

**National Taiwan University – University of Tokyo  
Joint Workshop  
for Young Sociologists 2024**

**Sociological Exploration of ‘Global Asia’**

January 19, 2024



**GAS**  
Global  
Asian Studies



**國立臺灣大學**  
National Taiwan University

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
## Preface

This booklet is the product of joint workshop titled “Sociological Exploration of ‘Global Asia’” which was co-hosted by National Taiwan University (NTU) and the University of Tokyo (UTokyo) on 19th of January, 2024. As I told in my welcoming speech, the history of our joint activities can be traced back to the joint summer program in 2012, but this is the first trial for us to record what our students presented in this joint workshop. 5 students from NTU and 8 students from UTokyo made a variety of reports on different topics of Global Asia, covering migration, international business, colonialism, education, identity, and so on.

I’m very grateful for GAS and Department of Sociology of NTU for their financial support for our joint activities. I’m also grateful for Mr. Alleson Villota Decena II, who joined last year’s joint workshop in Taipei, for his devotion to edit this booklet.

February 17, 2024

Shigeto Sonoda

A handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of the initials 'S.' followed by the name 'Sonoda' in a cursive script, with a horizontal line underneath.

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# Welcome Address and Opening Remarks

SONODA Shigeto & SU Kuo-Hsien



**Professor SONODA Shigeto, The University of Tokyo**



Good morning. We are still missing two professors, as well as one student whom I can easily expect to arrive late. Welcome to the University of Tokyo's Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia. We have gathered here today for the workshop for young sociologists. Every time we hold this workshop, everyone asks me what we mean by 'young sociologists.' Of course, the definition is quite difficult. The subtitle states, 'Sociological Exploration of Global Asia,' but you may be wondering how to connect your topic with the concept of global Asia. You do not have to

worry about this, and there are several reasons. First, because I must secure funding to support this workshop. I had to use the budget of the Global Asia Program of this Institute, which is why we needed the concept of Global Asia. The second reason is a rather confidential. When Professor Su was selecting several applications from NTU students, we discussed whose proposals should be accepted. I mentioned that these applications should have an international dimension to the research, even though they are solely focusing on Taiwan. Moreover, the topics of UTokyo students have already some connection with the global dimensions of social transformation or social structures in contemporary Asian society.

I originally wanted Professor Lin Kuo-Ming to say a few words, but he is still on his way. Therefore, I would like to ask Professor Su to say a few words and present the NTU delegates.

### **Professor SU Kuo-Hsien, National Taiwan University**



Thank you very much. Good morning, everyone. My name is Kuo-Hsien Su, and I am from National Taiwan University. I am very delighted to be here. I have lost count of how many times we have had this exchange since 2009. My impression is that while we visit in Tokyo occasionally, the Japanese team visits Taipei more often, perhaps in a two-to-one ratio. Each time we come here, we receive generous financial support from Todai, for which we are truly grateful. However, despite having funding, it is challenging to accommodate all the students who wish to participate in exchanges abroad. Tokyo is always the most popular destination for us. This year, we successfully solicited 12 applicants. However, as the number exceeds the capacity, we must decide and I let Professor Sonoda to make the tough job of select-

ing only five students. Professor Sonoda has a very good pair of eyes and picked the best students among the applicants.

We have a diverse range of students, including Ph.D. students, undergraduates, and master's students. I hope you enjoy our workshop and learn as much as from each other.

### **Professor SONODA Shigeto, The University of Tokyo**

Thank you very much. I would like to provide some additional information regarding what Professor Su mentioned. Before we had this joint workshop, we had joint programs which were conducted either in summer or spring. Our collaboration began in 2012 and as Professor Su mentioned, we often brought our students from the University of Tokyo to Taiwan. This is a very long story, but for us to establish university-level exchanges, we had to make a lot of considerations. At that time, I was working for the Division of International Affairs at the University of Tokyo. I approached to the Department of Sociology to initiate some appealing program that would encourage more UTokyo students to participate in exchanges to Taiwan. Historically, and even now, when it comes to exchanges, the push from Taiwan is much stronger than that of the push from UTokyo. Therefore, we tried to set up some attractive meetings, workshops, and programs especially for undergraduate students at UTokyo to encourage participation in exchange programs with NTU. Over time, we had implemented a lot of interesting programs. In 2014, Tsai-Ing Wen, who was not the President of Taiwan at that time, served as the head of Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). During this time, we also had the opportunity to meet with Mr. Joseph Wu, the Minister of Foreign Affairs. We engaged in extensive discussions with Tsai Ing-Wen, who was then the head of DPP.

***6 Joint Summer (Spring) Programs between NTU and UTokyo:  
2012-2018***



*(1) August 11-16, 2012 @ Taipei*



*(3) August 15 - September 5, 2014 @Taipei and Tokyo*



*(5) February 12-19, 2017 @ Taipei*



*(2) August 21-31, 2013 @ Taipei*



*(4) August 1-21, 2015 @ Tokyo and Taipei*



*(6) February 1-10, 2018 @Taipei*

Also, I think this is very good news. Previously we asked our students from U Tokyo, as well as from NTU, to organize field trips in the joint program. I am not sure if Professor Su still remembers, but one of my former students from UTokyo, who was a graduate of Peking University, was interested in alternative education programs in Taiwan, and just recently she passed the dissertation oral exam to go to the final round. Many people have benefited from this joint meeting; we have visited interesting places, had a lot of presentations, and so on. These meetings have been held since 2012 up until 2018. After that, we tried to engage in various activities (see the pictures below).

***Some Recent Activities***



*December 5, 2016 @ Taipei*



*February 10, 2020 @ Tokyo*



*February 19, 2022 @ Online*



*March 3, 2023 @ Taipei*

For example, in 2016, National Taiwan University hosted ‘Todai Day.’ It was not just the delegates from sociology; there was a university-wide exchange organized at that time. We can see many faces because we had participants from different disciplines from different institutes. Three years ago, I invited Professor Su to join the conference on Asian Student Survey, which covered more than 10 countries. Participants used a dataset to present papers, but then COVID struck. Then we lacked personal contact for two years, but we could have an online meeting instead. It was only last year that we could restart these in-person meetings, and you can see some familiar faces here, like Takumi and Allen in the middle of the picture. Thus, we have a long history and this meeting is a part of this historical developments between two universities.

Before we begin the first session, I would like everyone to introduce himself.

**KAWATO Kentaro, The University of Tokyo (B4)**

My name is Kentaro Kawato from the Faculty of Arts and Sciences at the University of Tokyo. I am currently a fourth-year undergraduate student and today I will present an overview of my research project. Thank you for this opportunity.

**WANG Wei-Chun, National Taiwan University (M1)**

Hello, everyone. My name is Wang Wei-Chun. I am a first-year master’s student in Sociology at National Taiwan University. Thank you very much.

**LI Nian, The University of Tokyo (M2)**

Good morning, everyone. My name is Li Nian. I am second-year master’s student at UTokyo. I joined Professor Sonoda’s class this year. My first foreign language is Japanese and my second is English. It is a bit challenging for me to present in English, but I will do my best. Thank you very much.



**WEI Lung-Ta, National Taiwan University (D7)**

Hello, everyone. My name is Wei Lung-Ta. I have been in the Ph.D. program for more than seven years. I hope that maybe I can graduate a year later. Thank you for having me.

**Marino KOUTSIOURIS, The University of Tokyo (Research Student)**

My name is Marino. I am a research student at the Graduate School of Interdisciplinary Information Studies. My research focuses on risk management. I studied law in Paris. I'm happy to be involved in this workshop. Thank you very much.

**MIWA Takumi, The University of Tokyo (D1)**

Good morning. I am Takumi Miwa, a first-year Ph.D. student at the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. It is nice to see you all.

**CHEN Yu-Tung, National Taiwan University (B4)**

Hello everyone, I'm Chen Yu-Tung. I am an undergraduate student at National Taiwan University. I have also attended this workshop last year. Nice to meet you all.

**LUONG Anh Nguyet, The University of Tokyo (D2)**

Hi, everyone. My name is Luong. I am from Vietnam and I am technically a second-year student in the doctoral program of ITASIA (Information, Technology, and Society in Asia). Thank you very much.

**NG Ke-Liang, National Taiwan University (D4)**

Hello, everyone. I am from Malaysia and currently studying for my Ph.D. at National Taiwan University. Thank you for having me here at the conference.

**WU Zihan, The University of Tokyo (D4)**

Hello, everyone. My name is Wu Zihan. I am a fourth-year Ph.D. student at

the University of Tokyo Graduate School of Interdisciplinary Information Studies. I work on media and international development. I also focus on crisis communication. Nice to meet you.

**ZHAO Xinshu, The University of Tokyo (D3)**

Good morning, everybody. I am Zhao Xinshu. I am from mainland China. I am a member of the Sonoda seminar group. I am a fourth-year student. Probably, if I graduate successfully, I will be the last Ph.D. student of Professor Sonoda. I have been to Taiwan twice. I really enjoyed my trip in Taiwan and I would like to return in the future.

**KO Liang-Yu, National Taiwan University (M2)**

Good morning, everyone. I am Ko Liang-Yu from NTU. I am an MA student in my second year. I graduated from NTU Department of Sociology. Thank you for having me today.

**Professor SONODA Shigeto, The University of Tokyo**

Now I would like to move into the first session. Professor Tseng, would you come up here and start the session?

# Closing Wage Disparities between Foreign and Japanese Workers in Japan: From Descriptive Analysis to Causal Inference

KAWATO Kentaro University of Tokyo




Thank you for having me. I am Kawato Kentaro from the University of Tokyo and I am currently in my fourth year. I must admit that I have not yet started my research project because I studied abroad in the UK. Consequently, I will be extending my bachelor's degree by one year. Thus, what I will present today is an outline of my research project. The working title of my research project is "Closing Wage Disparities between Foreign and Japanese Workers in Japan: From Descriptive Analysis to Causal Inference." And the outline is as follows:

The first section will address the limitations of the current research methodologies, particularly focusing on interview methods and structural approaches. I am going to incorporate the concepts of economic assimilation and quantitative analysis into this research project. The final section will introduce the concept of causal inference, as well as contain my original ideas in this research. However, due to time constraints, I will not be able to delve comprehensively on it.

Historically, research on immigrants in Japan has mostly relied on interviews, often focusing on specific groups of immigrants, and only paying attention to the challenges caused by the structure or systems. However, there are some limitations to these kinds of methods. There has been a limited emphasis on quantitative studies

incorporating economic perspectives. Some researchers have already highlighted this deficiency. This begs the question, what viewpoints have been lacking in the analyses conducted so far?

For instance, if one is not familiar with Japanese immigration studies, technical training programs or the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) or nursing care could illustrate this point. In the case of the technical training program, originally intended for immigrant training, yet often serving as a “side door” or a “backdoor” for foreign laborers in Japan. This point has been criticized many times. Such criticisms underscore the inherent distortions within these systems as the root causes of numerous issues. Such research has been conducted through interviews on intern trainees. And what are the viewpoints that are lacking in these arguments? It only focuses on the specific group of immigrants. Also, it is based on journalistic, descriptive approach, lacking insights into policy implications. Consequently, these approaches often fail to capture the diversity of individuals settling in and the assimilation processes. Immigrants in the technical training programs, for instance, face similar structures and experiences, further highlighting the limitations of these methodologies.



Source: Data from the Immigration Services Agency of Japan (2023) / 出入国在留管理庁 (2023)

I challenge these assumptions. Immigrants also experience temporal changes in their lives. While there is an assimilation process, the analysis tends to remain static because of the structure, they face the same problems. However, this static analysis fails to capture the essence of immigration, as it overlooks the broader issues faced by immigrants in Japan. This discussion in the first section highlights some of the limitations in the analysis of immigration Japan.

Next, I will proceed to the section on economic assimilation and quantitative analysis. Within these assumptions, I am particularly interested in exploring a more dynamic and diverse process of immigrants' assimilation. When examining specific aspects of assimilation and settling down, one crucial dimension is economic assimilation. A representative theory of economic assimilation is proposed by Duleep (2015) in the context of migration studies in the US and Europe. According to this theory, immigrants face the challenge of transferring human capital from their home country, which often results in immigrants having a lower economic status at first. However, immigrants gradually narrow the economic gap with the local population by adopting to their host country.

By analyzing the challenges faced by immigrants in this manner, several advantages of adopting this theory emerge. First, economic assimilation can be easily quantified through data. For example, in some studies, the wage gap between native Japanese individuals and immigrant laborers serves as a crucial indicator of economic assimilation. Moreover, this theory considers both immigrants and locals as coexisting within the same society, facing similar social structures such as education and the labor market, although with differing experiences. This raises questions about the underlying reasons and causes of these differences. Different experiences are not solely determined by social structures but are influenced by individual attributes. Like technical training, intern training program, EPA, or other systems, they are different based on individual circumstances. And that's the point I would like to move forward in this study. Moreover, it also begs the question as to whether immigration

assimilation is indeed an issue in Japan. This aspect has been lacking in the previous studies, where immigrants in Japan have received limited attention due to a lack of focus and available data.

People often assume that the main problems about immigration in Japan are caused by technical intern trainees or specified skilled workers. Consequently, research tends to focus on these groups, mainly blue-collar workers. However, it is important to note that there are professional workers in Japan as well, although the number is less than the group of workers. Unfortunately, these professional migrant workers have not gained much attention in research because of the limitations in research design or data availability. Currently, the situation is changed so I think I can do something to conduct research on those kinds of people.

The data was compiled just a few years ago and is called the “Basic Survey on Wage Structure.” This is the most extensive official data on wages. Starting in 2019, the survey began including information on the residence status of immigrants, which means including the different status, such as technical trainees or more professional resident statuses. Recently, there has been research focusing on the wage gaps between the residence status of immigrants, and I basically followed those kinds of research conducted so far. For example, Korekawa (2023) utilizes this data to examine the wage gap between foreign and Japanese workers, investigating whether the gap between foreign and Japanese workers can be attributed to limited skill transferability or the restricted mobility of workers, as mentioned in the theory I discussed. This research design can involve examining the wages and treating the wage gap as an indicator of economic assimilation. Through this approach, we can examine the process of assimilation and identify obstacles in economic assimilation.

The last part is my original contribution. However, this research only focused on the descriptive analysis, lacking causal inference. I think introducing a causal inference approach to this kind of research could enhance our understanding of the

challenges associated with the economic assimilation of immigrants. Incorporating recent approaches in causal inference allows for more accurate investigation of the challenges associated with economic assimilation of immigrants.

The problem with the current method of study lies in comparing, for example, immigrants with education to the immigrants who have not received education to explain the wage gap. What is the coefficient of education to the wage gap? We can examine the influence of education to the wage gap by comparing two different groups. However, what I want to know in this research is if one immigrant gets education, or if one immigrant moves from one place to another, what would happen? This is counterfactual. If this middle guy, for example, gets an education, then what happens or what the wage differences would be? It is the question that we would want to ask. I think that this kind of research has not been conducted so far. So, I want to introduce the framework of causal inference to examine the causes of wage gap more accurately.

We can consider scenarios such as a technical trainee not being employed by a particular company. By considering these kinds of questions, we can examine the impact of the restricted mobility of workers or, in the case of settled immigrants, the effect specialized education. This analysis extends beyond mere descriptive examination, allowing us to delve deeper into the question of how immigrants can better integrate into the Japanese society. It enables us to think about more policy interventions and the dynamic nature of immigration process. This concludes my presentation. Thank you for listening.

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# Chinese Female Marriage Immigrants in Taiwan Caring for Elderly Parents across Borders

WANG Wei-Chun National Taiwan University



Thank you for having me. Hello, everyone. I am Wang Wei-Chun, a first-year master's student majoring in sociology at National Taiwan University. Today, I will be discussing how Chinese female marriage immigrants in Taiwan care for their elderly parents across borders. First, let me briefly introduce the situation of foreign marriage immigrants coming to Taiwan.

The most significant and prevalent period of marriage immigration occurred in the 1990s. During this time, Taiwan's economy rapidly developed, and many businesses expanded to China and Southeast Asia, resulting in numerous marriages between Taiwanese entrepreneurs and local women. Moreover, the impact of globalization on labor and marriage markets led to the changes, with Taiwanese low-skilled males facing challenges due to competition both in the labor and the marriage markets due to competition from lower-wage workers from China and Southeast Asia. In response to these changes, Taiwanese laborers sought marriage opportunities abroad, attracting Chinese and South East Asian marriage immigrants motivated by economic considerations and aspiration for upward social mobility. The attraction to Taiwan was fueled by idealized notions of modernity, freedom, and love. In Taiwanese families, marrying mainland or foreign spouses often serves purposes such as household management, child-rearing, elderly, and disabled care, or increasing

family labor. Consequently, both men and the foreign spouses are sometimes viewed as child bearing tools or cheap laborers. However, not all these marriages are arranged or brokered.

Marriages formed through romantic love have increased, with individuals often having higher educational achievements or professions before coming to Taiwan. Over the past 30 years, mainland Chinese have been the largest source of new residents, and they remain the primary source constituting 61% of total foreign spouses in Taiwan, with around three hundred thirty thousand women, compared to twenty thousand men. Compared to Southeast Asian and Chinese marriage immigrants in Taiwan, they both serve as foreign spouses, daughters-in-law, and mothers in care roles in their home in Taiwan. However, little research has been done on the role of transnational care on interregional borders. Both face societal labels as outsiders, with political discrimination being an additional obstacle for Chinese immigrants due to cross-strait tensions, influencing their goals and societal aspects.

For example, due to the differences in the nationality laws, mainland Chinese spouses require six years of residency in Taiwan before being eligible to apply for citizenship and a passport, whereas other foreign spouses only need four years, placing them at a disadvantage compared to their Southeast Asian counterparts. It is essential to acknowledge that Chinese immigrants in Taiwan are not typical foreign nationals. Their status is affected by tensions between China and Taiwan, which distinguishes them from other immigrant groups.

This study focuses on transnational family care, where physically separated families maintain strong emotional bonds and rely on their caregiving and support each other. In the absence of an international welfare system, relatives take on caregiving responsibilities with key priorities such as managing the caregiving process, periodic visits, hands-on care, relocating parents, economic and cultural remittances, and using information communication technology for virtual calls (presence).

Baldassar and Merla (2014: 25) proposes a concept of care circulation to understand how caregivers circulate within this family. Care circulation refers to the fluctuating, reciprocal, multi-directional, and asymmetric exchange of care within a transnational family network. It is influenced by the political, economic, cultural, and social background of both sending and receiving countries. The authors posit that care circulation serves as a complementary framework for more comprehensive consistency of care and transnational context.

The increasing number of individuals reside, study, work, and retire in nations where they have sought citizenship, and they are concerned with processing social protection, such as, education, health care, employment, training, housing, etc. beyond the framework of a single country. They have coined a framework for understanding hybrid transnational social protection. The argument posits that mobile individuals establish social protection resources network transcending national boundaries, incorporating market accretion, public sector assistance, community support, and contributions from social connections, which include multi-directional giving and receiving between people who move and those who do not. They also provide a framework called “Resource Environment” to emphasize that the individual resources and the environment are formed by combination of all the possible protections available to them from four potential sources: the state, the market, the third sector, and networks. This framework can evolve over time and vary in different spaces due to various factors on different scales, such as the migrants’ nation of origin, place of residence, and the social network, depth of the social network, in addition to individual factors such as gender, ethnicity, religion, wealth, income, and education. This formation results in protection that is ultimately available. Building upon these concepts, “transnational social protection theory” and “social mobility” extend the scope of transnational protection beyond the state and involve more and more actors. Chinese immigrants may play a critical role in care practices and transnational social protection due to the political tension between Taiwan and China.

Our research addresses a key question: what are their experiences caring for parents across borders, and what factors shape their practice? The main idea of this paper is the role that the state plays in the care of Chinese female migrants for their parents in a unique cross-strait context. How does it influence their caregiver practice and how do they respond and take an action? Additionally, how do characteristics such as gender, class or ethnicity influence the wives' caregiving practices and impact their construction of transnational social protection to their parents?

I interviewed ten Chinese female immigrants in Taiwan who have been long time residents and have immigrated through marriage in the 1990s and to 2010. Most of them were aged thirty to sixty (see the table below).

Pseudonym	Age	Education	Native Place	Marriage form	Married	Resident in TW	Parents' age	Parents' status	siblings
Xiao-Zhen	58	Junior	NR	Matched	2002	2002	70+	Dad deceased; mom married in TW	x
Yi-Yi	54	High school	SR	Matched	2006	2006	80+ deceased	Both deceased	4♂3♀
Xin-Yu	52	Junior	SR	Matched	1996	1996	70+	Dad deceased	2♀
Xiao-Qin	47	High school	SR	Romantic love	1999	1999	70+		3♂1♀
Ning-Ning	42	College	NC	Romantic love	2003	2018	60+		0
Jia-Yi	41	College	NC	Romantic love	2005	2011	70+		0
Xiao-Yan	39	High school	SR	Romantic love	2005	2006	65+		1♂
Si-Yun	35	College	SC	Romantic love	2012	2012	60+		1♂1♀
Yu-chi	35	College	SC	Romantic love	2015	2015	60+		0
Yuan-Min	33	College	SC	Romantic love	2017	2017	60+	Adopted mom/ god-parents	1♀/1♀

S/N: Southern/Northern;  
C/R: City/Rural area

Now, I will discuss the findings but before that, I will briefly talk about the transnational social protection of parents of Chinese female marriage immigrants. According to the results, siblings or other parents who remain in China take on the majority of hands-on care responsibilities. However, friends and relatives in Taiwan are not absent but do not serve as primary caregivers. In China, the government provides medical insurance, social insurance, and pensions but does not offer institutional care for the elderly. On the Taiwanese side, applying for the provision of visitor visas, the “relative reunion visa,” allows their parents to occasionally visit

Taiwan. It may exist without any effort on their own. Market-driven care is now a consideration, with assistance from family and friends, and such cases are less common with participation in the mentioned primary roles in the third sector. So, here are the results.

Firstly, I will explain individual ties as care providers locally and across borders, and how Chinese female marriage immigrants come into intermediary and care roles. Regarding individual ties as a care provider locally, Chinese immigrants' other parents or siblings act as the primary hands-on caregiver. A previous study mentioned that siblings who have experienced mutual support in the past are willing to become the primary caregiver for their parents based on a sense of reciprocal respect and reciprocity. This is an established tradition of helping each other within the family. Xin-Yu says:

“When I was in my 20s, my dad was diagnosed with cancer. At that time, my younger sister was still in school. So, I became the primary caregiver and I was responsible for keeping my dad company. And later, when I reached a suitable age for marriage, I got introduced to my Taiwanese husband through friends and family, got married and moved to Taiwan. The caregiving responsibility then shifted to my mom and my two younger sisters.”

For those who do not have siblings, those who are only child, they rely on extended family and/or friends in the local community. Ning-ning, who is an only child said:

“Since both my cousin and I are only children, we've always had a great time together. Even though I'm not there, they help take care of my parents. But she thinks, since they're not her biological parents and my cousin and I are not biological siblings, and they don't have an obligation or responsibility to take care of my mom and dad. So, I try to maintain that emotional connection with my cousin. I don't hesi-

tate to spend money on them.”

Those individual ties can also act as care disruptors locally. It's at the care discretion of immigrants based on the distance and gender norms. A previous study mentioned that they may have conflicts, but my interviewees mentioned, Si-Yun said:

“When it comes to relocation compensation, my brother and sister may end up having a serious argument, but they don't because she said since there's a younger brother at home, it is pretty much a given that most things belong to him. Because his responsibility lies more in taking care of our parents in their day to day lives.” Family members sometimes conceal the fact that parents are unwell and the concealment is a practice rooted in mutual understanding and consideration for one another. Jia-Yi said:

“They never told me about it until after everything was over. I realized my parents were just afraid of making me worry.”

On the Taiwanese side, their husband and children or their friends who are from the same place act as care providers. Xiao-Qin said:

“My husband ends up going more often than I do. I think he just wants to, you know, be filial on my behalf.”

Ning-Ning is an only child and she said:

“Her son talked to her. He said, ‘both of us have our roles assigned. As the eldest son, I'll continue to worship on Dad's side, and my little brother will take care of the worship on your immigrant side, or grandma and grandpa.’”

The individual ties serve as a care disruption across borders. They prioritize the care of patrilineal families, such as husbands, children, and parents-in-law, before attending the needs of their own parents. This prioritization is based on the family life cycle and the multiple care rule.

I argue that immigrants are not just proxies. They are also influenced in their caregiving practice by these individual ties. These ties can serve as both care providers and disruptors. In some cases, the same ties can fulfill both roles simultaneously. Next, I will discuss the state as a care provider locally. Immigrants have access to medical insurance and social insurance, but the disparity in welfare between China and Taiwan lies mainly in the availability of the public care facilities for elderly parents. On the Taiwan side, they often apply for a visiting relatives visa.

Today, I talked about how the distinctive cross-strait relationship poses challenges in effectively mobilizing resources from both sides. Additionally, any role that provides resources tends to impede the construction of transnational social protection. Chinese immigrants, as intermediaries of caregiving, are not merely processed or appointed in the care process, but are also influenced by the source of social protection in decision-making and implementation of care. Thank you for listening.

# From 'Qiaopi' to 'Wechat Group': Applying 'Social Remittance Theory' to Overseas Chinese in Malaysia and Indonesia

LI Nian University of Tokyo



Hello, everyone. My name is Li Nian, and I am currently a second-year student in the master's program at the University of Tokyo. I belong to the Department of Area Studies, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. The title of my presentation is, "From 'Qiaopi' to 'Wechat Group': Applying 'Social Remittance Theory' to Overseas Chinese in Malaysia and Indonesia." These are the pictures I took myself during my travels in Indonesia and Malaysia. The first photo was taken at the Indonesian Hakka Culture Park, while the second photo was taken at the very famous Chinatown in Malaysia.



When we consider the whole overseas Chinese population, it is evident that although the Indonesian Chinese and Malaysian Chinese experienced a very long-time generational exchange, they still constitute a large number, comprising the majority



of the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. According to the newest data, they account for the 68% of the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. Despite their long history and different cultural backgrounds, a significant question arises: are they still connected with their relatives or family members who are still living in mainland China? This question is central to my research. What is different among the Indonesian Chinese and Malaysian Chinese if we compare them with other overseas Chinese?

Firstly, the motivation of the first-generation migrants to run away from mainland China to Indonesia or Malaysia was not to seek better job or to have a better career for financial gains. If you talk with the informants, they will tell you, “Our older generation had experienced war too and had to survive. They had nothing to eat in mainland China. So we had to save ourselves.” Even when the internet technology is not that convenient, they are still connecting with their relatives in mainland China through *Qiaopi*, a kind of communication involving letters and money they send back home. Originating in the 1820s, this practice continued for 150 years. Below is a picture of an authentic *Qiaopi* preserved in a museum. The function of *Qiaopi* was to preserve and maintain family ties.



With the advancement of communication technology, the traditional method of communication through a letter has gradually been abandoned and replaced by the social media platforms. Most of the members are using WeChat groups as their primary mode of communication. This has become the predominant means for overseas Chinese immigrants to stay connected with their family members.

When we think about such significant transformation, it suggests that something different is happening. Most of the informants I interviewed, although some of them can speak Chinese, are using WeChat. I like to introduce some basic, interesting information related to this research.


	Name	Nationality	Age	Gender	Religions	Generations	home city	Occupation	Interview Language
1	A	Indonesia	76	Male	Islam	3	Fujian FuQing	Advisor to the Indonesian Hundred Surnames Association	Chinese
2	B	Indonesia	67	Female	Christianity	4	GuangdongMei Xinn (Hakka)	Professor of Japanese Department	Japanese, Chinese
3	C	Indonesia	73	Female	Christianity	3	Fujian FuQing	Worked at a construction	Chinese, English
4	D	Indonesia	35	Female	Christianity	4	Fujian FuQing	Worked for an IT company	English
5	E	Indonesia	24	Male	Buddhism	4	GuangDong ChaoShan	Worked for a shipping company	Chinese

Firstly, A is an Indonesian, and he uses WeChat to stay connected with his relatives who are currently living in mainland China. B, also an Indonesian, similarly maintains connections with her relatives in mainland China. C and D are a mother-daughter duo. They both use WeChat to connect with their relatives in China. Lastly, E, a very young Indonesian Chinese working at a transport and import-export company owned by an Indonesian Chinese. Despite having lost contact with his relatives in China, E uses WeChat to communicate with his customers.

6	F	Malaysia	66	Male	Christianity	3	Fujian Fuqing	factory worker	English, Chinese
7	G	Malaysia	56	Male	Buddhism	3	Fujian FuQing (Hakk)	factory worker	Chinese
8	H	Malaysia	50	Male	Christianity	3	GuangDong	factory worker	Chinese
9	I	Malaysia	29	Male	Buddhism	4	GuangDong (Chaozhou)	Enrolled in doctoral program	Chinese, Japanese
10	J	Malaysia	23	Female	Buddhism	4	GuangDong (Hakka)	naillist	Chinese
11	K	Malaysia	52	Male	Buddhism	3	GuangDong	Worked at a Chinese herbal pharmacy	Chinese
12	L	Malaysia	24	Male	Buddhism	-	GuangDong ChaoZhou	College Students	Chinese

Among the Malaysian Chinese individuals I interviewed, some of them were initially not using WeChat, but they had previously downloaded it to check for information. For instance, F, who can only speak English, started using WeChat because some of his friends were using it. G, a Malaysian Chinese who had worked in mainland China for three years, established relationships there and wants to maintain connections with his friends using WeChat. H, a Malaysian Chinese who studied abroad in Taiwan built more connections in Taiwan than mainland China. J a Malaysian Chinese female, worked in mainland China for an ASMR company as a voice anchor but has since pursued a career as nail technician in Malaysia.

Next, let me briefly introduce the social remittance theory. Social remittance theory refers to the transfer and impact of social ideas, norms, practices, and cultural values from migrants in their host countries back to their home communities. Like financial remittance, social remittance, focuses on the transmitting knowledge, behavior, and social changes. Levitt Peggy who proposed this theory in 2011 in a joint paper with Lamba, modified the original concept of social remittance from a unidirectional flow from the host country to the sending society to a concept that involves a reciprocal flow of ways of speaking, doing, and thinking between two societies. This is an illustration I created to make it more understandable. Think of it as a part of the interaction between the host or receiving community and the sending society. According to the previous studies, the agents chosen by senders and the nature of the host communities primarily influence social remittance. Initially, my purpose was to examine how social remittance influences mainland Chinese society to understand the nature of mainland China rather than focusing on the host or receiving community.



I conducted a total of twelve interviews, and there is a small minority who have maintained relationships with their relatives in mainland China, totaling four individuals, all of whom are Indonesian Chinese. Although some Malaysian Chinese have rebuilt connections with mainland China, these connections were considered weak and lack support. The main function of the social remittance between Indonesian Chinese and their relatives living in mainland China is to verify the authenticity of information about mainland China. Some Indonesian and Malaysian Chinese build new relationships with people living in mainland China through their transnational experience.

I will briefly talk about informant A. I met informant A at an Indonesian Chinese mosque. They embody traditional Chinese values. Informant A works as a consultant for an Indonesian Chinese organization. During our conversation, he shared information about mainland China, particularly regarding COVID-19. Informant A mentioned about his nephew's concerns about the vaccine exported from mainland China. Some Muslim Indonesians do not want to take the vaccine. They think the vaccine from China is poorly developed and ineffective. So, he uses these kinds of information from WeChat to explain to the Muslim-Indonesians that the vaccine

from mainland China does not have pork, supporting his reputation and consulting role within the Indonesian Chinese organization.

These pictures depict informants C and D, who possess a very high level of education and wealth, belonging to a higher social class in Indonesia. They expressed a desire to be part of China's growth. Informant C uses information obtained from relatives or friends in mainland China to reinforce their social status in Indonesian society. I will conclude here. Thank you for listening.


# Exporting the Excess: The Making of Biopolitics around Overpopulation Discourse in Prewar Japan

MATSUI Takumi University of Tokyo



Hello, I am Takumi Matsui, a Ph.D. student of the University of Tokyo. I apologize for being late. Let's get started. The title of my presentation is "Exporting the Excess: The Making of Biopolitics around Overpopulation Discourse in Prewar Japan."

As is well known today in Japan, the declining birth rate and aging population are recognized as major social problems. However, in the beginning of the 20th century until the 1970s, overpopulation was a significant issue in Japan. When addressing the population problem, the family planning programs gained prominence, particularly in Asian countries like Taiwan. After World War II, especially in the 1960s, these programs were implemented as part of development aid for developing countries, a strategy often criticized as a form of global governance by the United States during the Cold War. Ignoring various social and economic factors, people asserted that overpopulation was the main factor hindering modernization and strengthening control over population growth, especially targeting women in developing countries.



The concept of population is closely linked to the work of Michel Foucault. He introduced the concept of biopolitics as a specific form of governance of modern states. He explained it as follows: “One might say that the ancient right to take life for life was replaced by a power to foster life or throw it into death” (Foucault 1976:181). What he had in mind was a series of apparatuses that constitute modern welfare states, including urban policy, public health, economic policy, and family policy. Through these mechanisms, the population is managed and at the same time is used as resources to maintain social order and contribute to national prosperity.

From this perspective, the family planning program emerges as one of the forms of biopolitics developed on a global scale. However, since the early 20th century, Japan, as it transitioned into the modern world, actively debated the same issue. The first national census in 1920 captured the actual state of population growth. In addition, the post-war depression in 1920, the 1927 financial crisis, and the impacts of the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922, along with administrative reconstructions, led to a rapid increase in unemployment and instability in the social order, especially with the Rice Riots in 1918. In response to the disorder that accompanied the de-

velopment of capitalism, various social policies were imported from the West and efforts were made to introduce them.

On the other hand, the issue of excess population or overpopulation, attracted widespread attention as a cause of poverty and unemployment. Here, I argue that the overpopulation problem is socially constructed and overpopulation itself is not an objective reality. While it is true that there was a rapid population increase during this period and a large pool of concealed unemployment in rural areas, it does not necessarily imply an excess in population, as discussed in development economics.

In this research, I analyze the discourse on overpopulation by adopting the governmentality approach, developed under the influence of Michel Foucault. The governmentality approach focuses on the process of problematization. First, a certain phenomenon is recognized as a problem that must be solved and the solution implemented. For example, population problem studies may establish standards of well-being, optimum population, and overpopulation. Overpopulation, formulated in this way, is then perceived by various actors as a program that threatens the social order that necessitates resolution. Authorities and intellectuals subsequently seek and implement solutions based on this framework of problematization, establishing governance in a modern state through a network of problematizations and solutions from below, rather than from above.

Therefore, my main research question is: How did the governance of the population developed in modern Japan around the problematization of overpopulation?

The important point to note is that the overpopulation problem was not the only category of social problems during that time. If the category of problems changes, the solutions will also change. I emphasize that the overpopulation problem competed with another category of problematization: unemployment. This issue was introduced by social policy scholars and bureaucrats at that time.



It is well-documented in Western Europe, the notion of unemployment, rather than joblessness or the status of employers and the unemployed, was conceptualized and became the subject of policy in the 19th and early 20th centuries. In response to the turmoil of the early capitalist era, Japanese authorities also accepted this concept, introducing unemployment governance through measures such as unemployment insurance and unemployment agencies.

However, existing studies have not sufficiently considered the multiple possibilities of problematization, thus failing to clarify what makes the overpopulation problem different from the other problems or categories. Therefore, I pose three smaller questions to answer the main question. Firstly, how was the overpopulation problem formulated in Japan during the 1920s, and how was the conflict between unemployment and overpopulation resolved? Secondly, what was done when the problem was framed as an overpopulation issue rather than an unemployment one? What is the difference between the solution for the overpopulation and from those for unemployment? Lastly, what kind of governance emerged because of the problematization of overpopulation?

Firstly, how did low population problems become a social problem in Japan in the 1920s? What kind of knowledge was used in this process? Alongside the widespread recognition of overpopulation problem by the public, there was a lively debate over its definition. The debate centered on whether Malthus' and or Marx's theories of population were correct. On one hand, Marxists referred to Marx's concept of industrial reserve army and highlighted the issue of unemployment. The problem, they say, was the capitalism which creates unemployment. On the other hand, sociologists and social policy scholars argued for the existence of overpopulation against the Marxist view on unemployment. While they partially acknowledge the view of the Marxist perspective, they still asserted existence of an overpopulation problem.

As a result, they established a new definition of overpopulation in terms of a

decline in living standards, rather than comparing population and land in the conventional way. This redefinition positioned the overpopulation problem against both Marxists and the notion of unemployment. As a result, poverty, and unemployment—typically attributed to capitalism—were now attributed to population growth instead.

Next, what actions were taken to solve the overpopulation problem? In a manner like today's approach to unemployment, solutions typically involved measures such as unemployment insurance, employment agencies, or, from a Marxist perspective, the abolition of capitalism.

However, in the case of the overpopulation problem, a different strategy was proposed. The Social Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Interior, responsible for a wide range of social administration in Japan at the time, recognized the issue of overpopulation and proposed a solution. They advocated for mass emigration, particularly targeting the poor and unemployed, to South America. This policy involved fully subsidizing travel expenses for these individuals and encouraging them to work as agricultural laborers overseas. This marked the first time that the government aggressively engaged in immigration policy to address the overpopulation problem.

And finally, what kind of governance resulted from the problematization of the overpopulation issue? It is generally understood that social policies began to be developed in Japan during the 1920s. The establishment of the Social Affairs Bureau within the Ministry of Interior in the 1920 marked a significant step in this direction. Tago Ichimin, the first director of the Social Affairs Bureau, along with others, explored ways to solve the social problems caused by capitalism through social policies, including unemployment insurance. However, they also acknowledged the overpopulation problem. As a result, the way to control poverty and unemployment included measures to close national borders. Although an unemployment agency was established, unemployment insurance was not introduced until after World War Two. This delay was because of the recognition that poverty and unemployment were not solely

caused by capitalism but also by the “natural law” of the population. Since the current system could not be changed, it could not be expected to be resolved domestically.



Thus, the mass immigration policy aimed to solve unemployment overseas instead of domestically. However, while this approach sometimes protected and encouraged emigration, it did not guarantee the well-being of immigrants. As a result, many immigrants faced difficult conditions in their home country and abroad. Immigrants were later called “The Abandoned” ( 棄民 / Kimin). People had almost no means of survival, both within and beyond national borders.

Lastly, we go back to Foucault. He and his successors said almost nothing about immigration. Nevertheless, I argue that the overpopulation problem and the mass immigration policy were forms biopolitics aimed at controlling the population. The immigration policy sought to relocate a surplus population overseas who could not be accommodated domestically. At the same time, it was also akin to throwing people to life-threatening situations.

It is also important to acknowledge that immigration to South America was supported by indirect violence against indigenous peoples in the Amazon region. It

has been pointed out that immigration to South America subsequently led to mass immigration. However, I wish to emphasize that in 20th century Japan, before the implementation of family planning programs, social policies were closely linked to the problems of overpopulation and immigration. This linkage and thoughts might still be relevant to social policy and immigration control today, particularly considering the declining population, welfare reforms, and absence of immigration policy. I would like to address this issue in the future. Thank you.

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# Japanese Colonialism and Decolonizing Violence in Taiwan and Korea: A Global Perspective


WEI Lung-Ta National Taiwan University



Good morning, everyone. My name is Wei Lung-Ta. It is my great honor to present my paper at the prestigious *Tokyo Daigaku Toyo Bunka Kenkyujo* (University of Tokyo Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia), which boasts 83 years of rich history. Today, I will examine how Japanese colonialism led to varying degrees of postwar decolonization violence in Taiwan and Korea. I will confine my presentation to twenty minutes.

Let me first establish the broader spatial and temporal context to shed light on the global historical meaning of the postwar decolonization violence. In 1945, the Second World War ended. Empires gradually collapsed and colonies became independent nation-states. The transition from colony to nation-state was often violent, with collective violence against colonizers and collaborators erupting globally. On the one hand, people revolted against colonial oppressions to establish national regimes, as evident in the Algerian War and the First Indochina War from 1946 to 1962. On the other hand, there were also civil wars like in Congo, Nigeria, and Mozambique to punish collaborators for betraying their own people. The death toll was staggering. This is why Frantz Fanon argued that violence is inherent to decolonization.

However, the postwar decolonization violence varied across Japanese empires' former colonies when it dissolved. In 1945, collective violence against Japanese colonizers erupted across Korea after its surrender. In just ten days after the war ended, there were 149 attacks on the police stations, 41 raids for arms and ammunitions, and almost 300 assaults on Japanese and Korean police officers and civil servants.



Koreans forcibly tore down and torched numerous Shinto shrines across Korea right after Japan surrendered. This destruction of sacred sites shocked and appalled the Japanese occupiers. The US Army was responsible for overseeing the Japanese withdrawal. They reported that repatriation from Korea was very violent and volatile with Japanese presence.

Post-war decolonization violence targeted not only Japanese colonizers but also Korean collaborators. In October 1946, during the US military rule, mass protests involving around three million people broke out in Daegu over hyper-inflation and food shortages. However, the main targets were not the foreign US government, but Korean landlords and police. There was extreme hatred towards the Korean police who had worked for both the Japanese and US. On October 33rd, 38 police officers in Daegu were brutally murdered through torture, burning, and even skinning. The Daegu uprising demonstrated the public's extreme hatred toward pro-Japanese figures, national traitors and sycophants embedded in the police bureaucracy and business.



Korea was not an exception globally. Such violence against colonizers and collaborators prevailed worldwide in the 20 years following 1945. In contrast, post-war Taiwan underwent remarkably peaceful and stable decolonization. Public order and social control continued under the Japanese governor general Rikichi Andō, despite imperial collapse. No large-scale disorder occurred, and the US Army found that Taiwan should have the most peaceful repatriation process out of all Japanese occupied territories.

There were a few sporadic cases of anti-Japanese police violence across Taiwan, but these were neither collective nor especially severe in nature. Without severe violence against Japanese colonies, there was certainly no violence toward internal Taiwanese collaborators. In early postwar Taiwan, collaborators only faced verbal criticisms in newspapers and magazines, demanding their exclusion from the public sphere. No serious violent clashes or radical agenda against them, even during the anarchy of the February 28th incident in 1947.

Based on these empirical differences, I raise my research question: Why did Korea, like most decolonizing societies, experience widespread violence against colonists and collaborators, while Taiwan was exceptionally peaceful?

German historian Jürgen also argues that decolonization was a foremost historical process of the 19th century, and it is best explained within a comparative context. Thus, I present three fundamental questions he proposes for decolonization research.

Firstly, why did one process of decolonization take a more violent course while another took a more peaceful one? My project follows this scholarly tradition, and my hypothesis is that rather than random occurrences, postcolonial violence is induced by pre-existing structural conflicts built up during colonial rule. In other words, understanding postwar decolonization violence requires examining long-term societal transformations instead of focusing narrowly on individual actors. Specif-

ically, my hypothesis states that dependence differentiates colonial policies, generating varying types and degrees of internal conflicts within Korean and Taiwanese societies. These conflicts, as structural factors, then shaped divergent manifestations of violence during their postwar decolonizations.

My preliminary findings shows that Japanese colonialism created a considerably dissimilar societal complex in Taiwan and Korea across the political, economic, and land policies. Due to limited time, I can only provide a broad overview today.

Japanese colonialism was characterized by an influx of bureaucrats, police, and settlers, and the use of centralized state machinery for direct rule. This deep penetration of local societies fundamentally altered the social hierarchy and power structure in Korea beyond the old gentry order. Extensive colonial control created conflicts not only between colonizers and colonized, but also among the latter, between collaborators and non-collaborators. Unlike Taiwan, Korea had been an independent kingdom for 500 years, which was a geographic periphery of the Qing Empire. This difference impacted the varying degrees of incorporation of native elites. My research in institutional analysis demonstrates far greater Korean elite co-optation at every tier of administration. Korea's higher degree of elite co-optation generated profound animosity and hatred between collaborators and resisters there. In contrast, Taiwan's limited symbolic power of empowerment enabled a more conciliatory relationship without antagonism.


Japanese colonialism introduced private land rights that accelerated social stratification trends in the colonies. How peasants and farmers were oppressed by whom consequently shaped the intensity and scale of their early postwar collective violence and collective actions. In Korea, the government general forcefully dispossessed small landowners through land surveys and rice productivity programs. Then, the land system in Korea intensified, leading to conflicts between peasants and Japanese, along with native Korean land owners. In comparison, Taiwan's rural policies are

largely fueled by conflicts only between peasants and Japanese landlords and sugar companies. Moreover, average living standards improved, and interclass relations on the island were not seriously antagonized.

Japanese colonialism transferred industrial capitalism with its attendant infrastructure, institutions, and technology to Taiwan, while spawning a new working class that fundamentally altered prior social structures. The colonial labor landscape and leftist mobilization accordingly molded early postwar labor collective action potentials.

In Korea, political repression of labor combined with business opportunities in Manchuria enriched big Korean firms in textile and rubber products at the expense of relational deterioration with Korean workers. In contrast, Taiwan's economic backwardness and small working class limited resistance, mostly to Japanese firms, without implicating local capitalists during the war aftermath.

Korean popular opprobrium towards collaborators can be seen in the biography of high colonial elite Im Moon Hwan ( 임 문 환 ). Im Moon Hwan graduated from Tokyo Imperial University's law school and possessed the prestigious civil service exam. However, such glittering credentials did not bring him practice in Korea. Instead, he faced severe derision across Korean society, regardless of political divisions. All Koreans despised such elites who became colonial bureaucrats through examinations from exiles fighting abroad and patriots at home to impoverished masses and even some landlords cooperating with Japan. Koreans view them as Japanese lapdogs, intolerable and self-serving traitors.



However, the situation was substantially different in Taiwan. The Taiwanese intellectual who received the Japanese colonial rule provided the following critique regarding native collaborators in the colonial administration. First, the honorary gentleman title for Taiwanese collaborators merely provided exemption from miscellaneous petty regulations without actual substantive privileges. Second, the meager gains associated were trivial tokens. Moreover, such marginal benefits were not extracted through direct oppression of fellow Taiwanese. As a result, local proxies avoided being vilified as public enemies.

My research has found that in Korea, Japanese colonialism was more extractive materially, relying more heavily on collaborators to govern. This common combination subsequently bred severe decolonization violence after the war. In contrast, Taiwan underwent relatively mild exploitation and there was less reliance on local proxies to govern. I see contemporary relevance in understanding why perceptions toward Japan significantly differ between its former colonies: hostility from Korea versus affinity from Taiwan.

In essence, the divergent colonial experiences I studied could elucidate this contrasting contemporary attitudes. I can read Korean. However, my Japanese reading ability remains limited. There are some likely flaws in the foregoing study. I welcome criticisms and guidance from all experts present, and I am eager to learn from Japanese scholars. With that, I conclude my presentation. Thank you.

# Occupation as a Cognitive Framework for Work: Japanese School Teachers' Occupational Attitudes and their Working Hours

MIWA Takumi University of Tokyo



Hello everyone, this is the first presentation of the afternoon. Today, I will talk about the situation of Japanese middle school teachers and propose solutions in their current situation from the occupational perspective. First, I will introduce the situation faced by Japanese school teachers, particularly their long overtime work. Japanese teachers have the longest working hours globally, with an average of fifty-six hours per week, meaning spend more than twelve hours at school each day. The global average is 38.3 hours. This increase in working hours can be attributed to several factors. First is the legal aspect: public school teachers are not paid for their overtime work. Instead, 4% is added to their basic salary, with overtime work recognized legally as voluntary work. Secondly, club activities demand a significant portion of the teachers' time. Despite being extracurricular work, club activities are very popular in Japanese school, and the teachers are assigned as coaches or supervisors. Interestingly, some teachers think these “less important” activities are the basis of their work and they feel joy when interacting with students.

Previous studies aimed to understand the challenging work situation of teachers. I am interested in exploring the relationship between the teachers' attitudes and their working hours. As mentioned earlier, the concepts of “initiative” and “voluntariness” among teachers seems to play an important role in understanding the situation.

This phenomenon extends beyond teachers and include care workers who are also perceived as service-oriented. This orientation often leads to overwork or *yarigai no sakushu* as coined by Honda, which means taking advantage of workers' motivation or the self-realization while keeping the labor condition worse.

In the field of educational sociology, studies have found that the mentality or mindset of teachers is called "teachers' culture." For example, "indefiniteness," the teachers cannot define the scope of the work and they see themselves as dedicated teachers. However, previous analyses on teachers' work have linked the attitude to the actual working hours. My question then is: Why does this contradictory situation persist? Some observations suggest that certain aspects of teachers' well-being, coupled with their motivations, contribute to their willingness to work long hours. I want to confirm whether the teachers' professionalism really makes them work longer hours. Another point is that, is it possible to explain the situation without attributing it to the teachers' mentality, such as the perpetuation of '*yarigai no sakushu*.'

I use three approaches in this study. The first is quantitative analysis, as mentioned earlier. The second involves modifying the theory of occupation, especially the aspect of self-decision. This constitutes the theoretical part of my research. In the last section, I want to connect the two parts and reconsider the issue. But I want to use the time for the story part. I will briefly discuss the analysis part. My research question is as follows: Does attitude towards teaching influence the working hours per week. From the data, I extracted the three types of orientations. The first emphasizes job security, the second focuses on contribution or empathy, and the third prioritizes work-life balance.

The result shows that contribution orientation has a positive effect on increased working hours. This means that individual teachers with higher contribution orientation tend to increase their working hours. Additionally, a school with higher average scores for work-life orientation tend to have teachers who work shorter hours on

average. I believe we can observe the teachers within the different types of their inter-personal spheres. Contribution orientation, which emphasizes relationships with students, can also extend to peer relationships among teachers. This sharing within the teachers' group is important, particularly in the context of Japanese education, where communication and interactions are very important.

I will now move to the second theoretical aspect to analyze this situation. I want to use and reconstruct the concept of occupation and focus on the self-decision and autonomy of each occupation. The approach is not new because social class studies try to categorize each class following the extent of autonomy. The famous one is EGP class definition and they thought that what defines class is autonomy of each job.


The process is like this: when human assets or human capital is specific or some companies need to get the skill from outside the organization, it becomes difficult to monitor their work. Employers then seek high autonomy among the employees, so that profession jobs is given a high incentive like money or status, is given to the professional jobs. The traditional scale of occupation is based on this premise, and is monistic from the professional to manual labor.

However, something is missing in the assessment of the autonomy of work: communication. In situations where decisions are made internally through communication, a different dynamic emerges. There are two types of criteria for self-decision-making in the working process. First is the external criterion, which is simple and based on the external knowledge. It goes for the direction of generalization. Professional jobs got a lot of external skills and decide by themselves. On the other hand, routine work follows the external, old orders. The second type of self-decision is based on the internal criteria, which means communication or communication history with clients and colleagues. This favors the personalization, and is commonly observed in the service care workers. However, this dynamic is not exclusive to



them; workers inside the organizations often navigate similar situations to coordinate with different departments.

To illustrate, I created this matrix, four ways of decision-making. The right half is close to the traditional one but I put the left half it's based on the internal criteria. Care workers are requested to base on each client's needs, and independently what we need to make decision to give the proper care to the clients, patients. But emotion criterion is the opposite. It is based on the personalized communication but it's heteronomous, which means that subject to the other person's judgment or the request. I think there are several modes within the same occupation. Sometimes, even the profession jobs include that routine work also and sometimes, need to care about the others. And when the social changes happen, the emphasis will shift among the different modes. In the extreme part of each mode, there are disadvantages of each mode. For example, routine work has a problem of inflexibility and high profession job also relates to the problem of authority. When it is difficult to decide based on the communication, at the same time, think by ourselves.



Let's revisit the issue of the teachers' work situation. Before that, Japan had experienced fast-paced changes in the field of public education. One of the most drastic changes was after the 1980s when the education policy significantly shifted. It criti-

cized the uniform style of education and governments adopted the principle of individuality. They started a lot of reform plans to develop teacher skills to cope with the situation. But these reforms did not work. For example, the ministry established a lot of graduate school for teachers but it did not reach its capacity. In 2009, suddenly they started the renewal system of the teaching license to keep the qualification of teacher teaching skill. But it was canceled in 2022 and the schools employed various staffs to support teacher jobs like counselors and assistants. But it is said that this is a double-edged sword. While it helped some teachers, it has increased the burden of coordinating among the different staff members. The volume of communication has increased. According to the survey, the Japanese teachers have the shortest time for skill development. They do not go towards the direction of expertise.

In the last 50 years, the expected role of education and teachers has shifted from the routine to the caretaking. The teachers need to listen to students' voice and give individualized support. However, not only teachers but also the lack of experiences to make decisions based on communication. Nevertheless, I think we have the initiative to focus on our decisions. Policy reforms have aimed towards expertise while keeping the level of autonomy, seeking evidence for expertise with the external knowledge. However, the working style of teachers did not follow that direction. While teachers respect students' individuality and value communication, maintaining autonomous decision-making has become challenging. As a result, the autonomy has decreased, and teachers struggle to determine what actions to take to preserve their working style. In my opinion, this decline in autonomy is evident.

I now go to my conclusion. Firstly, Japanese teachers seem to adopt internal criteria to do tasks. Teaching is one of the professional occupations, but the current working style is based on communication with students and colleagues. This results in a low level of autonomy as teachers find it difficult to distinguish what tasks to prioritize and end up working longer hours. This is a result of the changes in the mode of decision-making. It is important to design policies in accordance with the

way decisions are made. As demonstrated, there is a big difference between the policy and the reality faced by teachers. I think this social change is hugely reflected on the public education, so the situation is not just the program for teachers. The same structure of the program can be seen in different areas of work and occupation in modern Japanese society. This concludes my presentation. Thank you for listening.

# Family Background and the Choice of Field of Study of Senior High Schools in Taiwan and Japan

CHEN Yu-Tung National Taiwan University



Hello everyone. My name is Chen Yu-Tung, and I am from National Taiwan University. The topic I would like to present today is about the relationship between family background and the choice of field of study in Japan and Taiwan.

Choosing a field of study, which is called “bunri sentaku” 「文理選択」 in Japan and “dàxué shòuxiàn” 「大学受験」 in Taiwan is a unique and special process in East Asia. In Japan, students must choose the field of study between science and humanities during their second year in senior high school. Students can select what they want to learn in the course and choose what they want to take before taking the university entrance exam, if the students want to enter a public university or private universities.

Choosing a field of study in Taiwan is slightly different from Japan. In Taiwan, we usually call it as choosing a program. There are three groups in Taiwan: group one, group two, and group three. Group one belongs to the Humanities program, where students study social science. Group two and group three belong to the science programs. The major difference between group two and group three is that group three has additional two biology subjects. This group is designed for those who want to study medicine or biology. There is also another difference in the university

entrance exam, which is that there are two entrance exams in Taiwan, and students must take all the subjects in the first exam, which we call GSAT. After graduation, if students do not feel satisfied with the score of the GSAT, they can also additionally take the second exam AST and they can, just like Japan, choose which subjects they want to take before taking the exam.

However, there is a difference in the income between humanities and science fields. Science fields are regarded as prestigious and high-income fields, so some people consider it as a pathway to achieve social upward mobility or to maintain high social status. Many scholars in the Western countries have investigated the relationship between family factors and students' interest in success in social science's field.

Choosing the field of study is also important in Japan and Taiwan, although there is research about its relationship with the current educational level in Taiwan. But the related research in Japan is rare, so I still want to do this research to investigate the two following research questions. Firstly, does family background have an impact on a student's choice of field of study in Japan? Secondly, are there any differences that can be found in the results between Japan and Taiwan?

In Western countries, there is no formal process of choosing a field of study, but there are still some studies investigating the relationship between family factors and students' choice of college major. One significant factor is the parents' educational level. There are two different results being followed. Some scholars argue that parents' educational level only influences vertical stratification. Vertical stratification means going to the next stage of education, for example, from high school to university, and from university to graduate schools. Scholars like Kao & Shimizu (2019) think that parent's education level will not influence students' major choice. However, there are some scholars (Sonnert, 2009; Boudarbat & Montmarquette 2009) who think that parents' educational level can be considered as an indicator of familiarity

with science. Students whose parents have higher educational degrees will be more likely to choose science major.


The second indicator is family income, and there is also a contradictory research findings and assumptions. The first assumption involves choosing science to achieve upward social mobility, in which students from disadvantaged family backgrounds are more likely to choose science to seek a higher social position (Ma 2009; Leppel et al. 2001). Conversely, the second assumption is that choosing science is a way to maintain prestigious social status, which is that students from advantaged family backgrounds are more likely to choose science because of their ample resources (Niu 2017).

In the previous studies in Japan and Taiwan, there are some other factors that may influence the choice of field of study. The first one is gender. Male students are more likely to choose science, and female students are more inclined toward the humanities. This can be found in both Japan and Taiwan, mainly due to traditional gender norms in these two countries. The second factor is math ability, which is quite intuitive because students with higher math abilities are more likely to choose science. The third factor is the fear of math and science. In Japan, there is a study that shows many students choose the humanities course due to their fear of math and science, instead of having interest in the humanities subjects.


The data I used for Japan is called “Kodomo No Seikatsu to Manabi ni Kansuru Oyako Chosa,” and for Taiwan is the Taiwan Educational Survey. The analytical method I used was logistic regression. The sample size is 981 in Japan and 2,218 in Taiwan. The missing values in the control variables are imputed by using machine learning, specifically the AdaBoost Classifier. The dependent variables are used in literature such as the course of the program, the students attending in senior high school. Because I want to test who will be more likely to choose science. I called “1” as “Science Course” and “0” as the “Humanities Course” or “Program”.

The results show there is a possibility of choosing the science course. The main independent variables are two. The first one is family income and the second one is parents' education level. The other variables I am adding to my model to control are including gender, match grade, subject preference, urban or countryside, and private or public school.

And this is the percentage of students whose choice of field of study in Japan and Taiwan. There are more students studying humanities in Japan, while more students are studying science in Taiwan. This situation is called Bunkei Rikei in Japan. But the difference is not very large between these two programs or these two courses.




First, I will show the impact of parents' education level on students' choice of their field of study. This is a graph of the impact of father's educational level on students' probability of choosing science. Only the father's educational level has a significant impact. In Japan, students whose father has a graduate school degree will be more likely to choose a science course. And in Taiwan, a student whose father had a university baccalaureate degree has more probability to choose a science program.




There may be two possible explanations for this. And the first one is the ability of teaching, because some research has indicated that educational level may be seen as an indicator of the familiarity with science. Parents with higher educational levels may have more resources to teach their children math and science. The other explanation is occupational heritage. Students are more likely to pursue higher educational levels, which means that parents with higher educational levels may be more likely to be in the field of science. Their children may be influenced by their occupations and wanting to do the same occupation or similar occupation. They choose a science course or a science program.

I will now discuss the impact of income in students' choice of major. This is a predictive plot of the impact of income on choosing a science program in Taiwan. The x axis is the annual income in Japanese and in the y axis is the probability of entering the science program. The statistics show that the impact of family income is not significant in Taiwan. Student's choice of field of study would not be greatly affected by family income in Taiwan. However, please look at this plot and it shows a very perfect curve.






And this is a predictive plot of the impact of family income on a student's choice of field of study in Japan. We can see that students whose family income is the highest and whose family income is the lowest are both not likely to choose the science course.



I would like to explain the lowest curve first using the difference in tuition. These two graphs show the tuition of different schools in Japan and Taiwan. It is presented in Japanese. There is no difference between the departments within national and public schools in Japan. But there is a huge difference between the departments'

tuition in private schools in Japan. The tuition for medical schools is about four times the tuition for humanities. The tuition for STEM, which is science, is about 1.4 times the tuition for humanities. In addition, in Japan, about 75% of students enter private universities, so most of the students must face the large difference in tuition when they choose their college major. Compared with Japan, the difference in tuition between different departments is not that large, so the difference in affordance is not that heavy in Taiwan for Taiwanese students.



As for those in the highest income group, there are two explanations I would like to explain. The first explanation is that students who belong to this group do not have to worry about the future career prospects, so they don't need to choose science as a way to achieve social upward mobility. The second explanation is the difference in the industry structure between Japan and Taiwan. These two tables are the top nine largest enterprises in Japan and Taiwan.

Company (Japan)	Industry	Company (Taiwan)	Industry
Toyota	Automotive 汽车工业	Hon Hai Precision Industry	Electronics 电子
Honda	Automotive 汽车工业	Pegatron	Electronics 电子
Mitsubishi	Conglomerate 综合企业	Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing	Semiconductor 半导体
Japan Post Holdings	Conglomerate 综合企业	Cathay Financial Holding	Banking 银行
Nippon Telegraph and Telephone	Telecommunications 电信-通信	Quanta Computer	Electronics 电子
Itochu	Trading 贸易	Compal Electronics	Electronics 电子
Nissan	Automotive 汽车工业	Fubon Financial Holding Co.	Insurance 保险
SoftBank Group	Conglomerate 综合企业	CPC Corporation	Oil and Gas 石油-天然气
Hitachi	Conglomerate 综合企业	Wistron	Electronics 电子

Source: Fortune Global 500 2020

From the table, we can observe that Japan has many conglomerate companies, such as Sony, which produce a variety of products ranging from cell phones to music. In such companies, both science-talented and humanities-talented employees are desirable. However, in Taiwan, most of the companies are mostly electronics-related, resulting in a higher demand for science professionals.

I now draw some conclusions. Firstly, why is the impact of income not significant in Taiwan? I believe it is because the difference in tuition is small, allowing all students to choose the program they want. In addition, in Taiwan, large enterprises are mostly electronics-related. No matter how rich the family background is, everyone wants to study science and hence the impact is not very significant. On the other hand, in Japan, students from low-income families tend to avoid choosing science due to the significant difference in tuition, which they cannot afford, resulting in fewer opportunities for them to pursue science courses. And that's why students from high income families also tend not to choose science in Japan. This is because they don't have to seek higher social status. Humanities-talented employees are also desirable in Japan, so the need to choose science to achieve social upward mobility has decreased.

Moving on to further discussion, the choice of the field of study in Japan and Taiwan is not solely determined by students' abilities or interests. After controlling

students' math abilities and interests in hard sciences, students encounter parents' educational levels to continue to have a significant impact on students' decision regarding their field of study. Students from disadvantaged family backgrounds may encounter difficulties in pursuing the science course in Japan. Additionally, those whose fathers have higher educational backgrounds tend to have more resources, increasing their likelihood of entering the science course or science curriculum in both Japan and Taiwan. This highlights the underlying educational inequalities in the process of selecting the field of study in East Asia. In the future, and we have I think we must think about how to solve this issue. Thank you.

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# 35 Years of University Rankings in East and Southeast Asia: A Bibliometric Review

LUONG Anh Nguyet University of Tokyo



Good afternoon, everyone. My name is Luong, and I am from Vietnam. I research the engagement of Vietnamese universities in the global and regional university rankings. This presentation today is part of my literature review and set the background for my research. I think I do not need a comprehensive introduction about university rankings because it is penetrating in every aspect of our university lives. I am very glad that I do not need much introduction to this topic.


I chose East and Southeast Asia as the geographical focus of my literature review in higher education because it is a common grouping in education literature in general. Not only are the countries being geographically close but they also share certain common characteristics in terms of cultural norms and the economic ties. And it has been 35 years since the first comprehensive domestic ranking of universities in the region, which happened to be in China. Also, it marked 20 years of the first international university ranking, also in China, the Shanghai Academic Ranking of World Universities. You can see that countries in this region were no stranger to ranking activities.

At the beginning of the century, many countries in the region have experienced unprecedented challenges—there has been a common perception of relative disadvan-

tage in this global education race in terms of ranking position. For example, in the case of Japan, there is a sense of lost competitiveness compared to the excellent performance of universities in the UK and the US in terms of ranking position. In this kind of ranking, and in the past two decades, there has been a lot of activities and engagement of universities in this region in the ranking games. And, this area serves as a reference for my research for the case of Vietnam. So that's why I chose this region for my literature review.

There has not been any systematic knowledge about existing research on university ranking in this region. I chose bibliometric analysis as part of my literature review because it is a good introduction to any subfield in academic literature. I obtained data from the Scopus dataset from 2005 to 2024, with the latest publication being this year. Bibliometric analysis is a type of analysis that works on the metadata of publications, which enables identification of influential publications, prominent authors, and the most important or trendy topics in the existing literature. This analysis informs the research question that I am addressing in this presentation.

For the data collection process, I use relevant keywords to search for country names, region names, and a variants of university rankings, both in domestic rankings and international rankings. The research query returned 350 publications. I then manually reviewed and reduced the number to be included in the final analysis to 182. The time ranging from 2005 is the first publication recorded. Ninety five percent (95%) of these bodies of literature are in English. And I must admit that is one of the limitations because it ignores a lot of publications written and conducted in the local language of the countries in this region.



Talking about the number of research, there is an overall increase in the number of publications, even though there are some ups and downs. But the trend is increasing. And I want you to pay attention to the geographical focus. China has been the most frequently researched topic, the geographic focus of the publication with 84 times in the dataset and followed by Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, Hong Kong. Singapore and Thailand are catching up. And the rest of the region, I would say, is very insignificant or negligible because these research in the last seven countries are only comparative research on how their university performed in the rankings. There is no actual research that focused specifically on these countries.

### Academic Excellence Initiatives in 5 top geographical focuses

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023					
<b>China</b>	Project 211		Project 985												Double One Class (2017-2020)																			
<b>Taiwan</b>											5-Year plan (2002-2006)												Phase II											
<b>Japan</b>											21st Century COE		SIP		Global COE		Global COE		21st COE		21st COE		21st COE		21st COE		21st COE		21st COE		21st COE			
<b>South Korea</b>											Brain Korea 21												WCU											
<b>Malaysia</b>											MAMPU		MAMPU		MAMPU		MAMPU		MAMPU		MAMPU		MAMPU		MAMPU		MAMPU		MAMPU		MAMPU			

The pattern observable from these universities is that the top countries have been investing heavily in academic excellence initiatives over the past two or three decades.


This means that the government issues a lot of expensive funding programs for




universities to compete for higher positions in the global ranking system. For example, I listed the timeline of some academic excellence initiatives in China, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea and Malaysia. There are also many in Hong Kong and Indonesia. And as you can see, there are a lot of different phases, projects after projects, which also means that the funding is continuous.

For the last 20 and 30 years, in this data set of literature, these are the most cited research. From what I highlighted in the title, you can see that they are very critical, one, in terms of, for example—there are two research touching upon the topic of world class universities. And the rest of them are very critical. They pointed out the consequence of the ranking being raised is that perpetuating some kind of hegemony. It can be hegemony of English language over local language, or the hegemony of STEM and science over social sciences and humanities, prioritizing research over teaching and learning activities, that kind of consequence in the higher education system of these countries.

This figure shows the co-authorship patterns of the body of the dataset. For most of the first five years, it has been only solo authors. There were no collaborative patterns in the dataset. It was not until 2014, 2010 that the first publication was co-authored between two or more authors. And as you can see from the map, all the groups of researchers were very small and they don't have many linkages or co-authoring patterns with each other. It is safe to assume that this is a field mostly dominated by solo authors and small research groups without much networking and collaborating patterns. And if you look at co-authorship networks by country, the cross-border collaboration is also a very recent phenomenon. It was not until 2015 that the first cross-border collaboration in this data set was observed.




The last topic I want to address is the topics that have been researched over the past twenty years. There are two ways to know about the topics that have been researched. The first method, bibliometric analysis, involves using keyword co-occurrence over time, and this is the keyword co-occurrence map. The result here is not very clear, I must admit, but what you can observe is that the lighter the color, the more immaturity or recency in terms of publication time. In this map, there is a very recent topic that has been on the rise in the past few years, which is sustainability related keywords. And this has been attributed to the creation of some sustainability related ranking, for example, the University of Indonesia, UI, green metric, Times Higher Education impact ranking and US sustainability.



And together with the rise of these rankings people are searching to research more on how universities can build green campuses and structure their sustainability-related strategies. But there is a very clear cluster of sustainability in this body of literature.

The second method to know about what topics have been researched is to use code citation references. The key idea behind this method is that if two publications are cited in the same research, that means that the authors of the research are trying to connect the ideas. By linking these, by using codes like citation reference, you can cluster the topics into very closely related subjects. And on the map, I have identified four clusters of topics in the body of literature.



The first cluster, the yellow cluster topics as related to measuring and evaluating research. And this research in this area is used to talk about, for example, indexing and information system management, how to index articles and international databases like Scopus or Web of Science. The second group in the blue group of publications deal with the consequence of pursuing extensive research activities on academic life. For example, and I name it publish or perish. The green cluster topics are related to the ambition of national countries and national governments in this region to pursue and to build world class universities. And it is also related to the excellent initiative that I have been talking about in the beginning. And finally, the highly concentrated cluster of topics is the red one, related to flow methodology and

how rankings have perpetuated certain kinds of hegemony in the national higher education system.

In conclusion, some key takeaways from my findings include the dominance of solo authors and small research groups in English language research on rankings in East and Southeast Asia. Additionally, this group of literature is dominated by research from countries whose government-funded, very ambitious and competitive academic programs to build a world class university. And because of that, the focus of their research is very much, emphasizing around these kinds of initiatives, implementation, the goals, the result, the consequence, and the impact on research, practice, and research community in general. So, we can see a very clear policy-induced or policy-driven effect on research in this case. Finally, the latest developments in the field are related to the rise of sustainability-related rankings such as the University of Indonesia Green metric. That concludes my presentation. Thank you.

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# Making the Racial State Legible from Within: Pragmatic Resistance to Racial Domination and Transnational Prefigurative Politics among Malaysian Chinese Educators Inside and Outside the Classroom

NG Ke-Liang National Taiwan University



Good afternoon, everyone. Thank you for having me here. My name is NG Ke-Liang and I am from the National Taiwan University. Thank you, Professor Sonoda, for organizing this conference. The topic of my presentation is “From Chinese Problem to Mandarin Problem Neoliberal Assimilation, Pragmatic Resistance, and the Ethnic Chinese Educators in Malaysia.”

Chinese Educators in Malaysia have noticed a significant change in the last decade. More and more Chinese students are choosing not to study Mandarin and they are also avoiding taking examinations. To address this problem, these Mandarin educators have organized extensive supplementary classes as a remedy. On the slide you can see that thousands of students are gathered in a large auditorium. They were attending a Mandarin exam preparation class, so it seems like a mega cram school.

The decision of Malaysian students to give up studying Mandarin and taking Mandarin exams becomes a puzzle when we view this issue in the broader context of Southeast Asian countries. During the Cold War, Chinese communities were labeled as the Chinese problem, as a potential threat to national security. However, in recent years, with the ascendance of China and the democratization of Southeast Asian countries, the narrative has shifted from the Chinese problem to Chinese opportuni-

ties. Countries like Indonesia and Thailand are experiencing and seeing a phenomenon referred to as the “Mandarin Fever,” where Chinese communities are actively rebuilding Chinese language schools and reviving Chinese traditional culture. In Southeast Asian countries, the perception of Chinese identity has transitioned from being stigmatized to being a source of pride.

But Chinese educators in Malaysia have disclosed the data revealing a year-on-year decline in the number of students taking Mandarin examinations. According to the data, there is a consistent loss of at least 15,000 to 18,000 students every year. This indicates a significant trend in Malaysia where a substantial number of students willingly choose to forgo Mandarin examinations. In contrast to the Mandarin fever observed in neighboring Southeast Asian countries, Malaysian students are opting out of Mandarin examinations

Consequently, over the past five years, non-government educational organizations in Malaysia have initiated the “I want to be a Teacher Campaign,” and a “Loving Mandarin campaign.” This initiative aims to encourage young students to learn Mandarin and consider becoming Mandarin teachers in the future.

The transformation of the Chinese problem differs between Malaysia and its neighboring Southeast Asian countries, particularly in their experiences of assimilation, in contrast to the Mandarin fever and the Re-Sinicization in neighboring Southeast Asian countries. In Malaysia, Chinese students voluntarily chose not to learn Mandarin and avoid taking Mandarin exams. This highlights how the impact of neoliberal assimilation is hidden beneath the facade of individual choices. In the given context, I posed two research questions: How do Chinese educators react to the Mandarin problem and what perspectives do they hold regarding their roles and responsibilities in addressing the Mandarin problem? How do these educators negotiate with students and school officials who may perceive Mandarin as a potential threat to students’ academic performance and the school’s overall standing?

Empirically, today's Malaysian Chinese educators are taking a very different approach to addressing the Mandarin problem. They organize social activities rather than organize social protests. They organized many events such as the Loving Mandarin campaign, the I want to be a Teacher Campaign, and the large-skill cram school, the supplementary classes I have mentioned in the previous slides. Therefore, Malaysian Chinese educators are unlikely to use mass mobilization as the movement in history, so they are unlikely to show up in protest-centered research. Instead, they are more likely to use professionalized tactics and small resistance in school against the assimilation. Therefore, I propose shifting the approach to analyzing Malaysia's Mandarin problem from the lens of social protest to resistance.

We think Malaysia is an authoritarian state regime. Chinese educators find themselves in ambiguous yet precarious in-between positions. They are on the one hand, public servants representing the states so they are state actors. But simultaneously, they are also members of the ethnic Chinese minority. They cannot openly challenge the state. Social protest is not an option available to the Chinese educators even when they want to challenge the state policy. However, they could strategically employ pragmatic resistance to identify, utilize, and control spaces in the school and the available political opportunities within the soft states for resisting assimilationist policy.

I use a combination of qualitative methods for my research including online and offline participant observations, in-depth interviews, and a textual analysis of news reports. Between 2019 and 2023, I observed various social activities, including the Loving Mandarin Campaign, the I want to be a Teacher Campaign, and the Chinese Culture Online Camp, both in-person and online. I conducted interviews with 41 individuals including Chinese educators who organize those activities and students who participated in or assisted in these events.

In Malaysia, it is very common to see this kind of teacher award and ceremony. Non-government teacher organizations annually organize teacher award ceremonies.

In the event photo, you can see Chinese teachers receiving awards with children presenting flowers as a symbol of recognition for their crucial role in preserving Chinese education in Malaysia. This ceremony categorizes the Chinese teacher politically, highlighting their contributions and sacrifices often at a personal cost.



Additionally, Chinese educators collaborate with Chinese news media, organizing various campaigns, supplementary mentoring classes and establishing online platforms to provide free Mandarin exams, resources, and materials. They want to boost students' confidence and feeling in taking the Mandarin exams. The Chinese news media in Malaysia also produce a series of life stories as public narratives. They portray Mandarin teaching as a joyful, respectful, and meaningful job.

One of my informants, Teacher Lim, is an awarded Mandarin teacher. She told me that the teacher award in fact was not recognized by her Malay School principal in the workplace. Additionally, the Malay principal always subtly advises Teacher Lim not to promote Mandarin examination among Chinese students due to the worries about passing rates. Moreover, the Malay principal also often disapproves of teacher Lim's organizing Chinese cultural activities in public schools. Faced with limited school funding, Teacher Lim had to personally secure funds for those Chinese cultural events. Some of the Mandarin teachers I have interviewed are arranging for early retirement because the workplace immersed with bureaucratic racism makes them overburdened yet unrecognized.

It is apparent that the assimilationist policy reduces the time allocated for Man-



darin courses and limits opportunities for exposure to Chinese culture. Therefore, Chinese educators organize Chinese Culture Online Camps outside the school to cultivate ethnic identity and habitus among those Chinese students. The Chinese Culture Online Camp aims to transform the attitudes of Chinese students that they are trying to foster love for Chinese culture and ultimately, eliminating the tendency to give up learning and taking exams in Mandarin. On the photo, you can see they creatively integrated the ancient culture of China into the online camp activities.

One of the activities in the Chinese Culture Online Camp is an online tour of global China towns and this China tour guides students through seeing how the global Chinese diaspora responds to assimilationist policies in different countries and their endeavor to preserve Chinese language education and ethnic identity. Interestingly, the final stop in the online tour brings students to Kuala Lumpur, which is the capital city of Malaysia. However the tour guide emphasized to the Chinese students that Malaysia should not be referred to as having a Chinatown. We do not have a Chinatown in Malaysia. The distinction is drawn because in Malaysia, the term Chinatown typically denotes immigrant enclaves. Various Malaysian Chinese are seeing themselves as citizens who contributed to Malaysia's independence so Malaysians are not immigrants, they are citizens who helped the Malaysian independence from the British colonial government. By seeing the experiences of the global Chinese diaspora, this online tool aims to cultivate a sense of oppositional consciousness among Chinese students.

The Chinese educators also consistently encourage Chinese students to take Mandarin exams whenever they have a chance to say anything to the students in the activities. They convey to students that the world is undergoing significant transformations and with the rise of China, Mandarin is set to become a global linguistic capital in the future, as expressed by Pi Xu-Chen. She said, "Look further. We sense the world is changing. We know it's changing but why give up taking Mandarin examinations? Why give up something that could bring in tons of opportunities in

future? You are clearly seeing that our world is changing. So how do you know you won't end up working for a Chinese company later? And if all that goes down, I can guarantee people will be asking about your Mandarin speaking and writing skills, and the Mandarin examination is the basic starting point no doubt.

In conclusion, this research contributes to existing literature in three aspects. Firstly, I show that the role of Chinese Educators in Malaysia has been politicized. They engage in emotional work as pragmatic resistance both inside and outside classrooms. Also, they blur the boundaries between state actors and non-state actors. Secondly, I illustrate that Chinese educators in public schools often grapple with a sense of overwhelming responsibility. But their efforts remain unrecognized symbolically by the assimilationist state bureaucracy. Lastly, by applying the concept of pragmatic resistance and illuminate a dynamic, interwoven, yet contentious relationship between the state and society. Moving beyond the binary model of state and society, and situating the case of the Mandarin problem in a changing geopolitical context. Thank you for listening.

# Toward “a Caring World?”: Exploring the Logic of Japan’s Humanitarian and Emergency Assistance

WU Zihan University of Tokyo



Hi everyone, I am a fourth year PhD student and before I proceed to the discussion about Japan’s disaster assistance, I would like to quickly introduce the “aid philosophy” of Japan’s broader and more general Official Development Assistance (ODA). The underlying motives of Japan’s ODA is always heavily debated. In general, current literature summarizes Japan’s rationale behind foreign aid under three motives. The first is a strategic, which emphasizes the pursuit of national interest and a better position in the international hierarchy. The second is economic, which emphasizes the economic and business interest for Japan. The third is a humanitarian rationale but this stance has always been challenged by Western scholars, saying this is not the main motive behind Japan’s official development aid. Most of the scholars agree that strategic and economic concerns are the main motives. But here, my question is: What about international disaster assistance? When we think about international disasters, we naturally hope there will be more humanitarian elements in it. According to the stipulations in Japan’s national security strategy, Japan will share the lessons learned and experiences from the many natural disasters that it has experienced and there are three rules of provision. Firstly, aid should always focus on major disasters. Secondly, aid should be request-based, which means the request should be made by the disaster-affected country or an NGO. Finally, the actor is a Japanese government and for anyone who probably does not know about Japan’s

emergency humanitarian aid, there are three types. First are the people, dispatch of Japanese disaster relief team experts. The second type is goods, or the provision of emergency relief goods. The third is money, the provision of emergency grant aid.


After a reviewing the previous literature on the politics of humanitarian aid, and focusing on Japan's disaster aid, I identify three research gaps. The first gap is that most research tends to neglect the profound mechanism of international cooperation. The second gap is that most research focuses on exceptional disasters or very specific disasters, which means only one or two disasters. There is a lack of research on Japan in the 21st century. For my presentation today, I plan to answer three questions. Firstly, to what extent is Japan's disaster assistance motivated by humanitarian and strategic considerations? Secondly, what kind of humanitarian considerations? Lastly, are there any diachronic changes in the 20 years in the 21st century?

To answer these questions, I have a two-step measure. The first is data analysis, focusing on all emergency aid records identified through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) public data. The second is a document analysis focusing on ODA charters, ODA white papers, MOFA reference materials, and JICA's annual reports.


Before I talk about my research findings, I would like to briefly introduce a concept about the impact of a disaster, including three elements. The first one is a disaster event—a very devastating disaster event. The second is population exposure. For example, if a very devastating disaster happens right in the middle of the ocean, then the population exposure will probably be minimal. The element is vulnerability which focuses on the social economic infrastructure in one country or region which implies the ability to handle the disaster.

Now, I will talk about my research findings. I want to know here, for both pictures on this page and the next page, I excluded the eight projects related to the 2004 Southeast Asian earthquake and tsunami, as well as the 2020 to 2022 vaccination

programs which are related to the COVID. In this way, I can make the figure more readable and some trends more observable. This figure focuses on how many projects are there including all projects about the dispatch of people, experts, the provision of goods and money in general. As we can see here, Asia is evidently the focus. This is not surprising because Asia is always the focus of Japan. On the other hand, most disasters happen in Asia. Then we have Africa, the Middle East, and the Americas. By Americas, it mainly means Central American countries, the Central American Island countries. One interesting finding here is that there is an increasing importance of Oceanian countries and probably, this fact has been influenced by the initiative in 2009. The Proposal for Japan and Oceanian countries is that they are both islanders.



Regarding the type of disasters and aid projects, the most frequent type is humanitarian projects including the money and the relief goods provided for the relocation of refugees and providing necessary daily necessities and the recovery of a country or region. The rest are mostly types that are related to non-conflict natural disasters. But please remember this is only one phase of disaster assistance. If we review the data with a focus on money, the grant aid story will be quite different so most of the grant aid has been given to humanitarian projects, a much larger number than any other type of disasters. And here, the Middle Eastern countries absorb most of the grant aid almost every year. If we take a closer look at the data on emergency aid to foreign earthquakes to figure out more nuanced answers to the underlying concerns behind Japan's humanitarian emergency assistance.



During the data examination, I also compared Japan's aid with USAID. It is shown that in comparison with the United States, Japan's emergency aid is more strongly driven by humanitarian concerns. As you can see here, I highlighted in the table, both with colors and icons, these are the most devastating earthquakes in the 21st century. Almost all these earthquakes receive proper assistance.

### Case study: earthquakes

		Region	Decision	Allocation	Magnitude	Deaths	Affected	US OFDA	Declaration
2010	Haiti	Americas	○	2260	7	222570	3700000	○	
2005	Pakistan	Asia	○	2000	7.6	73338	5128309	○	
2023	Syria	Middle east	○	1750	7.8	4500	4108700	○	○
2015	Nepal	Asia	○	1400	7.8	8831	5639722	○	
2003	Iran	Middle east	○	1348	6.6	26796	267628	○	
2011	Turkey	Middle east	○	1000	7.1	604	32938	○	
2023	Turkey	Middle east	○	600	7.8	50096	9207204	○	○
2006	Indonesia	Asia	○	500	6.3	5778	3177923	○	
2008	China	Asia	○	427	7.9	87476	45976596	○	
2013	Philippines	Asia	○	350	7.1	230	3222224	○	
2021	Haiti	Americas	○	325	7.2	2575	702763	○	○
2022	Afghanistan	Asia	○	300	5.9	1036	364623	○	
2010	Chile	Americas	○	214	8.8	562	2671556	○	○
2023	Morocco	Africa	○	200	6.8	8	2497	○	○
2016	Ecuador	Americas	○	135	7.8	672	389364	○	
2007	Peru	Americas	○	130	8	593	658331	○	○
2016	Taiwan	Asia	○	120	6.4	117	525	○	
2012	Iran	Middle east	○	111	6.4	306	61546	○	
2010	China	Asia	○	110	6.9	2988	112000	○	
2015	Nepal	Asia	○	100	7.3	138	2428	○	
2010	Indonesia	Asia	○	50	7.8	530	11864	○	
2011	New Zealand	Oceania	○	50	6.1	181	301500	○	○
2007	Solomon	Oceania	○	50	8.1	52	2384	○	
2018	Indonesia	Asia	○		7.5	4140	2000000	○	○
2003	Algeria	Africa	○		6.8	2266	210261	○	
2005	India	Asia	×		7.6	1309	156622	○	
2005	Indonesia	Asia	×		8.6	915	105313	○	
2004	Morocco	Africa	○		6.4	628	13465	○	
2022	Indonesia	Asia	×		5.6	334	2204645	○	○
2016	Italy	Europe	×		6.2	296	4854	○	
2009	Italy	Europe	×		6.3	295	56000	○	○
2008	Pakistan	Asia	○		6.4	166	75320	○	
2009	Somca	Oceania	○		8.1	148	5584	○	
2018	Papua New Guinea	Oceania	○		7.5	145	544300	○	
2009	Indonesia	Asia	○		7	128	339792	○	
2021	Indonesia	Asia	×		6.2	110	100653	○	○
2016	Indonesia	Asia	○		6.5	104	86018	○	

However, I would argue that Japan's emergency aid is not devoid of strategic concerns. In the case when there is co-occurrence of other disasters, especially major disasters, there is a high possibility that Japan will squeeze money out from other disasters to focus on the major disasters. In this way, these highly visible aid projects might promote the international profile of Japan.

For example, after the 2004 Southeast Asian earthquake and tsunami, Japan cut down the budget of the vaccination program in Tajikistan to provide money for the earthquake and tsunami. And if we take an even closer look into the data, which project received more money or which project received the grandest aid, we will figure out that almost all these disasters are related to at least one significant global issue.

In argue that Japan's disaster assistance is influenced by both strategic and humanitarian concerns. The kind of strategic concerns here include the security interest or more generally, the kind of health security interest. For example, some projects are related to the Ebola outbreak in Africa. And the kind of strategic concerns related to international leadership and international reputation, especially for Japan, the country which is not that possible to use military forces. However, this kind of strategic concern is always moderated by the notion that Japan is a *heiwa kokka*, Japan is a peace-loving country. When there is a major disaster, Japan slightly fluctuates towards the direction of strategic concerns. However, when there are no major disasters, Japan fluctuates towards the direction of humanitarian concerns.

My last question here is what will be the direction of this kind of fluctuation between strategy and humanitarian concerns? Based on my analysis of ODA charters and white papers, I try to focus on the concept of "peace and prosperity," especially with the focus on the concept of peace.

In the 2023 ODA charter, it is stipulated Japan's commitment to contributing to the sustainable development of a free and open world. It is also written that a free

and open water directly leads to Japan's national interest. This change could be influenced by the current global power rivalry, including the rise of China, the trade war between China and the US, and the Russia-Ukraine war. If we go back to 2003 ODA charter comparatively, it's more fact-driven because if you investigate the details like humanitarian problems, extreme poverty, famine, refugee crisis, they are comparatively more facts. But if it is a free and open world, it's more value-driven, it's more like value.

This highlights the gap in Japan's approach, because if you still remember what I quote from Japan's national security strategy, Japan will share the lessons learned and experiences from the many natural disasters that it has experienced. But if we investigate whether it's the number of projects or the grant aid provided to the kind of project, there is a strong focus on humanitarian projects.

It can be argued that, other than this humanitarian and emergency aid, Japan is also providing official development aid to these countries for disaster prevention. However, this is beyond the scope of my presentation.

Now is the time for the conclusion of my presentation. I argue that there is an internalization of humanitarianism in Japan. But the notion of humanitarianism has a very profound connotation. For the right wing, it has a possibility to promote a better global profile for Japan. For the left wing, it has a possibility to promote overall well-being of the people. These reasons contribute to the widespread public support for aid. Humanitarian projects in Japan are not very controversial.

But I also argue that Japan's disaster assistance is fluctuating between humanitarian and strategic concerns. As we can see from my findings, there is more humanitarian aid than emergency aid. Luckily, the most visible disasters are those most devastating ones. So, this is the place where humanitarian strategic focuses converge. But there are still stealth disasters and forgotten wars. For example, from 2021 to



2022, the forgotten civil war in Ethiopia.

Lastly, the future of Japan's disaster assistance with the new ODA charter. I argue that there is a possibility of an exacerbation of the dual suffocation due to both the visibility of disasters in media coverage and the visibility of disaster assistance. As a final concluding remark, I quote from Jeremy Adelman a professor from Princeton University, "dealing with strangers, it is not only because they have needs, but also because we have need for them." This concludes my presentation. Thank you.

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# Feeding the People Well: The Case of Mitten Crab Aquaculture in China, 1960s - 1990s

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When you first see this picture, what comes to mind? Is it a new kind of oil platform or perhaps a secret research base at sea? Clearly, it has something to do with the three individuals standing over here. The words on their uniform read *wǔ chuán* 「武船」 in simplified Chinese, indicating that the individuals are from the mainland China. Is it a new Chinese weapon? Surprisingly, or unsurprisingly, it is none of the above. This giant yellow, 6-foot cage is called the *Ocean Farm One*. It is built by the China Ship making Industry Corporation and is to be delivered to its client in Norway, namely the Norwegian company is Salmar. It is the second largest producer of salmon in the world.

You may wonder by this moment, since when has China the engineering power to partner with the World's top-notch salmon producer? To answer this question, we need to first ask: What is aquaculture to China? In today's presentation, I want to guide you towards this rarely talked about history of the People's Republic of China (PRC)—its aquaculture sector during and after the Mao era. Aquaculture refers to the farming of aquatic animals and plants in all types of water, and the resulting product is called seafood. Today, more than half of the seafood on your plate is likely farmed rather than caught in the wild. From 1990 to 2008, global aquaculture production increased 527 percent, making it the fastest-growing industry in the world.

Since 1992, China has produced more farmed aquatic food than the rest of the world combined. It is the biggest producer and exporter and the third-largest consumer of seafood globally, all achieved within a matter of four decades.

At this stage it is fair to ask: How did China's aquaculture sector come to be? More specifically, for this presentation, why the prioritize aquaculture over catch fisheries? I'm doing this presentation mainly to understand more about China's shifting roles and enduring legacies, especially when the future source of state and nutritious food is becoming a global concern.

I investigated the literature, and it makes it clear that it is difficult to find writings directly related to my topic, so I resorted to environmental and agrarian history works. It is not surprising that the history of the early years of PRC is often viewed as a negative lesson. One of the most prominent writers on this topic is Professor Judith Shapiro who famously argued that the abuse of people and nature are often interrelated and Maoism rejected both Chinese tradition and modern Western science. However, I found more academic scholarship in Professor Sigrid Schmalzer's work. She argues that both radicals and technocrats embraced science as a core value back in the Mao era and there were striking similarities with the US in terms of research and extension systems. She further argues that the post-Mao era's so-called agriculture miracle doesn't look quite confined to the post-Mao era. I certainly agree with her aim of rescuing the diverse and meaningful Mao experiences of scientific farming from historical erasure.

In the second half of this presentation, I'll use the farming of Chinese meat and crop as a case study to illustrate how China's aquaculture sector developed in the second half of the 20th century. I chose the Chinese mitten crab for several reasons. Firstly, I like to eat it; it is an obvious reason. I find it fascinating because in China, it is considered as a high-value aquatic food and in other Chinese speaking worlds such as Taiwan and Malaysia. But in other countries such as the United States or

UK, it's considered an invasive species. Chinese mitten crab is also featured in a very rare case of knowledge transfer from the mainland to Taiwan. Usually, it is the other way around. We are at the receiving end of technology transfer but it is different in terms of aquacultural products.

The Chinese mitten crab has a unique migrating lifestyle, moving between freshwater and saltwater environments. Their life starts as eggs in the sea which hatch and go through several stages of larva when they transform into juvenile crabs, which is more recognizable to us. They start to migrate upstream to freshwater lakes and rivers and reach maturity there. During the lunar calendar month from September even as late as December, they feel the urge to migrate back to the sea to mate and spawn their next generation. It is also during this second migration that they get harvested by the fishermen. Today, almost all Chinese mitten crabs sold in the market are raised on farms.

Now, I would like to walk you through some of the important moments both in the history of fisheries and aquaculture in general, and the farming of the specific species. It is worth mentioning that as early as 1958, China has made up its mind to develop aquaculture. Former deputy minister of the Ministry of Fisheries Gao Wenhua, published an article titled "The Battle over Aquaculture and Catch Fisheries" in one of the Communist Party mouthpiece journals, *The Red Flag*. Interestingly, aquaculture and catch fisheries were viewed by Gao Wenhua as two different political lines where aquaculture needed to rely on the mass power of the people. Catch fisheries were viewed as part of capitalist country's imperial expansion which also required the state to take control in building the ships, processing equipment, and storage facilities. Gao Wenhua also made it very clear that catch fisheries are more often promoted by the people who studied in capitalist countries. He concluded that aquaculture is the right way to go because Chinese people have a long history and wide practices of small-scale fish farming. Fish was envisioned in the 1960s as a cheap and potentially important source of protein to enhance the people's physical

strength as is made very clear in this people's daily article "Called catch more fish, eat more fish." In the 1960s, the population of the Chinese mitten crab declined drastically due to dam building which didn't leave a tunnel for the mitten crabs to migrate. The mitten crab stock enhancement research also started at this stage. During this time, crab farming mainly took the form of transportation of juvenile crabs from their hometown Yangtze River delta to more inland water bodies.

In the 1970s, more than twenty provinces transported juvenile crabs to their own water bodies and harvested outside its natural habitats. But something very significant happened during the 1970s. The aquatic resource was faced with a depletion in the late 1970s. The state clearly recognized this as a problem. On October 18, 1978, the People's Daily published an editorial titled, "Do everything possible to solve the problem of eating fish." In this article, the author criticized land reclamation, which means filling lakes and water bodies with boulders and earth to create an arable land, to produce what the state considered as the most important strategic products, the grains. They also criticized the hydraulic products which ignored aquatic animals' migrating habits.

The 1980s and 1990s witnessed the major scientific breakthroughs related to aquaculture, specifically the Chinese mitten crab aquaculture. In 1981 and 1985, several scientists got awarded for their breeding work, for the successful breeding of Chinese mitten crabs in their laboratories. By the early 1990s, the state considered the eating fish problem properly solved. As is also obvious in the previous statistics, by 1992 China has produced more fish products than the world combined. The social and ecological consequences of this development is also obvious.

This is the screenshot of China's Central television. They made a video in China's Xinjiang province and interviewed the people who raised the crabs in Xinjiang. This person being interviewed said that before we started to cultivate crabs in Xinjiang, we were quite afraid of this stuff. We thought it was water spiders. Chinese mit-

ten crab was farmed, firstly in Xinjiang as early as the 1980s. The specific place that this interview was carried out was only 50 kilometers away from the point farthest from any ocean on earth. This is a picture of Professor Wang Chun from Shanghai Ocean University receiving an honorary County Citizen Certificate from the former Taiwanese Miaoli County Magistrate Liu Cheng-hung because of his dedicated work to help Miaoli people cultivate their own Chinese mitten crabs since 2012.



Source: <https://tv.cctv.com/2019/09/30/VIDEaADRmMTUzjv8adcNqLp9190930.shtml>

So far, it is still difficult to make any definite conclusions but here are some concluding thoughts. Overall, the Chinese state favored aquaculture over catch fisheries as early as the late 1950s. It also emphasized the importance of environmental conservation for sustainable catch fisheries. The state later viewed eating fish difficulties as caused by unwished-for practices under extreme political and ideological influences. Mainly, they blamed the Gang of Four in a lot of the articles I found in the People's Daily. The state solution to the problem included correcting the wrong ideas and practices, including land reclamation, an overly controlled market, and breakthroughs in science and technology such as breeding, ship building, and cold chain facilities. And next, environmental preservation, cooperation with international organizations such as the United States Food and Agriculture Organization. I didn't include much evidence about this part but China began to help train aquaculture technicians from Southeast Asian countries since 1980 and these trained technicians

returned to their separate countries in Southeast Asia and continue to work with Chinese technologies in aquaculture. These factors combined help shape China's aquaculture sector which didn't just rise suddenly out of nowhere after the 1978 reform, but can be traced back to the earlier often ignored years of the PRC. Thank you. That will be the end of my presentation.

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# Redefining Peoplehood: The Logic of National Boundary and its Social Effects

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Good afternoon, everyone. I am Liang-Yu, an MA student from National Taiwan University (NTU). The subject I would like to share today is “Redefining peoplehood: the logic of national boundaries and its social effect.” In a highly globalized era, the topic of peoplehood never ceases, especially in multi-racial societies around the world. It often becomes the most important topic in politics and society. For example, on the left side is the National Front in France and they call for the prioritization of native French. In the middle, in Malaysia, the Islamic party is gained a greater voice in the last regional elections and called for ethno-culturalism, which erodes the multiracial society. Last month in the US, Donald Trump said that illegal immigration is poisoning the blood of their nation in his new campaign.

Among these discourses, the national boundary is always the core concept from which controversies arise. First, what is a national boundary? The definition of “social boundary” is to bring a social group into existence; individuals draw a line to distinguish “us” from “them.” In this context, a nation is always a significant collective identity and boundary. Even in the highly globalized era, the nation remains the most significant political boundary and can barely be replaced. Nation-states often originate from ethnicity and carry an imagination or a demand for sameness, such as language, ancestry, or culture, which easily arouses people’s affection. Furthermore,

national boundaries imply a relationship not only between people but also between an individual and a symbolic collective entity. As Bloemraad and Bonikowski et al. (2016) suggest, nationalism includes narratives about the nation's characters, salient symbols, or established traditions. That is, national boundaries not only mean the membership of the nation, but also relate to who shares the sense of the symbolic collectivity. And as mentioned previously, nation-states originate from ethnicity and culture. However, the increasing complexity of population mobility, global political condition, and economic dynamics continue to redefine the concept of peoplehood. For example, the rise of the right-wing populist movements such as the AfD in Germany or the National Front in France, or even Trumpism, challenges the more liberal or so-called civic way of national boundaries. The debate over ethnic and civic national boundaries has endured for decades and the recent events just put it into the public stage. The two kinds of boundaries—the ethnic one, which means a more fixed and exclusionary criteria, such as cultural, linguistic, or religious elements, and the civic one, which from the standpoint of civic boundaries, identity can be built on creedal or ideological foundations, such as the mutual belief in freedom, loyalty to the democratic system—have left a large gray zone. For example, residency is seen as neither an ethnic or a civic criterion for national membership. On the other hand, requiring immigrants to learn the official language can be viewed as either reinforcing the ethnic concept or helping immigrants to adapt to the new culture. In the survey, respondents were asked how important they think each of the following criteria is to be truly a member of the same nation. It includes being born in the same country, having citizenship, living in the country for most of one's life, or being able to speak the same language, sharing the same religion, respecting the country's political institutions and laws, feeling the nationality or to having the same ancestry. So, these are quite different and multi-dimension of the criteria of national membership.

## Measure: National Boundary


Q. 2. Some people say that the following things are important for being truly [NATIONALITY]<sup>1</sup>. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is... (Please, check one box on each line)

		Very important	Fairly important	Not very important	Not important at all	Can't choose
<b>Born</b>	a. to have been born in [COUNTRY]	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	b. to have [COUNTRY NATIONALITY] citizenship	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Citizenship</b>	c. to have lived in [COUNTRY] for most of one's life	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	d. to be able to speak [COUNTRY LANGUAGE]	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Residency</b>	e. to be a [religion]	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	f. to respect [COUNTRY NATIONALITY] political institutions and laws	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Language</b>	g. to feel [COUNTRY NATIONALITY]	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	h. to have [COUNTRY NATIONALITY] ancestry	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Religion</b>						
<b>Respectlaw</b>						
<b>Feel</b>						
<b>Ancestry</b>						


However, it is quite hard to directly separate these criteria into binary categories of ethnic or civic one. To clarify the concept of people's perception of national boundaries, I utilize latent class analysis model in my paper to examine the answering patterns of these respondents. The data I used is from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) and I retained 40,000 respondents from 28 countries. As mentioned previously, I utilize the LCA model in my first analysis. The LCA or the Latent Class Analysis is based on the belief that there are groups in our population that behave differently but it is unobserved. Thus, the model enables us to discern potential groups by their responses to specific questions. It tries to fit the observed response pattern Y in the formula by assigning respondents into different classes X. We can assign the numbers of the classes we want to analyze. Bonikowski (2016) once employed the LCA model to analyze and classify Americans into four national-ist groups. Building on their work, I also created a four-group LCA model using the eight national boundary questions I mentioned above.

This is the result. The figure shows the predictive margin of the probability each group answering the eight questions, whether they support or not support the the claim of the question.


We can see that the first group, represented by the red group, I call them the Ardent Group. ‘Ardent’ means very enthusiastic or showing strong feelings about something. We can see that all criteria of boundary drawings are considered important for this group. People with an ethnic view such as having the same ancestry or to be born in the same place, and they also consider civic criteria important such as respecting the same country’s laws and institutions.




The next group, represented by the yellow color, I call them the Creedal group. ‘Creedal’ means a set of principles, and in this context, it means believing in the nation’s system of principles. They are the ideal civic nationalism who draws the boundaries based on the belief in acquired principles such as having the same citizenship, speaking the same languages, and respecting the same laws.



The third group, represented by green color, I call them Liminal Group. ‘Liminal’ means a position on the boundary or threshold, often indicating a transitional stage. I call them liminal because they have a mixed or evolving view of national boundaries from the red to yellow, or from yellow to red. In the more ethnic criteria, such as the four criteria on the left side, you can see that they place less importance on some laws of blood criteria, such as having the same ancestry. But they seem to consider the law of the soil criteria important; they think living in the same country or same territory for their long life is quite important.




Lastly, the blue group which I call the Disengaged Group. They demonstrate the least amount of concern in almost all criteria. However, they could be seen as the less engaged Creedal individuals, since they still recognize some civic criteria important.



We can focus on the age criteria. We see that it can roughly be distinguished into an ethnic and civic way to draw the boundaries on the left side and right side. However, there are still some nuances such as the difference between the law of blood and the law of soil. On the right side, some cultural and affectionate criteria such as feeling the same nationality or speaking the same languages is supported by the Creedal or Civic Group since it is not determined when someone was born. What civic nationalism means might be whether it is acquirable but not if it is rational or institutional.

It is quite interesting to present the different composition of the four groups by countries. I especially point out the three countries in East Asia on the right side. We can see that in Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea, most people are in the Liminal group, comprising 50% of the respondents. However, the proportion of the Creedal group and Ardent group varies. We can see that in Taiwan, the Creedal group is much larger than the Ardent group. On the contrary, in South Korea, the Ardent group has 40% of the respondents and it's much more than the Creedal group, In Japan, the Disengaged group, Creedal group, and Ardent group are all the same at 20 percent.



In the second part of my paper, I would like to discuss the social effects of national boundaries. Based on the framework, I argue that people with different emphasis on peoplehood will affect their attitudes and behaviors in the social world. For example, during the 2016 US election, Trump’s supporters’ exclusionary way to draw the national boundaries led them to the support of anti-immigrant policies and the ethnical patriotism. So how do the different perceptions of national boundaries lead to people’s various opinions and behavior in the social world?

Based on the several views of nationalism and citizenship theory I mentioned above, I argue that how people recognize their peoplehood may underlie these three logics. The first is the boundary drawing. Peoplehood is a distinction between “us” and “them” in social interaction. Some people might think that the national boundary or peoplehood is a kind of affection that is determined by who share the same sense toward the nation. The third one is quite rational and some people might think that

peoplehood is those who have the same political rights and responsibility. So, they share the same rights with the state. Individuals with different views of boundary criteria might acknowledge peoplehood in different way based on these three logics. I pointed out three kinds of public opinion and social behavior that might be affected by people's perception of national boundaries. For example, those who might view peoplehood as a political right might emphasize the state's political role and have a higher political participation, such as voting or engaging in public affairs. On the other hand, those who view peoplehood as a shared sense might emphasize more on the state's characteristic to unite people's feelings and affection.

I used the four latent classes from my first part of analysis to see whether they present differently in social behavior or whole have different political opinions. On the right, these are the questions answered by the respondents. For the participation, they asked: "Did you vote in the last national elections?" For the patriotism one, they asked: "How much do you agree or disagree that strong patriotic feelings are needed for a country to be united? For the immigrants' policies, they asked if legal immigrants who are not citizens should have the same right or should have equal access to public education.

These are my hypotheses. Firstly, regarding the immigration policy, I argue that Creedal identity and disengaged people consider a more inclusive way of boundary drawings, thus, might show a greater support for immigrants' rights. Conversely, the Ardent and Liminal group people may find it challenging to view immigrants from the different homeland as companions, so they will have a more exclusive view of the policy.

For patriotism necessity, because right-wing populism often aligns with the Ardent view of national boundaries, tends to exhibit a higher view of national hubris. In contrast, the Disengaged people might think patriotism to be least necessary is quite intuitive. But in the middle, we can see that the Creedal group, according to



the theory, they share the same belongingness because they believe in the political institution. I assume that they consider patriotism to be more important than the Disengaged group.

Finally, for the political participation, because Ardent, Liminal, and Creedal groups think that the civic criteria are important, I assume they may place equal importance on the rational and normative relationship with with the state so they may have a higher political participation rate. In this part, I utilize state fixed-effect model. In this model, the  $D$  denotes the treatment which is the four latent classes, and the  $X$  means the observable confounders. The most important is the  $A$ , which denotes some state-determined unobserved covariates such as different political institutions or the national policies or some cultural and geographic factors. Because they will strongly affect people's societal opinion and behavior. By fixed effect, it can strengthen the causal relationship between how people draw the boundary and their social behavior and opinions.


This is the result of the regression model. We can use the predictive margin plot which is more convenient to interpret. We can see that on opinion on immigrants' policies, the disengaged group people and Creedal express more agreement on providing legal immigrants the same rights. However, the Creedal group even shows a more tolerant attitude toward treating immigrants equally. For patriotism, it confirmed our hypothesis that the Ardent group agrees more on patriotism. However, it shows the interval gap between the four national boundaries, so we can say that the more criteria, individual cares about, maybe they will have more to believe in patriotism. The last is political participation which aligns with our hypothesis that the three groups place importance on the political rights and obligations. We can see that most of the hypotheses are supported but with some nuances.

## Result 2: Social Effects of NB

	(1)		(2)		(3)	
	Opinion on Immigrants Policies		Opinion on Patriotism Necessity		Political participation	
	m1	m2	m3	m4	m5	m6
Disengaged	0.182*** (0.02)	0.170*** (0.02)	-0.588*** (0.02)	-0.588*** (0.02)	-0.492*** (0.05)	-0.357*** (0.06)
Creedal	0.318*** (0.01)	0.298*** (0.01)	-0.315*** (0.02)	-0.236*** (0.02)	0.210*** (0.05)	0.087 (0.05)
Ardent	-0.099*** (0.01)	-0.017 (0.02)	0.283*** (0.01)	0.181*** (0.01)	0.026 (0.04)	0.041 (0.05)
State Fixed-effect		Yes		Yes		Yes
Female		Yes		Yes***		Yes
Age		Yes		Yes		Yes***
Education		Yes***		Yes***		Yes***
Religion		Yes***		Yes***		Yes***
Residency		Yes***		Yes***		Yes***
Constant	3.380*** (0.01)	3.303*** (0.04)	3.744*** (0.01)	3.753*** (0.04)	1.421*** (0.03)	0.729** (0.24)
R <sup>2</sup> / Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.02852	0.1042	0.07921	0.1888	0.0051	0.1243
n	39739	37951	39430	37702	36607	35104

Table 2. Models Estimating the Relationship between national boundary perception and its social effect

## Result 2: Social Effects of NB



In summary, in the first part, I used the LCA model to explore the details of how people recognize boundaries criteria and how it shapes their notion of national identity. In the second part, I used the state-fixed effect to test how the way people draw the boundaries truly affect their opinion toward policies and social behavior. In my work, I argue that the three underlying logics of national boundaries or the so-called peoplehood. However, it still lacks the mechanism of how these three logics

are perceived and how they relate to the emphasis of social behavior. I believe this deserves further investigation in future work. Okay, thank you, everyone.

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# Concluding Session

SONODA Shigeto & SU Kuo-Hsien

## **Professor SU, Kuo-Hsien, National Taiwan University**

This concludes our whole-day workshop. Professor Sonoda and I will deliver the final concluding remarks.

I just want to repeat: we are grateful that we have Professor Sonoda to host this workshop. I learned that this workshop started in 2012. If we deduct the two years of COVID, then it has been 10 years. So, each year, we have 15 or maybe 20 students. Earlier, we had a larger group. After 10 years, we probably have almost approached 200 students participating in this workshop. I often wonder how many of these participants grew from a young scholar to become a mature scholar. We must do a survey. In the beginning, when we start to do this, we coerced by, just like Luong's study, the university ranking required the university to have this exchange program, so we were all tasked at that time to do something to meet the Key Performance Index (KPI) of the University. But I was surprised because years later, when we all stepped down as administrators, Professor Sonoda kept going and wanted to continue this workshop. I was dragging along and then I was forced, coerced by Professor Sonoda. But I come to think of Miwa's presentation, who did the study on the long work hours of teachers. This kind of a task is not considered a regular part of the job, it's extra work. For us, there is no incentive to organize this activity because the department is not supportive as well.

I am not sure because all these years, it is all that the Professor organized and hosted by himself. I was not reluctant but forced to collaborate with Professor Sonoda. But when I reflect why I am doing this, what kind of motive behind, I gradually realized that it is to see students grow through this kind of a workshop is actually

very rewarding. Although it is only a one-day or two-day workshop, but it is really a great lead forward for someone to start the academic career because I see student prepare for their presentation, and for a long time, they prepare for three or four months, and even though this is only 20 minutes presentation, they grow and progress dramatically. It is rewarding and I saw students have a nice, very good, positive outcome out of this international experience, so we keep doing it. We will soon retire so we want to hand it over to the other faculty. But it is difficult so you should consider yourself very lucky that you could have this workshop. It is easy to go to the big conferences but you do not get this kind of very intensive interaction within and among the colleagues. I think this is a real opportunity that only happens between Todai and NTU, very selective universities. I want to thank all my colleagues who commit and help voluntarily without any reward, especially to Professor Sonada who has been very persistent in promoting this kind of exchange and help our students to grow from young scholars to become professional scholars.

### **Professor SONODA Shigeto, The University of Tokyo**

I have to reflect back what were incentives or to put it definitely, motives to continue this kind of meeting. Probably, the biggest motive is my strong continuing frustration to the students of U Tokyo for a long time. It is a long history but when I started to study about China and Asian societies from a sociological perspective, my classmates at the Department of Sociology at the University Tokyo simply did not know why I'm doing that kind of research. You are studying sociology and you are using a foreign language like English, German, or whatever. But why you are studying Taiwan or China, doing comparative studies of Asian societies? Recently, it's quite rare for me to see or hear such criticisms but I still remember when I was in my 20s, almost every sociologist did not know why I am doing this. But once I came to study some Asian societies out of Japan, then naturally, I became more interested in knowing other countries to reflect Japan. Looking at other societies provides us a good mirror to reflect what our society looks like. Simply put, I got a lot of sociological imagination through this kind of exchange with my colleagues in Taiwan, as

well as in the world in the global sociological community. But somehow, reflecting the history of Japanese society, interestingly, after World War II, the nature of sociology in Japan became Japan Study rather than sociological research. It is said that sociology doesn't have any nationality, or the target of analysis. But somehow, almost everyone in Japan took it for granted to study something about Japanese society through the analytical lens of sociology. But if you reflect, the history of Japanese sociology, nothing happened. No scholars in Japan analyzed Japanese society in 1910s. They just introduced sociological theories or sociological inquiry as a part of social philosophy without analyzing Japanese society at that time. But after World War II, Japanese sociology became a part of Japanese studies. I was critical about this. To enrich sociological knowledge, we must know a lot of societies. But no scholars of sociology tried to promote such cultural educational exchanges in Japan. So that is the source of my motive and I am keeping that incentive until now.

But I am always encouraged by the students of the University of Tokyo. In the initial stage, they say, why do I have to use English? And that is one of the reasons why I can see no student from the Department of Sociology but all four students are from Komaba, a different campus. They understand the importance of using foreign languages to make the network more extensive and international. So I am very happy to have the students but at the same time, I really want to see the students' growth, which eventually gives me energy to develop. So I have been doing these kinds of things for a long time to see the growth and development of the students. University of Tokyo students, I am giving you pressure to develop. Otherwise, my intention will not be rewarded. But anyway, whenever I have colleagues from Taiwan or other parts of Asia, I am simply inspired by why such things are happening. For example, I am now interested in intergenerational differences in terms of the perception of China in Japan. There is a huge gap. Youngsters have a more positive image but the older generations have a very negative image toward China. Japanese scholars in China studies take it for granted that such a phenomenon is quite understandable. But if you try to compare Japan with Taiwan, we can see a different picture. Then, do we realize that

just understanding the Japanese situation is not enough to create some sociological understanding of what is happening about the perceptions toward China. So again, referencing neighboring countries or other parts of Asia will give us a very good insight to think of what to do to enrich sociological attempts. I really want our student to enjoy this kind of stimulus. But of course, getting stimulus is sometimes very hard.

We can sometimes enjoy this kind of stimulus but sometimes you might find it very hard to receive a criticism. Sometimes you receive unexpected critical comments, difficult questions might be raised by the floor, including me. I am intentionally playing this kind of part, but anyway, I really want you to learn something from this participation in this workshop. Taiwan is a very small society and they have a lot of push factors to let the students go abroad, which might be regarded as a negative aspect of Taiwan. But seen from Japan, Taiwan has a lot of potential to learn about sociology, gaining perspective from abroad. I think both parties, probably the Taiwan delegates might think that Japan is very prestigious because we can reproduce sociologists internally without letting our students go abroad to get PhD. You might think Japan is much better than Taiwan. But it seems from me that you are at an advantageous position because you have many networks individually as well as institutionally. Both parties can learn a lot, and can gain benefits from this kind of exchange.

I'm afraid I have spoken too much. I would like to hear the students' voices before closing this session to go to the Italian restaurant to enjoy dinner.

#### **WU Zihan, The University of Tokyo (D4)**

I always feel happy to attend different kinds of workshops and this is really one of the main motives. I push forward my doctorate thesis, otherwise, I feel very reluctant to write. Instead, I am always just reading. I am really inspired by all the presentations here because it is a nice chance to learn about different topics, different research methods, and different research philosophies. I feel like everyone here received very helpful comments so I feel it is really a good day today.



**WANG Wei-Chun, National Taiwan University (M1)**

It is technically my first year in my MA program and I enjoy every time there is an opportunity to present and have some feedback and can revise our thoughts. First, I am very grateful for this opportunity. I just hope this will continue to be held for the younger students, not only for the people who want to participate in this academic activity, but for all students. Because I think it is a great opportunity to know different societies or different topics.

**ZHAO Xinshu, The University of Tokyo (D4)**

I think I enjoyed today's discussions more than what I expected. Because among a group of sociologists, I seem to be a little bit out of place because my research is more historical in nature. But I think it is eventually very good exercise to articulate our ideas in front of an educated audience. It is very challenging but very good, very healthy pressure for me personally. In order to prepare for this presentation, I really learned how to manage my stress. I found a very effective way of breathing, especially for those who suffer speech stress for a long time. So it goes like this, you breathe and then before you exhale, you breathe again to fill your lungs. And then, exhale all the air, all the carbon dioxide. It is probably the source of pressure carbon dioxide. So do this three times and you will feel much better. That is what I have learned in preparing for this symposium. Thank you for organizing this event.

**Professor SONODA Shigeto, The University of Tokyo**

I must tell you that the participants from UTokyo are my regular attendees of the zemi meetings but the rest four presenters are the ones who took my course offered at the Department of Sociology, not at the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences in Komaba. But after hearing the reasons why they want to take the course, most of them said they want to get an opportunity to present their paper in English. I want to hear Matsui's ideas because you said that the reason for you approaching me was because you wanted to get the opportunity to speak English, to let your research be

known by someone else.

**MATSUI Takumi, The University of Tokyo (D1)**

Thank you, everybody. This is my first experience presenting my research in English in public. I was very exhausted but it is very fun to listen to everybody's presentation. It is very good for me to share my research with people who do not share my research context, social context, or historical context, and not similar with my research theme. Using English was also a very good experience for me and I hope I will visit Taiwan next year.

**Professor SONODA Shigeto, The University of Tokyo**

I am sorry I don't have any classes next year but I will personally try to find someone who will be going to Taiwan with me. Lung-Ta, probably you must be the oldest participant in this workshop.

**WEI Lung-Ta, National Taiwan University (D7)**

I wanted to participate in this workshop because I have focused on Korea too much. Before, I had many chances to study in Korea. I stayed there for maybe a year once. Even though I studied Japanese language, my reading ability is very limited. So I try to participate in this workshop to gain motivation to study Japanese language and Japanese history again. So this workshop was very helpful for me. I really want to learn more from Japanese scholars and I really enjoyed this workshop. Thank you.

**CHEN Yu-Tung, National Taiwan University (B4)**

Thank you. I am very glad I could participate in this lively conference. It is my second time to participate in this workshop, and these two times, I felt I learned many things. Because the members are very diverse, I can learn many things I have not learned before. I can learn something about Japan and Asia. After the presentation, we discussed, and in the discussion session after the break, we could interact with each other and learn many things. I feel very happy to attend this workshop.

### **Professor SONODA Shigeto, The University of Tokyo**

As you know, we have only one undergrad student both from National Taiwan University and the University of Tokyo. But I do think that undergraduate students are always giving great stress to postgraduate students by asking. “Oh, are you really a postgraduate student? I can do this one too. How come you can say your research is much better than mine?” Okay, I will ask you to speak, Kawato, as the final speaker.

### **KAWATO Kentaro, The University of Tokyo (B4)**

What I want to say has already been said by everyone. But I want to emphasize that this kind of opportunity is very limited, especially for undergraduate students, especially presenting in front of master students, PhD students, and professors. This is a good opportunity but also scarce for students. It's also in English so I am very happy to have attended this conference because it's going to be of big help to my future career. I feel confident in presenting or in doing research. To sum it up, thank you for everyone and thank you for having me, professors. Thank you for organizing this event.

### **Professor SONODA Shigeto, The University of Tokyo**

Thank you. I would like to close the session now.



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