies.

Steinhoff: Okay, I cut out a section in which I was going to say that the kinds of short-term field studies that are now being promoted in Japan are not very useful, as I think you already know. I think the only way that it's really going to have any depth to it, is if you create a cohort of students from both sides who are able to work

together on a common project and who have the opportunity to go back and forth, rather than just taking a bunch of students from one place and dropping them in another institution for two weeks.

Nakajima: We have been running a summer institute with University of Hawai‘i and our University of Tokyo for five years. So, we went to Kīlauea altogether. It was very cold. We have our graduate students altogether. We constitute such joint university culture altogether.

Steinhoff: Good. So there were Hawai‘i students in it, too. Great. That’s how you do it. You have got to build long-term relations between the people. I think that is key.

Nakajima: University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa has very rich literatures on Okinawa. Japanese Americans. They are very important archives that Japanese students do not know. So maybe we can continue to research.

Steinhoff: Yeah, I think the door is open and our dean is very enthusiastic.

Sonoda: Okay. Well, I am sorry to say that we are running out of time. I think we still have some question, but anyway please give Professor Steinhoff a big hand.

Steinhoff: Thank you very much. Thank you. I have enjoyed it.

著者紹介

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

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

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